Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

Daniel A. Miller and David Kimball substituted as
parties ) plaintiff in the place of REPUBLIC )
CAPITAL BANK, F.S.B., formerly ) known as
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND } LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF ) WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin
corporation v. Martineau & Company : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce J. Nelson; Russell G. Workman; Nelson, Rasmussen and Christensen; Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant.
Mark R. Gaylord; Suitter Axland; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Miller and Kimball v. Martineau & Company, No. 980240 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1523

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

•

APPEALS

TAH COL

r 'inn

i rn T rr

iworr

1 r ^ir

I IMP M I lnih"tituM r r u n "
|l||||||lll III ill! |)||U Ml ls| I I ' M |(
"

rn

h

i

i

i

i LULL]

n rni'i \< ' * < irn < n i n

I

N

•HI Mill V

I l MM 4 > >l M M l ll IM I l|
l j ^ -1 L l l I, a i ioL JU in L j i | oiali iij,

|Jriiinli I^II

iJi li ml ml

16

mil t|)|ii II,ml

I.Ml M i l

" 'lOIII (III

J IIIIII

I l l l l l l .llllllt l,ll I )l -.11 II I ( Mill I III

rn 1 TT

n r

l r N

I,T

Ull Luke County,
iqt Court Judge

rakllord, L^q

IIWXLAND
Plaintiffs/Appellees
ffestTemple, Suite 700
l i k TTtah 84101
LllKU I I III Uil I l|
v
ll r ^ 1
l |
NM i< >N H ^ M H ^ h M * i M I T I M>. I M
tlluiiu y Un I U l< ml ml t|i|u II mi
I I r

(

' i l l I il

|

I

i il

(

p

r|

p

d*

Ulih w i l l l
**'

,*

BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID
}
KIMBALL (substituted as parties
)
plaintiff in the place of REPUBLIC
)
CAPITAL BANK, F.S.B., formerly
)
known as REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND }I
LOAN ASSOCIATION OF
)
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin corporation),

Case No. 980240CA

Plaintiffs and Appellees, )
"\7C

1

MARTINEAU & COMPANY, certified
public accountants,
)
Priority No. 15
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Court Judge
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
Russell G. Workman, Esq.
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

PARTIES
Appellant is defendant Martineau & Company ("Martineau"). Appellees are
Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball (hereinafter "Miller and Kimball"), who were
substituted as party-plaintiffs of Republic Capital Bank F.S.B. formerly known as
Republic Savings and Loan Association of Wisconsin.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PARTIES

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii-v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

vi-viii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATTVE CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

I.

The Nature of the Case

4

n.

The Course of Proceedings

6

III.

A.
The Foreclosure Action
6
B.
Martineau's Temporary Restraining Order
7
C.
The September 29, 1993 Preliminary Injunction Hearing . . 8
D.
Martineau's Equitable Claims for Injunctive Relief
9
E.
The January 19, 1995 Preliminary Hearing
10
F.
Post-Trial Motions
10
G.
Award of Attorneys Fees to Miller and Kimball
11
Statement of Facts
13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS OF MILLER AND KIMBALL

ii

23

Page
Nnmher

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DH) NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING MARTINEAU'S MOTION TO SET ASD3E THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT OR ALLOWING THE FORECLOSURE
SALE OF THE 1986 TRUST DEED TO GO FORWARD
26
A.

B.
II.

The Trial Court Properly Found that Martineau's
Eighteen Month Delay In Moving to Set Aside the
Default Judgment Was Not Reasonable

26

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Denying Martineau Injunctive Relief

31

MARTINEAU HAD NO MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO
JUSTD7Y SETTING ASD3E THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
OR GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELDZF
A.
B.

C.
HI.

25

33

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because
Miller and Kimball Did Not Intend It to Apply

35

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because
Miller and Kimball Would Be Benefited by
Keeping Their Interests Separate

38

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because of
Martineau's Intervening Interest

40

THE DEBT UNDERLYING THE TRUST DEED
HAS NOT BEEN EXTINGUISHED; THEREFORE,
IT WOULD NOT BE INEQUITABLE TO ALLOW
MILLER AND KIMBALL TO PROCEED WITH
FORECLOSURE

in

41

Page
IV.

V.

MILLER AND KIMBALL ARE ENTITLED TO
RECOVER DAMAGES FOR MARTINEAU'S
WRONGFULLY OBTAINED TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER

45

MILLER AND KIMBALL ARE ENTITLED TO
RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES FOR RESPONDING
TO TfflS APPEAL

49

CONCLUSION

50

APPELLEES' ADDENDUM
No. 1:

Stipulation and Motion Re Partial
Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action,
Substitution of Plaintiff and Dismissal of
Certain Defendants, dated June 21, 1993

No. 2:

Petition for Settlement of Final Account
of Receiver; and for Decree of Discharge
of Receiver, dated June 17, 1993

No. 3:

Order Approving Stipulation and Motion
Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause
of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff and
Dismissal of Certain Defendants, dated
June 22, 1993

No. 4:

Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Decree of
Foreclosure, dated September 22, 1993

No. 5:

Decree of Foreclosure, November 1,1993

No. 6:

November 30, 1993 Letter from Bruce J.
Nelson to Bruce T. Jones Re: Proposed
IV

Draft of Temporary Restraining Order
No. 7:

January 5, 1994 Letter from Bruce J.
Nelson to Bruce T. Jones Re: Original
Temporary Restraining Order To Be
Approved As to Form for Presentation
To Judge Noel

No. 8:

January 24, 1994 Letter from Bruce J.
Nelson to Bruce T. Jones Re: Summary
of Various Verbal Agreements

No. 9:

July 22, 1994 Letter from Bruce T. Jones
to Bruce J. Nelson Re: Proposed Hearing
Date of September 29, [1994] at 10:00 a.m.
Before Judge Noel

No. 10:

September 23, 1994 Letter from Bruce J.
Nelson to Bruce T. Jones Re: (1) Miller
and Kimball's Acquisition File of the Judge
Building, (2) David Kimball's Availability
at Hearing, and (3) Proposed Stipulation
of Agreed Facts

No. 11:

September 30, 1994 Letter from Bruce J.
Nelson to Bruce T. Jones Re: Proposed
Order Documenting the Court's Order
Made at Hearing Before Judge Noel and
Status of Temporary Restraining Order

No. 12:

Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
dated January 19, 1995

No. 13:

Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing,
dated January 19, 1995

No. 14:

Copies of Rules 60(b) and 65A of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Number
CASES:
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993)

2

Altabet v. Monroe Methodist Church, 111 P.2d 544
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989)

35, 40

Anderson v. Starr, 294 P. 581 (Wash. 1930)
Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990
(Utah 1993)
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993)

40

2, 3, 48
26, 46

Dobrusky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1987)

35

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989)

26

Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, Inc.,
882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994)

27

F.D.I. C. v. Lee, 988 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1993)
Federal Land Bank v. Colorado Nat'I Bank,
786 P.2d 514 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Cupples Bros.,
889 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1989)
First Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n v. Nath, 839 P.2d 1336
(Okla. 1992)
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993)
Korb v. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co., 3 P.2d 502
vi

35, 39
35, 39, 41, 42, 45

31

35, 39, 43, 41
2, 3

Page
Number
(Kan. 1931)

41

Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Assoc, Inc.,
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982)
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. AdUn, Wright & Miles,
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987)
O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770 (1934)
Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply,
407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965)

27, 29
25, 46
50
35, 37, 38, 39

42

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

2

Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1993)

49

Timothy A. Garverick & Assocs. v. Heidtman Steel
Prods., Inc., 807 F.Supp. 430 (E.D. Mich. 1992)

31

Utah Dept. of Social Serv. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991)
Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1994)
Whiteley v. DeVries, 116 Utah 165, 209 P.2d 206 (1949)

Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 57-1-23
§65A(c)(2)
§ 78-2-2
§ 75-37-7

50
26, 27
39

42
24, 46
1
42

vn

Page
Number

Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-502
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)(1)
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and (7)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65 A
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(c)(2)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A(e)

Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger.
40 Vand L.Rev. 283 (1987)

46-47
47
1
50
10
4, 7
3, 27, 28, 29, 31
28
3,4
48
32

35, 38

4 American Law of Property § 16.142
(A. Casner ed. 1952)

35

3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 1 459
(P. Rohan rev. ed. 1984)'

35

5 H. Tiffany, Real Property § 1479
(B. Jones 2d ed. 1939)

35

George E. Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages,
§ 6.15 at 420 (2d.Ed. 1970)

45

vm

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.$ 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Martineau requests the Appellate Court to consider four issues. (See Brief of
Appellant ("Applnt Brief), p. 1-2.) In presenting the issues, however, Martineau
inaccurately characterizes the trial court's rulings by seeking review of findings and
conclusions that were never made. For example, the trial court never concluded that
"Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball . . . owed no contractual obligation to honor
Martineau's lease." (See Id.at f A.) Nor did the trial court find or conclude that it
would allow the foreclosure sale to go forward "after [Miller and Kimball] had acquired
both mortgaged property and the debt securing that mortgage under circumstances
'designed' to discourage participation by the public at a foreclosure sale." (Id. at f B.)
Rather, the trial court determined that Martineau's motion to set aside the default
judgment was untimely and that Martineau was not entitled to injunctive relief. The net
effect was to allow Miller and Kimball to go forward with the foreclosure sale Martineau
had successfully postponed for almost 15 months. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 24(b)(1), Miller and Kimball hereby frame what they consider
are the proper issues on appeal and the applicable standard of review.

1

Issue No. 1: Based upon all of the facts and circumstances, did the trial court
abuse its discretion when it denied Martineau's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,
which motion was filed approximately eighteen months after default judgment was
entered against Martineau on March 5, 1993?
Standard of Review:

In considering Issue No. 1, the Appellate Court has

several standards of review to follow. First, a trial court's findings of fact are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286
(Utah 1993). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
determination, if a factual finding is based on sufficient evidence, then the finding is not
clearly erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Second, when a
legal rule is applied to a given set of facts, i.e. whether to set aside a default judgment,
the trial court's ruling is reversible only upon a showing of an "abuse of discretion."
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434-36 (Utah 1993).
Issue No. 2: Based upon all of the facts and circumstances, did the trial court
abuse its discretion when it denied Martineau's motion for preliminary injunction on the
grounds that Martineau lacked standing to seek injunctive relief?
Standard of Review: In considering Issue No. 2, the Appellate Court has the
same standards of review to follow as set forth above. See also, Birch Creek Irrigation
v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 994 (Utah 1993) (appellate court "will not disturb a trial

2

court's judgment granting or refusing an injunction unless the court abused its discretion
or the judgment rendered is clearly against the weight of the evidence").
Issue No, 3: Based upon the facts and circumstances, did the trial court abuse
its discretion by awarding Miller and Kimball their attorneys fees, under Rule 65A of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the amount of $20,000 for having been wrongfully
restrained from foreclosing Martineau's leasehold interest for over 15 months?
Standard of Review: In awarding attorneys fees, the Appellate Court reviews
the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Gillmor, 850 P.2d at 434-36.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
In moving to set aside the Default Judgment, Martineau relied upon Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, prior to moving to set aside the Default
Judgment, Martineau obtained a temporary restraining order and moved to have the trial
court enter a preliminary injunction precluding a foreclosure of Martineau's leasehold
interest. In moving for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
Martineau relied upon Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Copies of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 65A are attached hereto as Addendum No. 14.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

The Nature of the Case:
Martineau is seeking to preserve a leasehold interest which Martineau conceded

was inferior, junior and subordinate to Miller and Kimball's lien when the trial court
entered default judgment. This appeal is the last in a series of attempts by Martineau to
use Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building in hopes of elevating its inferior
unrecorded leasehold interest to a senior priority position.
This action, commenced on January 8, 1992, is an action to judicially foreclose
a 1986 Deed of Trust given to Miller and Kimball's predecessor, Republic Savings and
Loan Association ("Republic"), to secure a loan for the purchase of the Judge Building.
The purchaser, Judge Building Associates ("Associates"), defaulted on its obligations to
Republic in 1991. Martineau, who held an unrecorded leasehold interest in the Judge
Building, was named as a defendant on February 8, 1992. When Martineau failed to file
an answer, the trial court entered default judgment on March 5, 1993. Pursuant to Rule
58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Martineau received notice of the default judgment.
The default judgment determined that Martineau's leasehold interest was inferior, junior
and subordinate to the lien of Republic. Martineau never appealed the default judgment.
In May of 1993, Republic, Associates and its general partners agreed to sell the
Judge Building to Miller and Kimball. Martineau, who had expressed an interest in
purchasing the Judge Building, had knowledge of Miller and Kimball's purchase. On
4

June 23, 1993, Republic, Associates and its general partners stipulated that Miller and
Kimball could be substituted for Republic and could proceed with the foreclosure of the
1986 Trust Deed, which foreclosure would terminate Martineau's junior and subordinate
leasehold interest. The Court approved the stipulation and settlement. Subsequently,
Miller and Kimball moved for and the Court entered a decree of foreclosure on
November 1, 1993, ordering the Judge Building to be foreclosed.
Without warning, less than a week before the foreclosure sale was to take place
and after remaining silent for almost two years, Martineau injected itself into this action
by moving to dismiss the action and moving to enjoin the foreclosure sale. Martineau's
sole argument was that the 1986 Trust Deed had been canceled and was therefore no
longer in effect. Martineau argued that, because Miller and Kimball now held both the
fee title to the property and the beneficial interest in the 1986 Trust Deed, the two estates
merged, and the 1986 Trust Deed was extinguished as a matter of law.
The trial court found that Martineau's motions were untimely and without legal
basis. The trial court ruled Martineau had no standing to set aside the default judgment
since its motion was filed more than 18 months after the entry of default judgment and
more than 16 months after Martineau had learned of Miller and Kimball's purchase of
the Judge Building. Likewise, Martineau's claim for injunctive relief based upon certain
equitable claims was factually and legally inadequate. Not only did the parties express
an intent not to merge the two interests, but the trial Court found that Miller and Kimball
5

intended to foreclose Martineau's leasehold interest. In short, Martineau had no right
to interfere with the foreclosure of the 1986 Trust Deed, and this Court did not abuse its
discretion when it declined to set aside the default judgment, grant injunctive relief, or
dismiss the action. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Miller and
Kimball damages based upon Martineau having wrongfully enjoined Miller and Kimball.
II.

The Course of Proceedings:
A.

The Foreclosure Action.

1•

On January 8, 1992, Republic filed a complaint against Associates and its

principals seeking to judicially foreclose the 1986 Trust Deed. (R. 1-54.)
2,

On February 14, 1992, adding two parties claiming an interest in the Judge

Building, including Martineau. (R. 87-139.)
3,

Martineau never answered the Amended Complaint. (R. 1511-12.)

4,

On March 5, 1993, this Court entered default judgment against Martineau

(the "Default Judgment'). (R. 472-75.) The Default Judgment states that the "lien or
interest, if any, of the defendant Martineau ... is inferior, junior and subordinate to the
lien of [Republic] upon the real property at issue herein [the Judge Building], . . . ." (Id.
at f 1.) Martineau received notice of the Default Judgment. (R. 475.)
5,

In May and June of 1993, Miller and Kimball acquired the Judge Building

from Republic and were substituted as plaintiffs in this action. (R. 798-837.)

6

6.

Pursuant to the terms of the Default Judgment and the purchase agreement,

on November 1, 1993, the Court entered a Decree of Foreclosure. A foreclosure sale
was scheduled for November 30, 1993 at 12:00 p.m. (R. 849-74.)
B.

Martineau's Temporary Restraining Order.

7.

Less than a week before the scheduled foreclosure sale, on November 24,

1993, Martineau entered an appearance for the first time in the case and moved the trial
court for a temporary restraining order to forestall the pending foreclosure sale.
Simultaneously Martineau moved to dismiss the Complaint on the sole basis that the 1986
Trust Deed, under which the action was brought, had been canceled and was no longer
in effect. (R. 875-889.)
8.

On November 30, 1993, the trial court granted Martineau's motion for a

temporary restraining order, instructed Martineau's counsel to prepare a written order,
and set the bond at $1,000.
9.

The sheriffs sale scheduled for November 30, 1993 was canceled.

10.

On the afternoon of November 30, 1993, Martineau forwarded to Miller

and Kimball a proposed draft of a temporary restraining order "pursuant to the Court's
ruling." (R. 1233-34.)
11.

At no time subsequent to November 30, 1993 did Martineau submit the

proposed temporary restraining order to the Court for signature. (R. 1224.)
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12.

Martineau never presented an original temporary restraining order to the

Court for signature or deposit the $1,000 bond with the Court clerk. (R. 1225.)
13.

On or about January 24, 1994, Martineau confirmed that a mutual

agreement was reached between the parties that (a) "no formal order was necessary for
signature by the Court," (b) "the temporary restraining order remains in effect until
either (1) die parties agree otherwise or (2) subsequent order of the Court" and ® "he
agreed to hold the $1,000 bond in [his] trust account." (R. 1236-37.)
C.

The September 29. 1993 Preliminary Injunction Hearing.

14.

A week before the September 29th preliminary injunction hearing

Martineau forwarded a proposed Stipulation of Agreed Facts which outlined certain facts
Martineau believed were not in dispute. The Stipulation of Agreed Facts acknowledged
that "Martineau sought and obtained a Restraining Order from this Court which stopped
the pending Sheriffs Sale" and that the preliminary injunction hearing "had been
continued without date pursuant to agreement of the parties." (R. 1239-44.)
15.

At the hearing-, on September 29, 1994, due to Martineau's ever changing

and evolving legal theories, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the hearing on the
motion for preliminary injunction in order to afford Martineau an opportunity to file a
memorandum outlining all of the legal theories, authorities and facts supporting its
request for preliminary injunction.

8

16.

On September 30, 1994, Martineau's counsel forwarded a proposed order

to Miller and Kimball's counsel which documented the events at the September 29, 1994
hearing, as well as reaffirm the temporary restraining order. (R. 1245.) The proposed
Order specifically stated as follows:
1.
The Court acknowledges its issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order on November 30, 1993. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, such
Order remains in effect pending a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction
Motion, or pending other subsequent Order of this Court. (R. 1248.)
17.

Subsequent to September 30, 1994, Martineau never presented the proposed

order to the Court for signature.
D.

Martineau's Equitahle Claims for Injunction Relief,

18.

On October 7, 1994, Martineau filed, for the first time, a motion to set

aside the Default Judgment. (R. 972-994.)
19.

Concurrently, Martineau filed a Hearing Memorandum. (R. 975-994.)

The memorandum only outlined Martineau's legal theories, authorities and facts
supporting its request for preliminary injunction. (Id. at 975-76.) The memorandum
was silent as to why the Default Judgment should be set aside. In particular, Martineau
asserted that the 1996 Trust Deed Miller and Kimball were seeking to foreclose had been
either (1) extinguished by operation of law, or (2) become subordinate to the Martineau
Lease. (Id. at 981.) The new legal theories Martineau relied upon included: (a) merger

9

of title; (b) express contract; (c)unjust enrichment; (d) waiver and laches; (e) promissory
estoppel; and (f) equitable estoppel. (Id. at 982-83.)
E.

The January 19. 1995 Preliminary Hearing.

20.

The preliminary injunction hearing was held on January 19, 1995. Four

witnesses testified: Hill, Kimball, Miller and Leland Martineau. (R. 1374-1559.)
21.

At the close of Martineau's presentation of evidence, Miller and Kimball

moved for dismissal of Martineau's claims pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 41(b) . (R. 1522.) Miller and Kimball's motion was granted when the trial court
denied Martineau's motion to set aside the Default Judgment on the grounds there was
an unreasonable delay in bringing the motion. (R. 1549-1550.) The trial court also
denied Martineau's motion for preliminary injunction, in part, on the grounds that none
of Martineau's rights had been violated by Miller and Kimball's subsequent purchase of
the Judge Building. (R. 1551-52.)
F.

Post-Trial Motions.

22.

Martineau did not file any post trial motions, choosing simply to respond

to Miller and Kimball's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Damages,
filed on February 3, 1995 (R. 1170-1178 and 1202-1212) and objecting to Miller and
Kimball's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, filed on March 2,
1995. (R. 1215-20.)
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23.

On or about May 26, 1995, the parties entered into a Stipulation re:

Completion of Pending Foreclosure and the trial court entered an Order re: Completion
of Pending Foreclosure, whereby Martineau stipulated to the foreclosure of its leasehold
interest. (R. 1279-1283.) Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order, neither party waived
any claims, defenses, rights of appeal, etc. by virtue of the stipulation regarding
completion of the foreclosure. (Id.)
24.

On June 29, 1995, the trial court issued a minute entry relating to

objections raised by Martineau over the language of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order regarding the preliminary injunction hearing. (R. 1284-1287.)
25.

In August of 1995, Miller and Kimball submitted to the trial court for

signature the revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in accordance
with the minute entry of June 25, 1995. (See Applnt's Addendum No. 13.1)
G.

Award of Attorney's Fees to Miller and KimhalL

26.

On May 9, 1995, the trial court held a hearing to consider whether Miller

and Kimball were entitled to recover damages from Martineau for having obtained a
wrongfully issued temporary restraining order in November of 1993.

1

The executed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated 24,
1995[sic] is attached to Appellant's Docketing Statement and as Addendum No. 13 to
Appellant's Addendum. Miller and Kimball shall hereinafter refer to Addendum No. 13
as the "Court Findings."
11

27.

On June 29, 1995, the trial court issued a minute entry finding that Miller

and Kimball were entitled to recover damages, which would be limited to the "costs and
attorneys fees incurred by Miller and Kimball in defending against the temporary
restraining order and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction." (R. 1284-88.) The trial
court instructed the parties to consult and determine if the issue of damages could be
submitted by affidavit. (Id.)
28.

On February 2, 1996, the trial court held a hearing to consider the amount

of attorneys fees and costs to be awarded to Miller and Kimball based upon Martineau
having obtained a wrongfully issued temporary restraining order.
29.

On May 24, 1996, after the presentation of evidence, the trial court entered

a second set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, wherein the trial court
concluded that the temporary restraining order entered on November 30, 1993 was
wrongfully issued and awarded Miller and Kimball attorneys fees in the amount of
$20,000. (R. 1339-1333.)
30.

On June 21,-1996, Martineau filed a timely Notice of Appeal seeking

appellate review of the following: (I) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
dated August 1995, concerning the January 19, 1995 preliminary injunction hearing
(Court Findings); (ii) Minute Entry, dated June 29, 1995, concerning the trial court's
determination that Martineau was liable for Miller and Kimball's attorneys fees and costs
incurred by Miller and Kimball in defending against the temporary restraining order and
12

the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (R. 1284-88, Court Findings); and (iii) Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated May 24, 1996. (R. 1329-1333,
Addendum No. 14.)
III.

Statement of Facts.
Miller and Kimball's objection to Martineau's effort to use their purchase of the

Judge Building to avoid foreclosure of its leasehold interest centers on the timing of its
motions. After conceding it held an inferior interest, after allowing default to be taken,
after learning that Miller and Kimball were purchasing the Judge Building in April 1993,
Martineau waited until the week before the foreclosure sale to intercede. The trial court
found Martineau's delays unreasonable. Because timing was critical to the trial court's
ruling, Miller and Kimball set forth the following material facts in chronological order:
a.

On March 6, 1986, Associates became the owner of certain real property

located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is commonly known as the
Judge Building. (R. 2-3, Court Findings, p. 2 % 1.)
b.

On March ^6, 1986, Associates executed and delivered to Republic a

Promissory Note, dated March 6, 1986 (the "1986 Note") in the principal amount of
$2,300,000.00. (R. 3, 15-22, Court Findings, p. 2, 1 2.)
c.

On March 6, 1986, Associates executed a Deed of Trust with Assignment

of Rents and Lease in favor of Republic to secure a $2,300,000 note (the "1986 Trust
Deed"). (R. 4, 23-38.)
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d.

Concurrently, and as further security, Associates executed an Assignment

of Rents, Profits and Leases. (R. 4, 47-53.)
e.

On November 13, 1990, Associates entered into a Lease Agreement with

Martineau & Company, CPAs, whereby Martineau leased approximately 4,500 square
feet located on the fifth floor of the Property. (R. 1080-1105, Court Findings, p. 3, f
3.)

Martineau's lease, which was negotiated between Associates' general partner,

Harold J. Hill, and Martineau's principal, LeLand Martineau, was substantially different
from other tenants in terms of the length of the lease, monthly rent, and pass-through
costs.2 For example, at Martineau's option, the lease could be extended for a total of 18
years. Similarly, the Martineau lease was only subject to a one percent (1 %) annual
increase in rent, compared to five percent (5 %) for all other tenants. Nor was Martineau
responsible for any pass-through operating costs. In other words, the terms were so
favorable to Martineau that Associates (through Mr. Hill) asked Martineau not to discuss
them with other tenants or anyone else. (R. 1412, 11. 12-17, Court Findings, p. 3, f 3.)
f.

The Martineau Lease was never recorded.

(R. 1522, 1532, Court

Findings, p. 3, 13.)
g.

Associates became delinquent in its obligation to Republic in October of

1991 when it stopped making payments. (R. 1427, Court Findings, p. 3, If 4.)
2

Martineau argued that it signed the standard form lease used with all other
Judge Building tenants. Various terms, however, were altered to render the agreement
"substantially" different from others. (See R. at 1084, 1085-86, 1091-92 and 1093.)
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h.

Martineau learned that Associates was in default of the 1996 Note in

December of 1991. (R. 1509; Court Findings, p. 3, 1 5.)
i.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hill of Associates approached Martineau about the

possibility of purchasing the Judge Building. (R. 1501.)
j.

On January 8, 1992, Republic filed a complaint against Associates and its

principals, Mr. Hill and J. Michael Martin, seeking to judicially foreclose the 1986 Trust
Deed. (R. 1- 54, Court Findings, p. 3, f 6.) The Complaint alleged, among other
things, that Associates was in default of the 1986 Note and owed Republic approximately
$2,200,000. (R. 1-54.)
k.

On February 11, 1992, Republic filed an Amended Complaint, adding

Martineau as a defendant. (R. 87-139, Court Findings, p. 4, j 8.)
1.

After being served with the Amended Complaint, Martineau knew Republic

was trying to foreclose its leasehold interest and after presenting the Amended Complaint
to its counsel made a conscious decision not to answer or respond to the Amended
Complaint. (R. 1510-12; Court Findings, p. 4, | 9.)
m.

At the preliminary hearing, LeLand testified that he knew with absolute

certainty that the lease interest was inferior, junior and subordinate to the 1986 Trust
Deed and that, in the event of foreclosure, any and all rights and/or interest Martineau
had as a leasehold tenant would be extinguished and terminated. (R. 1512-14, 1516,
1517, Court Findings, p. 4, f 9.)
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n.

Martineau never sought an extension of time nor filed an answer or

counterclaim. (R. 1512, Court Findings, p. 4, 1 10.)
o.

In the beginning of 1993, Martineau began negotiations with Republic and

its agent, Ray Unrath of Wallace & Associates, to purchase the Judge Building. (R.
1501-02.)
p.

On March 5, 1993, this trial court entered Default Judgment against

Martineau. (R. 472-475.) The Default Judgment states that the "lien or interest, if any,
of the defendant Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants is inferior, junior
and subordinate to the lien of plaintiff upon the real property at issue herein, . . .." (Id.
at f 1.)(Emphasis added.) The Default Judgment goes on to provide that
2.
The defendant Martineau & Company is not a judgment debtor . .
., is not a creditor having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the Property
and is not a successor in interest to any such person or entity, and is not
entitled to redeem the Property or any part thereof from any sale of the
Property pursuant to Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Upon any execution sale of the Property pursuant to order of this Court
in the above entitled action any interest or lien claimed by the defendant
Martineau & Company shall be forthwith extinguished and
terminated.
(R. 472-475 at tf 2, 3 (emphasis added), Court Findings, p. 4, if 11.) A copy of the
Default Judgment was given to Martineau. (Id.)

16

q.

As of March 5, 1993, Martineau was aware that default had been entered

against it and that the Default Judgment by its express terms would extinguish
Martineau's leasehold interest in the Judge Building. (R. 1513.)
r.

Recognizing that its interest was inferior, junior and subordinate to

Republic's, Martineau did not appeal the Default Judgment. (Court Findings, f 11.)
s.

Following the entry of the Default Judgment against Martineau, Leland

Martineau had a couple of oral conversations with plaintiff, David M. Kimball,
concerning the Judge Building. (R. 1503-04, 1516-17; see also Court Findings, p. 5,
f 12.) These conversations were informal in nature and addressed issues, such as Mr.
Martineau's impressions about the Judge Building, Mr. Kimball's intentions to purchase
the Judge Building, and Mr. Martineau's desire to remain as a tenant. (R. 1503-17;
Court Findings, f 12.)
t.

At one point in time, Mr. Kimball stated to Mr. Martineau that he was not

in the business of "kicking tenants out." (R. 1504, Court Findings, f 12.)
u.

Mr. Martineau's and Kimball's oral communications in March and April

1993 were informal and did not give rise to a promise by Kimball to retain Martineau as
a tenant. (R. 1503-17, Court Findings, f 13.)
v.

On March 16, 1993, on Kimball's behalf, Hill submitted a purchase offer

to Dennis Bush of Republic to purchase the Judge Building for $850,000, which purchase
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would be free and clear of all encumbrances. (R. 1448; Court Findings, f 15.) Republic
never accepted the offer. (R. 1397-98, Court Findings, f 15.)
w.

When Kimball made his offer to purchase the Judge Building, Miller and

Kimball had not received or reviewed the Martineau lease, and were not aware of the
terms thereof. (R. 1411, 1446, Court Findings, 1 16.)
x.

On March 18, 1993, Republic sent a letter of intent to Mr. Martineau,

offering to sell the Judge Building to him for $850,000 cash, which was $100,000 less
than what he had previously been negotiating with Republic. (R. 1506, Court Findings,
f 17.) Martineau did not accept this offer. (Id.)
y.

On May 28, 1993, the culmination of negotiations between Associates,

Republic and Miller and Kimball resulted in the execution of the Real Estate Sale and
Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement"), whereby Miller and Kimball acquired the
Judge Building. (R. 1453, Court Findings, p. 7, f 20, Addendum No. 4.) Pursuant to
paragraph 3.4 of the Purchase Agreement, Miller and Kimball purchased the property,
subject to and conditioned upon "the entry of a final order by the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the foreclosure action
commenced by [Republic] and entitled Republic Capital Bank, F.S.B. v. Judge
Building Associates, et aL, Civil No. 920900094 PR." (Addendum No. 4 at 1 3.4
(emphasis added).) The parties further expressly agreed to preserve and assign to Miller
and Kimball the right to foreclose Martineau's leasehold interest:
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11.21 In connection with the settlement of the Action and the sale of
the Property to Purchaser, TCF agrees to preserve and assign to
Purchaser the right to foreclose on the leasehold interest of Martineau
& Company. (Id. at 1 11.21 (emphasis added).)
z.

As part of the Purchase Agreement, Associates (and its general partners),

Republic and Miller and Kimball agreed to several significant terms and conditions,
including the following:
i.

First, Associates transferred the Judge Building to Miller and

Kimball by Special Warranty Deed, dated June 21, 1993, and assigned the leases in the
Judge Building to Miller and Kimball, which deed was recorded in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry No. 5543957, Book 6700 at Page 927.
(Court Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 5.)
ii.

Second, Miller and Kimball obtained a new loan from Republic,

which loan was secured by a Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents and Security
Agreement in favor of TCF Bank Wisconsin, F.S.B. (fka Republic), dated June 21,
1993, and recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry
No. 5543958, Book 6700 at Page 929 (the "1993 Trust Deed"). (Court Findings, 1 21,
Addendum No. 6.) The 1986 Trust Deed was subordinated to the 1993 Trust Deed,
pursuant to a Subordination Agreement, which was recorded in the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry No. 5543953, Book 6700 at Page 912 (Court
Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 8.) The Subordination Agreement expressly provides
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that the "Foreclosure Action initiated by [Republic] and any foreclosure of the March
6, 1986 Loan Documents shall not operate to diminish, defeat, foreclose or in any
way impair the lien of the Purchaser's Loan Documents/' (Id. (emphasis added).)
hi.

Third, as part of the loan, Miller and Kimball executed an

Assignment of Leases in favor of TCF Bank of Wisconsin, FSB, dated June 23, 1993,
which was recorded in Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on July 1, 1993 as Entry No.
5543959, Book 6700 at page 0953. (Court Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 7.)
iv.

Fourth, Miller and Kimball and Republic entered into a letter

agreement, whereby Miller and Kimball agreed to either enter into a revised lease with
Martineau in a form satisfactory to Republic or use their best efforts to complete the
foreclosure action against Martineau.

(Court Findings, f 21, Addendum No. 10.)

Paragraph 2 of the letter expressly provided as follows:
2.
Lease with Martineau & Company. Within nine (9) months from
the date hereof the Borrower [Miller and Kimball] shall have either entered
into a revised lease with Martineau & Company in a form satisfactory to
Lender and Borrower or shall have used its best efforts to complete the
foreclosure of the Huiterest of Martineau & Company in the Judge
Building property pursuant to the foreclosure action assigned by
Lender to Borrower and entitled "Daniel A. Miller and David M,
Kimball, Miller and Kimball v. Judge Building Associates, et al., Civil
No. 920900094PR. (Id. (emphasis added).)
v.

Finally, Associates, Hill, Martin and Republic entered into a

stipulation, whereby Associates, Hill and Martin were released from personal liability
from any deficiency judgment on the 1986 note and that Miller and Kimball could be
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substituted for Republic in this action and proceed to foreclose the 1986 Trust Deed. In
particular, the stipulation provided that:
[T]he parties stipulate that Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball may be
substituted in the above entitled action as parties' plaintiff in place of and
as successor to the Bank as plaintiff for the sole purpose of completing
the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in the Property and
on the condition that no deficiency judgment will be sought against Judge
Building Associates, Hill or Martin.
• ••

3. Completion of Foreclosure: Dismissal of Sampinos Claims. The
parties acknowledge that plaintiffs, or their designated assignees, may
proceed with the above-entitled foreclosure action or proceed with the
non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed, provided Hill and Martin are
dismissed as party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought against
Judge Building Associates, Hill or Martin after any sheriffs or trustee's
sale of the property and that purchaser indemnify and hold the Bank
harmless of or from any claims which may hereafter be asserted against
Bank by reason of any further actions taken in this matter. . . . Judge
Building Associates stipulates that the Plaintiff may move Ex Parte and
without notice to Judge Building Associates for the entry of a decree of
foreclosure consistent with the terms of this Stipulation or dismiss the
Complaint.
(R. 798-837, Court Findings,! 21, (emphasis added).)
aa.

Prior to Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building on June 23,

1993, Mr. Martineau knew that, as a condition of the purchase, the Martineau lease was
rejected and that Republic and Miller and Kimball intended to proceed with the
foreclosure. (R. 1516-17, Court Findings, f 18.)
bb.

Prior to Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building, Martineau

knew with absolute certainty that its leasehold interest in the Judge Building would be
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foreclosed. (R. 1517-18, Court Findings, 1 19.) Upon learning that its leasehold
interest would be foreclosed, Martineau took no steps to prevent the foreclosure until
November 24, 1993, a week before the scheduled foreclosure sale. (Id.)
cc.

On June 21, 1993, Republic, Associates and Miller and Kimball executed

the Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action,
Substitution of Plaintiff and Dismissal of Certain Defendants, as part of the Purchase
Agreement. (R. 798-837, Appellee's Addendum No. 1.)
dd.

On June 22, 1993, the trial court entered an Order Approving Stipulation

and Motion Regarding Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action , Substitution
of Plaintiff and Dismissal of Certain Defendants. (R. 843-45, Court's Finding, f 22,
Appellee's Addendum No. 3.) The trial court's order provided, in part, as follows:
2.
Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are substituted as parties
plaintiff in place of Republic Capital Bank, F.S.B. (formerly known as
Republic Savings and Loan Association of Wisconsin, a Wisconsin
corporation). All pleadings filed hereafter shall reflect this substitution.
3.
Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are substituted as parties
plaintiff for the sole purpose of completing the foreclosure of any
interest Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants, may
have in the property which is the subject matter of the Complaint and
on the condition that no deficiency judgment will be sought or granted
against Judge Building Associates, a Utah limited partnership, Harold J.
Hill or J. Michael Martin. (Id. at ft 2 and 3 (emphasis added).)

22

ee.

Pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement, on November 1, 1993, the

Court entered a Decree of Foreclosure and a foreclosure sale was noticed and scheduled
for November 30, 1993. (R. 872-874, Appellee's Addendum No. 5.).)
ff.

Martineau took no steps to prevent the foreclosure of his leasehold interest

until November 24, 1993, less than a week before the foreclosure sale, when it entered
an appearance for the first time in the case and moved the trial court for a temporary
restraining order to forestall the pending foreclosure sale. (R. 875-889.)
gg. On the morning of November 30, 1993, the trial court granted Martineau's
motion for a temporary restraining order, instructed Martineau's counsel to prepare a
written order, and set the bond at $1,000.
hh. The sheriffs sale scheduled for November 30, 1993 was canceled.
ii. On October 7, 1994, 18 months after the entry of the Default Judgment (and
almost three years after Martineau was served with the Amended Complaint), Martineau
moved to set aside the Default Judgment. (R. 972-974, Court's Findings, f 23.)
jj. A preliminary injunction hearing was held on January 19, 1995.
kk.

At no time during the evidentiary hearing did Martineau present any

evidence demonstrating that it would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was not
entered. (R. 1374-1559, Court Findings, f 29.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS OF MILLER AND KIMBALL
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Martineau's effort to enjoin the foreclosure of its inferior and subordinate
leasehold interest was untimely and without legal basis. Martineau's foray into this case
came almost two (2) years after it was commenced, nine (9) months after default
judgment was entered, and eight (8) months after learning Miller and Kimball were
purchasing the Judge Building. Yet, it was not until October 7, 1994 that Martineau
finally moved to set the Default Judgment aside. Needless to say, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it ruled that Martineau's delay in moving to set the default
judgment aside was unreasonable. As such, Miller and Kimball were free to proceed
with the foreclosure of Martineau's leasehold interest.
Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martineau's motion
for a preliminary injunction. Martineau failed to meet its burden necessary to impose
the extraordinary relief requested. Miller and Kimball's subsequent purchase of the
Judge Building in no way violated Martineau's rights. Miller and Kimball and the lender
had a legal right to insure that Martineau's leasehold interest would be extinguished. The
parties expressly contracted that Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge Building
would not operate as a merger and that Miller and Kimball would be able to proceed with
the foreclosure of Martineau's leasehold interest. This fact was known to Martineau over
eight (8) months before it sought injunctive relief and eighteen (18) months before
moving to set the Default Judgment aside. Since Martineau failed to demonstrate the
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likelihood of success on the merits or that it would suffer irreparable harm, the trial court
properly denied Martineau's motion for injunctive relief.
Finally, the trial court properly awarded Miller and Kimball's reasonable attorneys
fees. Having been wrongfully enjoined from proceeding with the foreclosure sale for
more than fourteen months, Miller and Kimball are entitled to recover damages. Under
Utah law, when an injunction is wrongfully issued, "the enjoined party has an action for
costs and damages incurred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction." Mountain
States Tel. & Tel Co. v. Adkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah
1984). An injunction is "wrongful" if it is finally determined that the applicant was not
entitled to the injunction. Id. In the instant case, the Court has concluded that the
applicant, Martineau, was not entitled to any of the relief sought, including a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Therefore, Miller and Kimball were
entitled to recover its costs and attorneys fees incurred as a result of the wrongfully
issued injunction. Id.: see also Utah Code Ann. § 65A (c)(2). The trial court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion by awarding Miller and Kimball's damages in the amount of
$20,000.
ARGUMENT
Stripped to its core, Martineau's appeal asks this Court to apply uncontested legal
standards to findings of fact not made by the trial court. In particular, although not
expressly described as such, Martineau asks this court to determine whether Miller and
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Kimball are barred from foreclosing Martineau's unrecorded leasehold interest based
upon the merger doctrine. By proceeding as it has, however, Martineau has placed the
proverbial cart before the horse. Before this Court can consider Martineau's issues, it
must first overcome the procedural hurdle that the trial court abused its discretion in (a)
refusing to set aside the Default Judgment and (b) denying Martineau injunctive relief.
Only if the appellate court determines the trial court abused its discretion in ruling as it
did, should it even consider Martineau's issues on appeal.
Martineau carries a heavy burden on appeal. In order to prevail, Martineau must
demonstrate the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that it abused its
discretion in denying Martineau's untimely motions. A trial court's findings are clearly
erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). In order to successfully
challenge the trial court's findings of fact, therefore, Martineau must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate the findings are so lacking as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9, 12 (Utah
App. 1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is u no reasonable basis for the
decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). Martineau has
failed to carry its burden.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING MARTINEAU'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
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DEFAULT JUDGMENT OR ALLOWING THE FORECLOSURE
SALE OF THE 1986 TRUST DEED TO GO FORWARD.
Before considering whether the trial court erred in concluding that Miller and
Kimball had no contractual obligation to honor Martineau's lease, or that the law of
merger prohibits Miller and Kimball from foreclosing, Martineau must first demonstrate,
by marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, that the trial court
abused its discretion in declining to set the Default Judgment aside. Laub v. South
Central Utah Tel. Assoc, Inc., 657 P.2d at 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982); Wade v. Stangl,
869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994).

Martineau has not and cannot meet its burden.

In order for a defendant to be relieved from a default judgment, he must not only
show one of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but
he must also show that his motion was timely, and that he has a meritorious defense to
the action. Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah
1994). In addition, the defendant has the burden on appeal of showing that the court's
findings were clearly erroneous and that it abused its discretion in refusing to set the
default judgment aside. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306. A trial court's duty is to consider the
motions "based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances." Id.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Found That Martineau's Eighteen
Month Delay In Moving To Set Aside the Default Judgment Was
Not Reasonable,
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On November 24, 1993 Martineau moved to enjoin the foreclosure sale of its
leasehold interest that nine months earlier it had acknowledged was inferior, junior and
subordinate to the lien being foreclosed — the 1986 Trust Deed. Martineau asserted it
was entitled to injunctive relief because the 1986 Trust Deed, under which the action was
initially brought, had been canceled by operation of the law of merger. Martineau
claimed that when fee title to the Judge Building and the beneficial ownership of the 1986
Trust Deed had been transferred to Miller and Kimball, the two estates merged and the
1986 Trust Deed was extinguished.
However, when it moved for injunctive relief, Martineau ignored the existence
of the Default Judgment which had been entered against it on March 5, 1993, and for
good reason. The Default Judgment not only awarded judgment against Martineau, but
decreed that Martineau's leasehold interest was "inferior, junior and subordinate" to the
1986 Trust Deed. The Default Judgment further ordered that "upon execution sale of
the property . . . any interest or lien claimed by . . . Martineau . . . shall be forthwith
extinguished and terminated/' More importantly, a motion for relief from judgment
"does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation." See Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). In other words, unless Martineau set the Default
Judgment aside, which it failed to do, it had no standing to object to or hold up the
foreclosure sale.
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It was not until October 7, 1994, that Martineau recognized the need to set the
Default Judgment aside.3 In support of its motion, Martineau relied on Rule 60(b)(6) and
(7) of the Utah RuleS of Civil Procedure, alleging that the judgment was no longer
equitable and should not have prospective application and any other reason the trial court
may think of justifying relief from operation of the judgment.4 In considering whether
to grant or deny a motion under Rule 60(b), the trial court may consider a variety of
factors including whether the motion was "made within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b); Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306. Rule 60(b), and in particular subparagraphs (6) and
(7), also bring into conflict competing interests in the finality of judgments and relief
from inequitable judgments. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306. In reaching its decision to deny
Martineau's motion, the trial court relied on these factors, stating as follows:

3

In an effort to downplay the significance of its unreasonable delay,
Martineau argues that the motion to set aside was "filed eleven months after issuance of
the Temporary Restraining Order as a precautionary measure only - a result of
concern by [Miller and Kimball] counsel that without such a Motion on record all of the
issues before the trial court would not be issue." (Applnt's Brief, p. 15 (emphasis
added).) Martineau's motion was not filed as "precautionary measure." It was filed
because Martineau recognized, as Miller and Kimball asserted, that it could not avoid
foreclosure without first setting aside the Default Judgment. This statement reinforces
Miller and Kimball5 position that Martineau was barred from objecting to the foreclosure
unless it successfully set the Default Judgment aside.
4

Martineau moved for relief from the judgment under subparagraphs (6) and
(7) because a motion for relief under just about any other provision of Rule 60(b) would
clearly be time barred. A motion under subdivisions (1) through (4) must be brought
within three months after the judgment was entered, Utah R Civ, P. 60(b), and the
judgment in this case was entered March 5, 1993, over eighteen (18) months before
moving to set aside.
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The Court is not going to set aside the default judgment. The Court
is of the opinion that there was an unreasonable delay in bring the motion
to set aside default judgment. These judgments have to have some finality,
and under certain circumstances they can be set aside, but there must be a
reasonable response to a motion for a default judgment. . ., and the Court
finds that there was not in this case; that there was an unreasonable delay.
(R. 1550-51.) In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied upon a variety of
uncontroverted facts.
Republic commenced this foreclosure action on January 8, 1992 and first named
Martineau as a defendant in February 1992. Knowing that its leasehold interest was
subordinate to Republic's, Martineau did not file an answer. The Default Judgment was
entered against Martineau on March 5, 1993. Martineau knew that its lease was inferior,
junior and subordinate to the interests of Republic and made a conscious decision not to
answer the Amended Complaint. Martineau reviewed and understood the effect of the
Default Judgment and chose not appeal.
In the spring of 1993, shortly after default was entered, Martineau had several
conversations with David Kimball concerning their interest in purchasing the Judge
Building. At the same time, Republic offered to sell the Judge Building to Martineau for
$850,000. Martineau chose not to accept Republic's offer. Martineau also knew that
neither Miller and Kimball nor Republic were going to allow Martineau to remain as a
tenant under the current lease terms and that its leasehold interest in the Judge Building
would be foreclosed. Yet, Martineau allowed the purchase of the Judge Building to go
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forward without objection. Martineau's motion was not filed until October 7, 1994,
nearly 16 months after Miller and Kimball purchased the Judge Building, and almost a
year after Martineau enjoined the scheduled foreclosure sale. In short, Martineau knew
about all the grounds it relied on before filing its motion.
Based on this array of facts, the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying the
motion to set aside the Default Judgment because Martineau's delay was not reasonable.
Cf Timothy A. Garverick & Assocs. v. Heidtman Steel Prods., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 430
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (one year delay was unreasonable); Federal Land Bank of St. Louis
v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1989) (court held Rule 60(b) motion was
untimely after defendants waited ten weeks after foreclosure judgment and motion filed
twelve days before sale). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
enforcing the Default Judgment and allowing the foreclosure sale to go forward.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying
Martineau Injunctive Relief.

Having denied Martineau's motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that injunctive relief would be inappropriate under the circumstances.
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), moving for injunctive relief did
not result in the suspension of the Default Judgment. As such, the Court could not
ignore the effect the Default Judgment had on Martineau's motion for injunctive relief.
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A restraining order or preliminary injunction will issue only upon a showing that:
(1) the applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues; (2)
the threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or
injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; (3) the order or injunction, if
issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial
likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim. Utah
R. Civ. P. 65A(e). IXiring the preliminary injunction hearing, Martineau failed to make
the necessary showing to entitle it to injunctive relief.
First, Martineau presented no evidence that it would suffer irreparable harm. (See
R. 1496-1520; Court Findings.) Second, Martineau could not and did not show that the
foreclosure sale of its leasehold interest outweighed Miller and Kimball's and the lender's
right to foreclose so that free and clear title would pass to Miller and Kimball. Finally,
Martineau failed to show that there was a substantial likelihood it would prevail on the
merits. To the contrary, the trial court asked and was told by Martineau's counsel that
the June 1993 transaction, which resulted in Miller and Kimball's purchase of the Judge
Building, was legal. (R. 1531; Addendum No. 13.) The trial court went on to conclude
as follows:
Now, you've relied quite heavily, Mr. Jones, on this subsequent
transaction that occurred in June of 1993 to say that this default judgment
should be set aside, and that that somehow violated Mr. Martineau's rights.
And I disagree with you. I am not convinced and I haven't been shown
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that there's any right of [Martineau's] that has been violated by that
subsequent transaction.
I think you can see that the plaintiffs had a legal right to do what
they did. They could have gone out and borrowed money on the property.
I believe they have acted legally in everything that they've done and that
they had a right to fashion this transaction in the way that they did, and I
don't know of any vested right that [Martineau] would have in his position
to prevent them in any way from doing that, or even to argue that they
shouldn't. So I just am not convinced.
And in addition that, there's been absolutely no evidence, and as
heavily as you have relied on that subsequent transaction, there's been
no evidence as to the significance of that subsequent transaction,
actually, to your client, as to what his intent was, what he relied upon,
whether he intended to bid on this property or whether in any way he
actually has been harmed. I think that you've asked me to rule on that
academically, that there may be some harm. But there has been no
evidence from your client with regards to those subsequent transactions.
(R. 1551-52; Appellee's Addendum No. 13 (emphasis added).) The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to enjoin the foreclosure sale.
II.

MARTINEAU HAD NO MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO JUSTIFY
SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OR GRANTING
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
The focus of Martineau's appeal apparently centers around the trial court not

giving adequate consideration to its legal arguments that Miller and Kimball had
promised to honor Martineau's lease and that the merger doctrine prohibited Miller and
Kimball from continuing to pursue foreclosure. In advancing these arguments, however,
Martineau does not disagree with the applicable law; rather, just how the trial court
applied the law to the facts.
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For example, in attacking the Court's refusal to adopt the merger doctrine,
Martineau focuses on a single clause in a 24-page, 39-paragraph trust deed executed by
Miller and Kimball as part of the refinancing of the Judge Building. (See Applnt's Brief,
p. 10; Addendum No. 6, f 16 (Borrower shall "comply with and observe Borrower's
obligations as landlord under all leases of the Property or any part thereof').)
Martineau also relies upon the Assignment of Leases to imply that Miller and Kimball
contracted to keep Martineau's lease in place after June 1993. (Applnt's Brief, p. 11;
see Addendum No. 7, Applnt's Brief, pp. 10-11.) Martineau then turns to the favorable
lease it obtained from Associates in 1990 to suggest that Miller and Kimball were
contractually barred from foreclosing. (Id. at 11-12.) Finally, Martineau asserts that
Miller and Kimball "persuaded the trial court they could proceed with foreclosure
because they did not intend a merger of legal title and the existing lien on the property."
(Id. at 13.) What Martineau is really arguing is that the trial court allegedly erred in
concluding that the merger doctrine did not apply. The Purchase Agreement and its
related documents, however, did not result in the merger of interests, especially since the
documents expressed a specific intent to foreclose the 1986 Trust Deed and, in effect,
Martineau's junior leasehold interest.
The merger doctrine is a rule of common law. It states that, "[w]hen a person
holds two estates in property in the same right and without an intervening estate, the two
estates will coalesce to one estate unless a beneficial reason exists for keeping them
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distinct. "5 Ann M. Burkhart, supra note 5, at 284 (citing 4 American Law of Property
§ 16.142 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property \ 459 (P. Rohan
rev. ed. 1984); 5 H. Tiffany, Real Property § 1479 (B. Jones 2d ed. 1939)).6 The
merger doctrine does not apply in this case for several reasons.
A.

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because Miller and Kimball THH
Not Intend It to Apply.

The merger doctrine is not favored. F.D.L C. v. Lee, 988 F.2d 838, 843 (8th Cir.
1993). Whether or not merger applies in a given case depends on the intent of the person
acquiring the two interests. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770,
773 (1934); Federal Land Bank v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 786 P.2d 514, 515 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1989); First Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n v. Nath, 839 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Okla. 1992);
Altabet v. Monroe Methodist Church, 111 P.2d 544, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). In this
case, it was Miller and Kimball's intent that was dispositive, and the intent of any other
party to the foreclosure is irrelevant, except to the extent another party's intent may

5

There is some question as to whether a trust deed creates an "estate in
property" such that the merger doctrine would even apply. See Ann M. Burkhart,
Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 283, 329 (1987).
6

The term "merger doctrine" is also used to refer to other legal doctrines,
perhaps the most common of which is the rule diat, upon delivery and acceptance of a
deed, the provisions of the underlying contract for the sale of the property are merged
into the deed and thereby become unenforceable. See, e.g., Dobrusky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d
1325, 1326 (Utah 1987). It is the doctrine of real property and not the contract doctrine
that Martineau relies on in this case.
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illuminate Miller and Kimball's intent. If the court can divine an intention that the
estates not merge, then it will give effect to that intention. Nath, 839 P.2d at 1340.
In this case, all the evidence of the parties' intent shows that Miller and Kimball
did not intend a merger of their legal title and their lien on die property. Paragraph 3.4
of the Purchase Agreement provides that the sale to Miller and Kimball was contingent
on the completion of the foreclosure proceedings. (Addendum No. 4, \ 3.4.) Paragraph
11.21 of the Purchase Agreement further provides that Republic "agrees to preserve and
assign to [Miller and Kimball] the right to foreclose on the leasehold interest of
Martineau & Company." {Id. 1 11.21 (emphasis added).) On June 21, 1993, Miller
and Kimball entered into a letter agreement by which Republic required them either to
enter into a revised lease with Martineau satisfactory to Republic or to use its best efforts
to complete the action against Martineau to foreclose its interest in the property.
(Addendum No. 10.) Concurrently, Republic and Associates entered into a stipulation,
approved by the court, acknowledging that Miller and Kimball could either proceed with
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed "for the sole purpose of
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in the Property."
(Applee's Addendum No. 1, p. 4 (emphasis added).) Associates further stipulated that
Miller and Kimball could move, ex parte, for the entry of a decree of foreclosure. {Id.
at 5.) These documents demonstrate that Miller and Kimball, Republic and Associates
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intended that there be no merger and that the foreclosure proceed so Martineau's
leasehold interest could be extinguished.
Miller and Kimball also testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that their
intent was that their interests in the property not merge. Perhaps the best evidence of
Miller and Kimball's intent was that they proceeded with the foreclosure action, only to
be rebuffed at the last minute by Martineau's actions. Cf. O'Reilly, 37 P.2d at 773.
In O'Reilly, the defendant (McLean) had given the plaintiff (O'Reilly) a
mortgage on certain property in 1925, to secure a debt. The following year, Utah
Lumber Company brought an action against the plaintiff and McLean to foreclose a
subsequent materialman's lien on the property. The lien was foreclosed, and Utah
Lumber Company received a sheriffs deed to the property. In June 1929, O'Reilly
brought an action against McLean to foreclose the 1925 mortgage. A few months later,
in September 1929, Utah Lumber Company conveyed the property to O'Reilly by quit
claim deed. O'Reilly then deeded the property to John Gardner, who in turn contracted
to sell the property to Utah Mortgage Company. Utah Mortgage Company claimed that
O'Reilly could not proceed with her foreclosure action because her equitable title under
her mortgage had merged with the legal title acquiredfromUtah Lumber Company. The
Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument:
We are of the opinion there was no intention to effect a merger at
the time Mrs. O'Reilly acquired legal title by obtaining the quitclaim deed
from the Utah Lumber Company on September 20, 1929. The evidence
37

shows that she was one of the defendants in the action brought by the Utah
Lumber Company to foreclose its materialman's lien and under which
action it obtained the sheriffs deed. Before the sheriffs deed issued to the
lumber company, plaintiff commenced the present action, still claiming her
mortgage lien on the property, notwithstanding judgment in the lien
foreclosure suit . . . . After obtaining the deed from the lumber
company, she continued her present action to judgment, thereby
evidencing an intention inconsistent with a merger.
Id. at 773 (emphasis added). The court further noted that, when Gardner negotiated to
sell the property to Utah Mortgage Company, more than five months after O'Reilly had
accepted the quit claim deed from Utah Lumber Company, both O'Reilly and Gardner
acknowledged that O'Reilly wanted her mortgage paid off. Id. The court concluded:
It is clear . . . that neither plaintiff nor Gardner considered that a merger
of the equitable title of plaintiff had been effected by the acquisition of the
legal title by plaintiff under the deed from the Utah Lumber Company.
Their intention to keep the mortgage alive and effective is clearly and
expressly manifested. Consequently no merger took place.
Id. at 773-74.
Similarly, Miller and Kimball's intention to keep the Trust Deed "alive and
effective" is "clearly and expressly manifested." Thus, "no merger took place."
B.

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because Miller and Kimball
Would Be Benefited by Keeping Their Interests Separate,

The merger doctrine operates as "a technical, nonsubstantive rule" of property
titles: "If the holder of the interests is not benefited in any way by keeping the estates
distinct, they will merge to simplify the state of title." Ann M. Burkhart, supra note 2,
at 284. Conversely, if the holder of the interests is benefited by keeping the estates
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distinct, they will not merge. See, e.g., O'Reilly, 37 P.2d at 773 (where it is in the
mortgagee's interest to keep the mortgage alive, merger does not occur) (citations
omitted). See also Whiteley v. DeVries, 116 Utah 165, 209 P.2d 206, 208 (1949)
(Wolfe, J., concurring) ("when it is required that a mortgage be not considered as
merged in the title of the mortgagee, equity will . . . treat the mortgage as still in
existence"). Even if there were some doubt about their intent, the trial court correctly
found that Miller and Kimball did not intend a merger of their estates where, as here, the
circumstances indicate that Miller and Kimball would benefit if their interests did not
merge. See Federal Land Bank, 786 P.2d at 516; Nath, 839 P.2d at 1340.
Where a mortgagee reacquires the beneficial interest in the mortgaged property,
there is a presumption that he intended to keep the security alive, and that presumption
can only be overcome by "strong evidence." Lee, 988 F.2d at 843. That presumption
applies, for example, where the mortgagee fails to join an interest holder as a defendant
in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding and then purchases the mortgaged property at the
sheriffs sale. Nath, 839 P.2d at 1340. The presumption should apply even more where,
as here, the mortgagee does join the interest holder as a defendant in the mortgage
foreclosure proceeding and stipulates that the proceeding can continue against the interest
holder-the only remaining defendant-even after a sale of the property.
Miller and Kimball are clearly benefited if the estates do not merge. Absent
merger, Miller and Kimball can proceed with the foreclosure action and clear the
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property of the unfavorable junior interest - Martineau Lease. That is why all parties
to the transaction-TCF (aka Republic), Associates and Miller and Kimball as the new
owners-agreed that the foreclosure action should continue.
C.

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply Because of Martineaufs
Intervening Interest.

Finally, the merger doctrine does not apply where there is an intervening estate
between the two estates sought to be merged. See, e.g., Altabet v. Monroe Methodist
Church, 111 P.2d 544, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) ("if there is an outstanding
intervening tide, the foundation of the merger does not exist as a matter of law") (quoting
Anderson v. Starr, 294 P. 581 (Wash. 1930)). In this case, the interests in the property
were created as follows:
•

In 1986, Associates gave Republic a lien on the property, in the form of
the Trust Deed, which was later assigned to Miller and Kimball.

•

In 1990 Associates gave Martineau a lease to the property.

•

In 1993 Associates gave Miller and Kimball a special warranty deed to the
property.

Clearly, Martineau1 s leasehold interest is an intervening interest between Miller
and Kimball's interest under the 1986 Trust Deed and their interest under the 1993
special warranty deed. Thus, the merger doctrine does not apply. See, e.g., Altabet,
111 P.2d at 545-46. Based upon the clear weight of authority and the uncontroverted
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facts of this case, it becomes obvious that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it declined to enjoin the foreclosure of Martineau's unrecorded leasehold interest.
III.

THE DEBT UNDERLYING THE TRUST DEED HAS NOT BEEN
EXTINGUISHED: THEREFORE. IT WOULD NOT BE
INEQUITABLE TO ALLOW MILLER AND KIMBALL TO
PROCEED WITH FORECLOSURE.
Martineau further argues that the trial court erred in not finding that the 1986

Trust Deed had been extinguished and therefore could not be foreclosed.
Brief, p. 15.)

(Applnt's

In fact, the trial court found that at no time did Miller and Kimball

intentionally relinquish their rights to foreclose Martineau's leasehold interest. (Court
Findings, 1 31.)

The trial court determined that the 1986 Trust Deed was not

extinguished. The undisputed facts were that Republic and Miller and Kimball simply
agreed not to seek a deficiency judgment against Associates or Hill and Martin, its
general partners. A debt and the liability of the mortgagor for that debt "are two distinct
things." Federal Land Bank, 786 P.2d at 516 (citing Korb v. Minneapolis Threshing
Mach. Co., 3 P.2d 502 (Kan. 1931)). "A mortgage lien is not discharged if it is the
intention of the parties merely to release the mortgagor's personal liability for it and not
to extinguish the debt." Id.
The intention of the parties in this case, as set forth in the stipulation that the court
approved, was merely that "no deficiency judgment" be sought against Associates and
its principals, Hill and Martin. The effect of the Purchase Agreement, therefore, was
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only to release Associates, Hill and Martin from personal liability and not to extinguish
the debt. Cf. id. (where the mortgagee agreed to cancel the debtor's promissory note and
release him from all personal liability but also expressed an intent that there be no
merger, the documents only released the debtor from personal liability and did not
extinguish the mortgage lien). Therefore, the 1986 Trust Deed remained alive and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it to be foreclosed.
Finally, without citation to any legal authority, Martineau claims that the trial
court should not have allowed the foreclosure because it uis no longer equitable that the
[Default JJudgment should have prospective application." (Applnt. Brief, pp. 15-16.)
Stated differently, Martineau asserts that the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 24, that
"Martineau's 18 month delay in moving to set aside the default was not reasonable"
ignores the circumstances which developed during those 18 months, which made it unfair
to enforce the Default Judgment. (See Applnt's Brief, pp. 16-17.)
In advancing this argument, Martineau once again ignores that this was a statutory
action to foreclose a trust deed as a mortgage, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-7-23 & 7837-1 through -9. These statutes do not require the court to balance the fairness of the
parties' respective positions. The only questions are the relative priorities of the parties'
interests and whether Miller and Kimball have complied with the statutory procedures.
The fact that the defendant may be prejudiced as a result of the foreclosure is irrelevant.
Cf. Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 407 P.2d 141, 142
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(1965) (defendant could not complain where the plaintiff foreclosed a trust deed as a
mortgage, even though in selecting that remedy the plaintiff was able to obtain additional
costs and attorney fees). If the statutory procedure could be thwarted simply by alleging
unfairness, the statutory scheme would be nullified.
The only case Martineau relied on for its equitable argument, Nath, 839 P.2d
1336 (Okla. 1992), is clearly distinguishable. The mortgagee in that case brought an
action to foreclose its mortgage and purchased at the foreclosure sale. The mortgagee
had failed to name a junior interest holder in the foreclosure action and later brought an
action to have its foreclosed mortgage declared superior to the county's junior tax liens.
The court concluded that, where the mortgagee's failure to join the county in the earlier
foreclosure action was not attended by some inequitable conduct, the mortgagee's first
mortgage was not merged into the legal title the mortgagee acquired at the foreclosure
sale. Nath, 839 P.2d at 1341. The court held, however, that the mortgagee had to
bring a second foreclosure proceeding to clear the property of the county's tax liens.
The court noted that the county could insist that the sale be conducted fairly and for a fair
value, and that the sale could be set aside if it was not. Id. at 1343 n.37. Nath stands
for the proposition that any foreclosure sale must be conducted fairly. It does not
support Martineau's argument that the court should stop a sale before it occurs if it would
somehow be unfair to junior interest holders. Foreclosure sales always hurt junior
interests by cutting them off, but that does not make them unfair. A junior interest
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holder can protect its interest by bidding at the foreclosure sale. But until there has been
a foreclosure sale, the court cannot say that the sale was unfair. Nath implicitly
recognized the fact that the county's valid tax liens could be lost as a result of the
foreclosure was not the sort of unfairness that would justify interfering with the sale.
Similarly, in this case, Miller and Kimball have not acted inequitably. They have
done everything they could to keep the 1986 Trust Deed alive and to foreclose that deed.
They are therefore entitled to proceed with the foreclosure sale. Nor have Miller and
Kimball been unjustly enriched by the foreclosure of Martineau's inferior leasehold
interest. If anyone would be unjustly enriched, it is Martineau.
Martineau leased its space in the building knowing that the building was subject
to a $2,300,000 trust deed. If it wanted to ensure that its leasehold would survive
foreclosure, it could have asked for a nondisturbance agreement, as other tenants in the
building did, but it chose not to. Martineau admits, it could not escape the effects had
Republic proceeded with foreclosure prior to the sale to Miller and Kimball. The fact
that Associates and Republic were able to find a buyer for the property before the
foreclosure sale was completed does not destroy the mortgagee's right to rid its security
of an unfavorable lease. If Miller and Kimball were precluded from foreclosing,
Martineau's junior interest would be
elevated to a priority for which its owner paid nothing and hence is, as
to him, a pure windfall. And it is a windfall at the expense of the prior
mortgagee. Where [as here] the first mortgagee knew of the second
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man and intended to prevent him getting this benefit it would be
unconscionable to permit him to have it.
George E. Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages, § 6.15 at 420 (2d.Ed. 1970)
(emphasis added).
By allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed, the trial court did not put
Martineau at a disadvantage. To the contrary, it put Martineau in no worse a position
than it would have been before the sale to Miller and Kimball. On the other hand, if the
fortuity of the sale to Miller and Kimball had the effect of elevating Martineau to a senior
position, it would be Martineau who would be unjustly enriched. See Federal Land
Bank, 786 P.2d at, 516 (by keeping a first mortgage lien alive, the court places a junior
lienor in the same position it expected to occupy at the time its interest arose, namely,
a junior position; any contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the junior lien holder). The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to set the Default Judgment aside and
allowing the foreclosure sale to go forward as ordered.
IV.

MILLER AND KIMBALL ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FOR MARTINEAU1 S WRONGFULLY OBTAINED TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER.
Having concluded that Martineau was not entitled to set aside the default judgment

entered into on March 5, 1993, and having concluded that Martineau was not entitled to
a preliminary injunction, the trial court properly concluded that Miller and Kimball were
entided to recover damages. Under Utah law, when an injunction is wrongfully issued,
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"the enjoined party has an action for costs and damages incurred as a result of the
wrongfully issued injunction." Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. Adkin, Wright &
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). An injunction is "wrongful" if it
is finally determined that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. Id. In the
instant case, the Court has concluded that the applicant, Martineau, was not entitled to
any of the relief sought, including a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction. Therefore, Miller and Kimball have an action for costs and damages incurred
as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. Id.; see Utah Code Ann. § 65A (c)(2).
Martineau raises the same argument it did in the lower court by asserting that
Miller and Kimball are not entitled to recover damages because Martineau failed to
properly secure a formal temporary restraining order. Considering Martineau already
raised this argument before the lower court, it has a heavy burden of demonstrating that
there was no reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. Crookston, 860 P.2d at 938.
The Code of Judicial Administration provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties
obtaining the ruling shall within 15 days, or within a shorter time as the
court may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or
decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and orders shall
be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for
signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objection shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after service.
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Rule 4-502 (emphasis added). Based upon Rule 4-504, it is the party who "obtains the
ruling" who shall prepare and submit an order for the court's signature.
It is undisputed that on November 30, 1993, this Court granted Martineau a
temporary restraining order. It is also undisputed that the temporary restraining order
stayed the pending sheriffs sale of the Judge Building. The sheriffs sale would have
resulted in the eviction of Martineau who was occupying one of the premium spaces in
the building. The parties, and Martineau in particular, knew the temporary restraining
order remained in effect even after the passage of ten days and until the preliminary
injunction hearing. This fact was reaffirmed on numerous occasions by Martineau's
counsel. (See Appellee's Addendum Nos. 6-11.)

To suggest that the temporary

restraining order was not entered and/or expired is in direct conflict with Martineau's
conduct and statements.
Moreover, and more importantly, Martineau cannot use its own failure to secure
a formal temporary restraining order as a sword to avoid liability for its conduct. It was
Martineau's responsibility to have the temporary restraining order entered by the Court.
Martineau recognized this responsibility when he forwarded temporary restraining orders
to Miller and Kimball's counsel. When Miller and Kimball did not voice an objection
within five days after receipt of the proposed orders, it was incumbent upon Martineau
to submit the proposed orders for signature by the Court. However, on January 24,
1994, Martineau stipulated that no formal temporary restraining order was necessary for
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signature by the Court agreeing that "the temporary restraining order remains in effect
until either (1) the parties agree otherwise or (2) subsequent order of the Court." These
facts were all before the trial court when it concluded that Miller and Kimball were
entitled to recover attorneys fees. Martineau's failure to secure a formal temporary
restraining order did not obviate its liability to pay for damages caused as a result of the
wrongfully issued injunction.
As evidenced by die various correspondence and hearings held before the trial
court, Martineau clearly understood that a temporary restraining order had been issued
and remained in effect until the preliminary injunction hearing was held on January 19,
1995. This knowledge is best evidenced by the September 30, 1994 letter in which
Martineau reconfirms that the temporary restraining order remains in effect. (Appllee's
Addendum No. 11.) Martineau cannot shield itself from liability simply because it failed
to secure the Court's signature on an order the Court granted and the parties honored.
To do so would give Martineau a substantial windfall, which clearly was not the intent
of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65A(c)(2).1 Based upon the circumstances before it,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys fees.
7

Martineau cites Birch Creek Irrigation Co. v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990 (Utah
1993) to support its assertion that the temporary restraining order expired by definition ten
days after it was issued. The Prothero case is distinguishable because there was no
evidence the parties had stipulated that the temporary restraining order would remain in
effect after the passage often days. In this action, the parties clearly intended to have the
temporary restraining order "remain in effect" until the completion of the preliminary
injunction hearing.
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Martineau's final attack on the award of attorneys fees centers on the trial court's
alleged failure "to limit fees to what is allowed under the rule." (Applnt's Brief, pp. 1920.) Martineau argues that the January 19, 1995 hearing considered all of its various
motions and, therefore, attorneys fees not directly related to the restraining order should
not have been awarded.
The fallacy of Martineau's argument is that it runs in direct conflict with the trial
court's finding that "[a] substantial portion of the amount of time spent by plaintiffs'
counsel after the issuance of the temporary restraining order on November 24, 1993,
was spent in defense of the temporary restraining order and motion for preliminary
injunction." (R. 1331, Addendum No. 14.) What Martineau also ignores is that the
issues it raised subsequent to issuance of the temporary restraining order applied
irrespective of the motion before the court. In other words, none of the fees Miller and
Kimball incurred would have been incurred but for the application for and issuance of
the temporary restraining order. See Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 597 (Utah
App. 1993). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded
Miller and Kimball attorneys fees in the amount of $20,000.
V.

MILLER AND KIMBALL ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS
FEES FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL.
In the proceeding below, the trial court properly awarded attorneys fees to Miller

and Kimball based upon having to respond to and defend against a wrongfully issued
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temporary restraining order. As the prevailing party below, Miller and Kimball are
entitled to recover attorneys fees reasonably incurred on appeal. Utah Dept. of Social
Serv. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1993, 1997 (Utah App. 1991). Additionally, the arguments
raised by Martineau on appeal are not new. As a consequence, pursuant to Rule 33(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should award Miller and Kimball
their attorneys fees for having to respond to this frivolous appeal. See Utah R.App.P.
33(a); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309-310 (Utah App. 1987).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to set aside the Default Judgment. Further, the Court
should conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
injunctive relief and allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Finally, the Court should
uphold the award of attorneys fees and further award attorneys fees to Miller and
Kimball for having to respond to this appeal.
DATED this 6th day of October, 1998.
SUITTER AXLAND

AdkCyAf
M J C E t . Jt>NES,/Esq(
MARK R. GAYLORD, Esq.
Attorneys for Miller and Kimball, Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of October, 1998, I caused to be hand
delivered, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, to the
following two:

Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
Robert L. Payne, Esq.
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 1

JUH2=>
VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Robert D. Merrill, #2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B.
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN
corporation)
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY,
Certified Public Accountants,

STIPULATION AND MOTION RE
PARTIAL SETTLEMENT,
ASSIGNMENT OF CAUSE OF
ACTION, SUBSTITUTION OF
PLAINTIFF AND DISMISSAL OF
CERTAIN DEFENDANTS
Civil No. 920900094PR
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

This Stipulation is entered into as of the ZUJ~day of
June, 1993 by, between and among Republic Capital Bank, F. S. B. ,
(now known as TCF Bank Wisconsin, fsb, a federal savings bank
(the "Bank"), Judge Building Associates, a Utah limited
[partnership ("Judge Building Associates"), Harold J. Hill
("Hill"), J. Michael Martin ("Martin") and Sam Sampinos
("Sampinos") as follows:

0* 0 0 7 9 S

RECITALS
A.

On January 8, 1992 Bank filed a Verified

Foreclosure Complaint (the "Complaint") against Judge Building
Associates, Hill and Martin.

The Complaint was amended on

February 2, 1992 in order to join Wilma W. Gardner as a personal
representative of the estate of Kenneth N. Gardner, deceased
("Gardner") and Martineau & Company, certified public accounts
(" Martineau").
B.

The Complaint was filed to foreclose a trust deed

(the "Trust Deed") in favor of Bank covering real property and
improvements located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 known as the Judge Building and more particularly
described in the Complaint (the "Property").
C.

Judge Building Associates, Hill, Martin, Gardner

and Martineau were all duly served.

Judge Building Associates,

Hill and Martin have filed answers and Martin has filed a third
party complaint against Sampinos.

Sampinos has filed a

counterclaim against Martin and Martin has filed a response
thereto.
D.

Bank, Judge Building Associates, Hill and Martin

have agreed with Gardner to pay Gardner the total sum of $15,000
in exchange for Gardner' s release and reconveyance of the
Gardner encumbrance against the Property.
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E.

Martineau has not filed any responsive pleading

and on March 3, 1993, upon the Bank's Motion the Court entered
its default judgment against Martineau.
F.

Judge Building Associates, as "Seller", has

entered into a Real Estate Sale and Purchase Agreement and
Escrow Instructions (the "Purchase Agreement") with Daniel A.
Miller and David M. Kimball, as "Purchaser" with respect to the
Property, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto
marked Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof.
G.

In order to implement the terms of the Purchase

(Agreement, the parties hereto have agreed to the settlement of
certain claims as among them with respect to the matters covered
by the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this
Stipulation.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties stipulate as follows and
move the Court to enter an order approving this Stipulation.
1.

Escrow.

The Purchaser, Bank, Judge Building

Associates, Hill and Martin acknowledge that the documents and
funds called for in the letter of escrow instructions (the
"Escrow Instructions") addressed to Associated Title Company
(the "Escrow Agent") have been delivered or will be placed with
the escrow agent within two (2) days of Court approval of this
Stipulation.
2.

Substitution of Plaintiff: No Deficiency.

As of

the date hereof Bank has assigned to Purchaser the cause of
011X26932.2
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action set forth in the Complaint and the underlying note and
Trust Deed and the Purchaser has agreed that Purchaser' s rights
thereunder is junior and subordinate to the Trust Deed and other
loan documents entered into by the Bank and Purchasers pursuant
to the Purchase Agreement.

Accordingly, the parties stipulate

that Daniel A, Miller and David M. Kimball may be substituted in
the above entitled action as parties plaintiff in place of and
as successor to the Bank as plaintiff for the sole purpose of
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in
the Property and on the condition that no deficiency judgment
will be sought against Judge Building Associates, Hill or
Martin.

This substitution is made pursuant to the provisions of

[Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.
I
Claims.

3.

Completion of Foreclosure: Dismissal of Sampinos

The parties acknowledge that Miller and Kimball, or

their designated assignees, may proceed with the above entitled
foreclosure action or proceed with the non-judicial foreclosure
of the Trust deed, provided Hill and Martin are dismissed as
party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought against Judge
Building Associates, Hill or Martin after any sheriff s or
trustee's sale of the Property and that Purchaser indemnify and
hold the Bank harmless of or from any claims which may hereafter
be asserted against Bank by reason of any further actions taken
in this matter.

Martin and Sampinos agree that the Court may

enter an order dismissing the third party complaint and
011X26932.2
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counterclaim as between them without prejudice.

Judge Building

Associates stipulates that the Plaintiff may move Ex Parte and
without any notice to Judge Building Associates for the entry of
a decree of foreclosure consistent with the terms of this
Stipulation or dismiss the Complaint.
4.

Termination of Receivership.

The parties agree

that there is no further need for a Receiver in this Action and
I the receivership may be terminated and the Receiver released
upon the filing of a final report and accounting with the Court.
5.

Settlement of Disputed Claims.

The parties

acknowledge that this Stipulation is intended as a settlement of
disputed claims and that nothing contained herein constitutes an
admission of liability by any of the parties.
6.

Costs.

Each party shall bear his or its

attorneys' fees and costs of court incurred in connection with
this matter, the negotiation of this Stipulation and the
performance of this Stipulation.

Any party who sues

[successfully to enforce the terms of this Stipulation may
recover his, its or their costs of court and reasonable
attorneys fees incurred in the prosecution of that suit.
7.

Successors and Assigns.

All covenants and

agreements contained in this Stipulation shall bind and inure to
the benefit of the respective successors or assigns of the
parties hereto.
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8.

Entire Agreement.

This Stipulation contains the

entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements and
understandings oral or written pertaining to the same.

This

Stipulation may be amended or modified only by an agreement in
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any
waiver, amendment, extension or discharge is sought or the
assignee of such party.

No waiver of any provision of this

Stipulation and no consent to any departure by any party
therefrom shall in any event be effective unless the same shall
be in writing and signed by the other parties and then such
waiver or consent shall be effective only in the specific
instance or the specific purpose for which given.

This

Stipulation may be executed in counterparts each of which shall
be deemed an original but all of which taken together shall
constitute one and the same instrument.
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DATED this 2^

day of June, 1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

yio^^
Robert D. Merrill
Attorneys for TCF Bank
Wisconsin, fsb

Azda^

William C. Halls
Attorney for J. Michael Martin

William Russell
Attorney for Judge Building Associates,
Harold J. Hill and Sam Sampinos

APPROVED:
"PURCHASER"

Daniel A. Miller

David M. Kimball
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REAL ESTATE? SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT
AND ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS
This Real Estate Sale and Purchase Agreement and Escrow
Instructions (the "Agreement") is made and entered into by and
between JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a Utah general partnership,
(the "Seller"), and DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M. KIMBALL (the
"Purchaser"), and is effective as of this *~2J& day o f M £ s _ , 1993
(the "Effective Date"). This Agreement is also consented to and
joined in by TCF BANK WISCONSIN, F. S. B. , formerly Republic '
Capital Bank, F. S. B. ), a federal savings bank ("TCF") as its
interests may appear.
W I T N E S S E T H :
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE MUTUAL COVENANTS
contained herein, and other good and valuable consideration the
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the
Seller hereby agrees to sell and Purchaser hereby agrees to
purchase and pay for that certain property hereinafter described
in accordance with the following terms and conditions.
1.

PROPERTY

1.1 The conveyance by Seller to Purchaser shall
consist of all of the real property described in Exhibit "A"
attached to this Agreement (the "Real Property"), together with
all right, title, and interest, if any, of Seller in and to any
and all rights to use parking facilities, all roads, easements,
streets, and ways bounding the Real Property, and rights of
ingress and egress thereto and public or private utility
connection thereto.
1.2 The conveyance"by Seller to Purchaser also
shall include all improvements (the "Improvements") of any kind
whatsoever situated upon the Real Property, including, but not
limited to, the building now known as the Judge Building located
at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and fixtures
located on the Real Property (the "Building")..
1. 3 The conveyance by Seller to Purchaser also
shall include all tangible personal property, if any, located on
or in the Improvements owned by Seller (the "Personal Property").
The Real Property, Improvements, and Personal Property
are hereinafter sometimes collectively called the "Property."
At Closing the following shall be transferred and
assigned by Seller to Purchaser:
OU\24443.3-A
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1.4 The Tenant Leases, as more fully described in
Paragraph 3.1(g) below, and any refundable security deposits made
by the tenants thereunder;
1. 5 The Contracts, as more fully described in
Paragraph 3.1(f) below;
1.6 Any assignable warranties and guarantees in
conjunction with the Property;
1.7 All trade names, trademarks, and names owned
and assignable by Seller including the use of the name "Judge
Building", and telephone numbers used in connection with the
Property, and all intangible property rights related to the same;
and
1. 8 The plans and drawings and the engineering
reports more fully described in Paragraph 3. 2 below.
2.

PURCHASE PRICE

2.1 The purchase price for the Property shall be
Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00), which is
payable to TCF in the following manner:
(a) Twenty Five Thousand Dollars
($25,000.00) transferred by Purchaser to Associated
Title Company (the "Escrow Agent") as an Earnest Money
deposit at the same time as this fully executed
Agreement is delivered to the Escrow Agent. Prior to
Closing (the term is defined in paragraph 9. 1 below)
Purchaser shall deposit the additional sum of One
Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($175,000.00) for
a total of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00)
in the form of immediately available funds with the
Escrow Agent. The Earnest Money shall be placed in an
interest bearing account at a federally-insured bank
selected by Escrow Agent. If the $25,000.00 Earnest
Money is forfeited to Seller as provided in this
Agreement, Seller shall be paid the interest earned
thereon. If the Earnest Money becomes credited to
Purchaser or otherwise payable to Purchaser due to
Seller' s failure to timely perform, then the interest
earned thereon shall be paid to Purchaser at Closing.
(b) The balance of the purchase price shall
be paid by Purchaser in the form of:
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(i) Purchaser's execution at Closing of
a Promissory Note in favor of TCF in the original
principal amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($550,000.00 (the "Note"), providing for
interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of
Eight and One-Half percent per annum (8 1/2%) and
payable in equal monthly installment payments
amortized over a 25 year term with a final payment
due seven years after the date of the Note,
secured by a deed of trust, assignment of rents,
and security agreement (the "Deed of Trust")
encumbering the Property, and such additional
documents (the "Loan Documents") as may be usual,
customary and proper in the opinion of TCF and its
counsel to evidence and secure Purchaser' s
obligations to TCF.
3.

PRE-CLOSING OBLIGATIONS AND CONDITIONS

3.1 As of the Effective Date of this Agreement,
Seller or TCF has delivered to Purchaser, at TCF' s sole cost and
expense, each of the following:
(a) A current commitment (the "Title
Commitment") for the issuance of an ALTA standard
owner' s policy of title insurance from Associated Title
Company (the "Title Company") together with good and
legible copies of all documents referenced therein as
exceptions to Seller' s title. If Purchaser elects to
obtain extended coverage Purchaser shall satisfy all
obligations of the Title Company in connection
therewith, including without limitation the updating or
recertification of any survey;
(b) ALTA surveys of the Real Property and
Improvements meeting the accuracy standards of a Class
A survey as defined by ALTA/ACSM and prepared by a
surveyor or engineer licensed in the state of Utah (the
"Survey" );
(c) Drafts of the Note,-Deed of Trust and
Loan Documents in the usual form used by TCF for review
and approval by Purchaser within Five (5) working days
after the effective date of this Agreement;
(d) An inventory of the Personal Property,
which is located at the Property;
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(e) Copies of all existing warranties and/or
guaranties affecting the Building or any features
thereon and any Personal Property located therein or
thereon which shall be assigned to Purchaser at
Closing;
(f) Copies of all management, employment,
services, operations, maintenance and supply contracts
affecting or pertaining to the Property or the business
conducted thereon, together with a description of any
or all undertakings and/or modifications which are not
in writing (the "Contracts"). Purchaser shall assume
Contracts except for those which Purchaser shall notify
Seller in writing within ten (10) days after the
Effective Date that Purchaser will not assume at
Closing;
(g) Copies of rental agreements with those
tenants at the Property listed on Exhibit "BM attached
to this Agreement (the "Tenant Leases");
(h) Copies of 1992 real property tax
statements for the Property; and
(i) Copies of all periodic reports prepared
by Wallace Associates, the Court appointed receiver of
the Property (the "Receiver").
Purchaser acknowledges that the documents referred to
in Paragraph 3. 1(d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) have not been
prepared by Seller or TCF or at their direction and no warranty
is made as to the accuracy or completeness of these documents.
3.2 As of the Effective Date of this Agreement,
TCF has delivered to Purchaser, at TCF' s sole cost and expense,
each of the following to the extent that any such items which
pertain to the Property exist and are in the control or
possession of TCF: copies of any and all studies, engineering
data, site analysis, architectural drawings, tenant office floor
plans, floor plate drawings, reports, results of tests and
statements or records reflecting the expenses incurred in
connection with the operation of the Properties during the years
1989 to date, if available.
3.3 Within fifteen (15) days after the Effective
Date of this Agreement, Purchaser shall deliver to TCF such
information concerning Purchaser as TCF shall reasonably request
including, without limitation, Purchaser' s tax returns for the
-40il\24443.3-A
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two tax years immediately preceding the Effective Date of this
Agreement, Purchaser' s current financial statements, which shall
be true, accurate, and complete in all material respects,
together with a complete listing of each of Purchaser' s assets,
an authorization to TCF to obtain a credit report of Purchaser,
and Purchaser' s organizational documents.
3. 4 (a) Seller' s and TCF' s obligations under
this Agreement are subject to and conditioned, First, upon the
entry of a final order by the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah in the foreclosure action
commenced by TCF and entitled "Republic Capital Bank, F. S. B. v.
Judge Building Associates, et. a.," Civil No. 92090094PR (the
"Action") approving this Agreement, releasing the Receiver and
approving either the dismissal or other disposition of the
Action, and, second, the approval of this Agreement by the TCF' s
board of directors within ten (10) days after the Effective Date.
TCF shall notify Escrow Agent and Purchaser in writing within
five (5) days following the expiration of the foregoing 10-day
period that corporate approval has been obtained, then this
condition shall be deemed fulfilled or be waived. If TCF gives
timely notice of disapproval of this condition, then neither
party shall have any further obligation to the other hereunder,
Escrow Agent promptly shall return the Earnest Money to Purchaser
and Escrow Agent shall return to Seller or TCF any documents
delivered to escrow by them.
(b) TCF' s obligations under this Agreement
are further subject to and conditioned upon approval by TCF's
loan committee and board of directors within ten (10) days after
Purchaser' s submittal of the information as set forth in
paragraph 3. 3 above, of Purchaser' s Obligations and entering into
the Loan Documents. TCF shall notify Escrow Agent, Seller and
Purchaser in writing within five (5) days following the
expiration of the foregoing 10-day period that corporate approval
obtained, then this condition shall be deemed fulfilled or
waived. If TCF gives timely notice of disapproval of this
condition, then no party shall have any further obligation to the
other hereunder; Escrow Agent promptly shall return the Earnest
Money to Purchaser and Escrow Agent promptly shall return the
Earnest Money to Purchaser and Escrow Agent s.hall return to
Seller or TCF any documents delivered to escrow by Seller.
3. 5 Seller or TCF shall deliver tenant estoppel
statements to Purchaser for all tenants occupying more than 1000
square feet of leased space within five (5) days after the
effective date of this Agreement.
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TITLE REVIEW

4. 1 Purchaser shall have a period of five (5)
days after the Effective Date (the "Title Review Period") to
provide written disapproval to Escrow Agent and TCF of the
condition of title to the Property as disclosed by the Title
Commitment and thereby to terminate this Agreement. All
exceptions to Seller' s title which are shown on Schedule B of the
Title Commitment and to which no written objection is timely made
shall be considered "Permitted Exceptions." If the Title Company
amends the Title Commitment after the expiration of the Title
Review Period to provide for exceptions in addition to the
Permitted Exceptions, then the Purchaser shall either accept by
written notice provided to Seller and Escrow Agent within five
(5) days after receipt thereof the additional exceptions as
Permitted Exceptions or elect in the same period by written
notice to Seller and Escrow Agent to terminate this Agreement.
If Purchaser shall timely disapprove the Title Commitment in
writing or thereafter shall timely disapprove in writing any
additional exceptions in accordance herewith, this Agreement
shall be deemed terminated and the Earnest Money and all interest
earned thereon shall be promptly returned to the Purchaser, any
documents delivered to escrow by Seller or TCF shall be returned
to them and thereafter no party shall have any further rights or
obligations under this Agreement.
5.

FEASIBILITY STUDY AND INSPECTIONS

5. 1 Purchaser represents and acknowledges that
Purchaser has conducted a feasibility study of the Property, and
reviewed and inspected the items delivered by Seller or TCF
pursuant to this Agreement.
5. 2 During this Feasibility Period, Purchaser and
its duly authorized agents and representatives have been entitled
to enter upon the Real Property and Improvements at all
reasonable times to inspect the operation of the Property and to
conduct whatever other inspections Purchaser has deemed necessary
or advisable with respect to the structural integrity of the
Building or otherwise, including the conduct of environmental
assessments. Seller or TCF shall not be required to take any
action or effect any remediation of defects alleged to have been
discovered by Purchaser during the Feasibility Period.
6.

DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION PRIOR TO CLOSING

6. 1 In the event t h a t the Improvements, or any of
them, are damaged by any casualty p r i o r to Closing, the cost of
-6011X24443.3-A
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repairing such damage shall be estimated by an architect retained
by TCF.
6.2 If the cost of repairing such damage as
estimated in accordance with Paragraph 6.1 above is less than
FIFTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($50,000.00), then the Seller
or TCF shall repair such damage as promptly as is reasonably
possible, restoring the damaged property at least to its
condition, immediately prior to such damage; and, in the event
such repairs have not been completed prior to Closing, then the
Closing shall nevertheless proceed as scheduled, and Purchaser
may have the Escrow Agent withhold from TCF the funds necessary
to make such repairs until Seller or TCF has repaired such damage
pursuant to the provisions hereof, at which, time such funds shall
be distributed to TCF.
6. 3 If the cost of repairing such damage as
estimated in accordance with Paragraph 6.1 above is greater than
FIFTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($50,000,000), then Purchaser
may elect to terminate this Agreement and receive a refund of the
Earnest Money and the interest earned thereon. alternatively,
with the approval of Purchaser and TCF, TCF shall, at TCF' s sole
expense, repair the damage as promptly as is reasonably possible,
restoring the damaged property at least to its condition
immediately prior to the casualty, and Closing hereunder shall be
deferred until such repair is made; or at TCF's and Purchaser' s
Agreement, Seller shall pay to Purchaser, at Closing, all
insurance proceeds payable for such damage, and the sale shall be
closed without Seller' s repairing such damage.
7.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES: RELEASE

7. 1 Representations and Warranties of Seller.
Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that:
(a)
conditions set
conditions set
the full power
this Agreement

Upon satisfaction or waiver of the
forth in Paragraph 3. 4 above and the
forth in Paragraph 9.3 below, Seller has
and authority to enter into and perform
to the terms hereof;

(b) Except for the Action, Seller has not
received written notice of any litigation pending or
threatened (including without limitation proposed or
threatened condemnation) affecting the Property or
Seller' s ability to consummate this transaction, or of
any violations of any laws, regulations, ordinances or
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statutes in connection with the use and ownership of
the Property;
(c) Seller has not received notice of any
violation of any applicable laws, regulations, or
ordinances with respect to the Property; and
(d) Seller and TCF make no representation or
warranty as to the transfer to Purchaser of title to
any item of personal property, it being understood by
Purchaser that the personal property being acquired by
Purchaser "as is, where is."
7.2 Release. Except with respect to the
representations and warranties set forth in Paragraph 7. 1 above:
Except for those matters which Seller is or may be
liable for due to its ownership of the Property, during
its ownership of the Property, Seller, the Receiver and
TCF are hereby released from all responsibility and
liability regarding the condition of materials or
substances that have been or may in the future by
determined to be toxic, hazardous, undesirable or
subject to regulation and that may need to be specially
treated, handled and/or removed from the Property under
current or future federal, state and local laws and
regulations;
Seller, Receiver and TCF are hereby released from
all liability with respect to all matters with regard
to the valuation or utility of the Property or its
suitability for any purpose whatsoever;
Purchaser expressly acknowledges that Purchaser
has not relied on any warranties, promises,
understandings or representations, express or implied,
of Seller, Receiver or TCF or RCB or of any agent of
Seller or TCF, relating to the Property which are not
contained in this Agreement, and that Purchaser is
acquiring the Property in its present condition and
state of repair, "AS IS," with all defects, latent or
apparent, and subject to all matters which an accurate
inventory, survey or physical inspection of the
Property would disclose;
Purchaser acknowledges that any information of any
type which Purchaser has received or may receive from
Seller, Receiver or TCF or their agents is furnished on
-8011X24443.3-A

the express condition that Purchaser shall make an
independent verification of the accuracy of such
information, all such information being furnished
without any warranty whatsoever and Purchaser agrees
that Purchaser will not attempt to assert any liability
against Seller, Receiver or TCF for furnishing such
information.
Purchaser acknowledges having inspected the
Property, having observed its physical characteristics
and existing conditions and having had the opportunity
to conduct such inventory, investigation and study on
and of said Property and adjacent areas as it deems
necessary and hereby waives any and all objections to,
complaints about or claims (including, without
limitation, federal, state or common law based actions
and any private right of action under state or federal
law including but not limited to, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
and any state environmental statute, to which the
Property is, or may be, subject) regarding physical
characteristics and existing conditions, including,
without limitation, subsurface soil and water
conditions and solid and hazardous waste and hazardous
substances on, under or adjacent to the Property; and
Purchaser further hereby assumes the risk of
changes in applicable laws and regulations relating to
environmental conditions, so long as such changes do
not occur before the Closing, on the Property and the
risk that adverse physical characteristics and
conditions, including, without imitation, the presence
of hazardous substances or other contaminants, may not
have been revealed by its investigation.
7.3 Representations and Warranties of Purchaser.
Purchaser hereby represents and warrants to Seller and TCF that
as of the date hereof, the individuals executing this Agreement
on behalf of Purchaser are authorized to do so, and as of the
Closing the persons executing all documents to effect the
transfer and transactions contemplated hereby shall be fully
authorized to do so.
7. 4 Re-Certification; Survival. All
representations set forth in this Paragraph 7 are deemed to have
been re-certified as of Closing by the party making such
representation. The representations and warranties shall not be
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deemed to have merged in the delivery of any deed, assignment or
bill of sale but shall survive the Closing.
8.

ESCROW PERIOD

8.1 From and after the Effective Date of this
Agreement until the earlier of the termination of this Agreement
or the Closing, Seller and/or TCF shall:
(a) Maintain and manage the Property through
the Receiver in its present condition, ordinary wear,
tear and casualty excepted, and will punctually perform
every obligation and undertaking of lessor or landlord
under any Tenant Leases;
(b) Continue to actively promote the
Property for lease, and Not enter into any new Tenant
Leases or modifications of existing Tenant Leases
without the written consent of Purchaser; and
(c) Be responsible for obtaining the final
billing for utilities as of Closing, and Purchaser
shall be required to have all utilities transferred to
Purchaser' s name as of the Closing; provided, however,
Purchaser shall be entitled to have all utilities
transferred to Purchaser' s name as of the Closing in
order that there shall be no interruption of utility
services. Utilities, including, without imitation,
telephone, gas, water and electricity, shall be
apportioned on the basis of the final meter reading the
final invoice to be obtained by Receiver. Purchaser
shall be responsible for all utility charges from and
after the Closing. All utility deposits shall be paid
over to TCF at Closing and Purchaser shall make new
utility deposits at Closing.
9.

CLOSING

9.1 The Closing or Close of Escrow shall take
place at the office of the Escrow Agent no later than June, 1993,
subject to such reasonable extension as may be necessary for TCF
to complete the process described in paragraph 3.4 above. If
Closing fails to timely occur by June, 1993, or as may be
extended by TCF as a result of the failure of the conditions set
forth in this Agreement then this Agreement shall terminate and
the Earnest Money and all interest earned shall be promptly
returned to Purchaser any documents delivered to escrow by Seller
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shall be promptly returned to Seller and therefore neither party
shall have further rights or objections hereunder.
9.2 At Closing, Seller shall deliver or cause to
be delivered to Purchaser, at Seller' s sole cost and expense,
each of the following items:
(a) A Special Warranty Deed executed and
acknowledged on behalf of Seller, in recordable form,
conveying good and indefeasible fee simple title to the
Properties to Purchaser in the form attached hereto as
Exhibit "C," subject to all current taxes, reservations
in patents, all easements, rights-of-way, covenants,
conditions, and restrictions as may appear of record,
all leases and all matters which an accurate survey or
a physical inspection of the Property would disclose;
(b) A certificate of non-foreign status in
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "D":
(c) An ALTA standard Owner's Policy of Title
Insurance or, if timely requested by Purchaser, an ALTA
extended Owner's Policy of Title Insurance (the "Title
Policy") issued by the Title Company in the full amount
of the purchaser price insuring good and indefeasible
title to the Real Property in the Purchaser subject
only to the Permitted Exceptions; the cost of a
Standard Owner' s Title Policy shall be paid by TCF;
(d) All original warranties and guaranties,
if any, and the keys pertaining to or affecting the
Property or any portion thereof and an assignment, duly
executed and acknowledged by Seller, assigning to
Purchaser all of Seller' s right, title and interest, if
any, in all warranties and guaranties applicable to the
Properties, or any part thereof in the form of Exhibit
"E" hereto;
(e). A bill of sale duly executed and
acknowledged by Seller, transferring and assigning the
Personal Property free and clear of all liens in the
form of Exhibit "F" hereto;
(f) The originals of the Tenant Leases and
all amendments thereto, together with an assignment
duly executed and acknowledged by Seller, assigning all
of Seller' s interest in and to said Tenant Leases to
Purchaser in the form of Exhibit " G" hereto;
-11011X24443.3-A
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(g) Duly executed Estoppel Certificates with
respect to each Tenant Lease or the certification by
Seller or the Receiver as to the status of each Tenant
Lease;
(h) An assignment, duly executed and
acknowledged by Seller, assigning to Purchaser (who
shall assume Seller' s obligations thereunder) all of
Seller' s rights under the Contracts in the form of
Exhibit "H":
(i) All additional documents and
instruments, including those documents described in
paragraphs 1 and 3. 2 above, this Agreement requires to
be provided by Seller at Closing, and all additional
documents and instruments as in the reasonable opinion
of the Title Company or Escrow Agent are reasonably
necessary for the proper consummation of this
transaction.
9. 3 At Closing, Purchaser shall deliver or cause
to be delivered to TCF. the following items
(a) The duly executed Loan Documents
referred to in Paragraph 2. 1(b) above;
(b) The premium differential to obtain ALTA
extended title insurance coverage if such has been
timely requested by Purchaser and the cost to obtain
the extended title insurance and the premium for any
special or other endorsements as may have been
requested by Purchaser; and
(c) All additional documents and instruments
this Agreement requires to be provided by Purchaser at
Closing and all additional documents and instruments as
in the reasonable opinion of the Title Company or
Escrow Agent are reasonably necessary for the proper
consummation of this transaction.
;

fe*

9. 4 At Closing, the following items shall be ZjvDbKS^s fMa&u.
paid, adjusted or prorated between Seller and Purchaser:
StUi^.U>-<(a) Ad valorem taxes and any general or
-3- \ ^ ^ nQ_
special assessments for the Property for the current *
calendar year shall be prorated as of the date of J - » ^ c v ^ ^ Y t e
Closing on the basis of the latest available tax bill £«****
^
and shall not be subject to subsequent adjustment;
~^^ ^c"*-vOU<
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(b) Charges for the Title Policy shall be
made as provided in paragraph 9.2(c) above and 9.3(d)
above;
(c) All rent will be apportioned as of 11:59
p. m. on the day preceding the Closing. No prorations
shall be made for delinquent rents existing as of the
Closing. With respect to such delinquent rents,
Purchaser shall make a reasonable attempt to collect
the same for Seller' s benefit after Closing in the
usual course of operation of the Property, and any such
collection shall be remitted to Seller promptly upon
receipt by Purchaser; provided, however, that nothing
contained herein shall opt or to require Purchaser to
institute any lawsuit or other collection procedure to
collect such delinquent rents. In this regard, the
first money is collected from tenants owing delinquent
rents shall be applied to the current month' s rent and
retained by Purchaser and any overage shall be
forthwith paid by Purchaser to TCF for the delinquent
rents;
(d) All prepaid rents and refundable
security deposits actually collected and received by
Seller shall be credited to Purchaser. Non-refundable
deposits shall remain the property of Seller; and
(e) All other Closing costs (except as
otherwise set forth in this Agreement and professional
fees which shall be the responsibility of the party
employing the professional except as otherwise set
forth in this Agreement and in the event of litigation
concerning this Agreement), including, but not limited
to, recording and escrow fees, shall be shared by the
parties according to local custom.
9. 5 Without limitation, it shall be the
obligation of the Escrow Agent at Closing or promptly thereafter
as the case may be:
(a) To record the Special Warranty Deed
delivered hereunder and upon recordation the Special
Warranty Deed shall be delivered to Purchaser;
(b) To deliver to Purchaser those items
specified in Paragraph 9. 2(d)-(j) above;
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(c) To perform the prorations specified in
Paragraph 9. 4 hereof; and
(d) To deliver to TCF the funds referred to
in Paragraph 9.3(a) above, and the Loan Documents which
are not recorded and to record TCF Loan Documents as
directed by TCF and upon recordation they shall be
delivered to TCF.
9. 6 Possession of the Property and keys thereto
shall be delivered to Purchaser by Seller or the Receiver at
Closing.
9.7 Purchaser agrees to indemnify and hold TCF,
the Receiver and Seller harmless of and from any and all
liabilities, claims, demands, and expenses, of any kind or nature
(except those items which by the terms of this Agreement
specifically remain the obligation of Seller, TCF or the
Receiver) arising or occurring subsequent to the date of Closing
and which are in any way related to the ownership, maintenance,
or operation of the Property, including, but not limited to,
court costs and attorneys' fees. TCF agrees to indemnify and
hold Purchaser harmless of and from any and all liabilities,
claims, demands, and expenses of any kind or nature (except those
which by the terms of this Agreement specifically become the
obligation of Purchaser) arising or occurring prior to the date
of Closing that are in any way related to the ownership,
maintenance, or operation of the Property, including but not
limited to court costs and attorneys' fees.
9.8 In the event any party hereto receives notice
of a claim or demand which results or may result in
indemnification pursuant to Paragraph 9. 7 above, such party shall
immediately give notice thereof to the other. The party
receiving such notice shall immediately take such measures as may
be reasonably required to properly and effectively defend such
claim, and may defend same with counsel of its own choosing. In
the event the party receiving such notice fails to properly and
effectively defend such claim, and in the event such party is
liable therefor, the party so giving such notice may defend such
claim at the expense of the party receiving such notice.
10.

REMEDIES UPON DEFAULT

10.1 In the event that Seller or TCF fails to
timely comply with all conditions, covenants, and obligations
Seller or TCF has hereunder, such failure shall be an event of
default and Purchaser shall have the option (a) to terminate this
-1401i\24443.3-A
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Agreement and receive immediately without further instruction or
consent of Seller or TCF the Earnest Money and all interest
earned thereon, or (b) grant Seller and TCF additional time
within which to comply.
10. 2 In the event all conditions of this
Agreement are satisfied and all covenants and agreements to be
performed prior to Closing are fully performed, but the sale is
not consummated through a default on the part of Purchaser, then
Seller shall have the option (a) to terminate this Agreement and
to receive from Escrow Agent upon demand liquidated damages in
the amount of the Earnest Money and all interest earned thereon,
such amount being agreed upon by the between the Seller or TCF
and the Purchaser as liquidated damages due to the difficulty and
inconvenience of ascertaining and measuring actual damages, and
the uncertainty thereof; or (b) to sue to enforce this Agreement
by specific performance.
11.

MISCELLANEOUS

11.1 Any notice to be given or served upon any
party hereto in connection with this Agreement must be in writing
and shall be deemed to have been given (including by courier and
electronic facsimile transmission) and received and served
personally on the party to whom notice was given or on the second
day after mailing if mailed to the party to whom notice is to be
given by first class mail, certified or registered, postage
prepaid, return receipt requested and property addressed to
Purchaser, Seller and Escrow Agent as follows:
To Seller:

Judge Building Associates
c/o Harold J. Hill
366 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

With Copies to:

William C. Halls, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
William R. Russell, Esq.
#8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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To TCF:

TCF Bank Wisconsin, F. S. B.
500 West Brown Deer Road
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53223
Attn: Richard C. Thiermann,
Senior Vice President
Fax No. : (414) 351-8680

With copy to:

Robert D. Merrill, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Fax No. : (801) 534-0058

To Purchaser:

Daniel A. Miller
c/o D.M. Properties Incorporated
13601 Ventura Blvd, Suite 93
Sherman Oaks, California 91423
David M. Kimball
Kimball Investments
999 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

With copy to:

David R. Olsen, Esq.
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

To Escrow Agent:

Associated Title Company
349 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

11.2 Any representations and warranties contained
in Paragraph 7.1 above shall be true and correct on the date of
Closing, and Purchaser shall have no obligation to close if such
representations and warranties are not true and correct as of
such date. Any representations and warranties contained in
Paragraph 7. 3 above shall be true and correct on the date of
Closing, and Seller shall have no obligation to close if such
representations and warranties are not true and correct as of
such date. It is further understood and agreed that any and all
representations, warranties, covenants, and agreements contained
herein, whether to be performed before or after the time of
Closing, shall not be deemed to be merged into or waived by the
instruments of Closing, but shall expressly survive Closing and
shall be binding upon the party obligated thereby.
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11.3 This Agreement shall be construed and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
Venue for any action shall be Salt Lake County, Utah only and the
parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of any federal or state
court in such county.
11.4 Where required for proper interpretation,
words in the singular shall include the plural; the masculine
gender shall include the neuter and the feminine, and vice versa.
The terms "heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns" shall
include "successors, legal representatives, and assigns."
11.5 This Agreement may not be modified or
amended, except by an agreement in writing signed by each of the
parties signing below. The parties may waive any of the
conditions contained herein or any of the obligations of the
other party hereunder, but any such wavier shall be effective
only if in writing and signed by the party waiving such
conditions or obligations.
11.6 Purchaser may not assign its right, title
and interest under this Agreement without the prior written
consent of Seller and TCF which may be granted or denied in
Seller' s and TCF' s sole and absolute discretion.
11.7 In the event any party files a suit in
connection with this Agreement or any provisions contained
herein, then the substantially prevailing party in such action
shall be entitled to recover, in addition to all other remedies
or damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of court
incurred in such suit.
11.8 The descriptive headings of the several
articles, sections, and paragraphs contained in this Agreement
are inserted for convenience only and shall not control or affect
the meaning or construction of any of the provisions hereof.
11.9 This Agreement (and the items to be
furnished in accordance herewith) constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties pertaining to the subject matter
hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements
and understandings of the parties in connection therewith. No
representations, warranties, covenants, agreements, or conditions
not expressed in this Agreement shall be binding upon the parties
hereto or shall affect or be effective to interpret, change, or
restrict the provisions of this Agreement; provided, however,
that all certifications, representations, and warranties of
Seller contained in the statements and schedules to be furnished
-17OU\24443. 3-A
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herewith, shall become a part of this Agreement as though st
forth herein.
11.10 Numerous copies of this Agreement may be
executed by the parties hereto. Each such executed copy shall
have the full force and effect of any original executed
instrument.
11.11 This Agreement shall be of no force and
effect unless Purchaser shall execute and deliver the Agreement
to Seller by 5:00 p.m. local time, May 28, 1993 and unless Seller
shall have executed this Agreement and delivered it to Escrow
Agent on or before 5:00 p.m. local time, May 28, 1993. The
deliveries required herein may be made by facsimile provided ink
originals are delivered within forty-eight hours after the
facsimile transmission.
11. 12 Time is of the essence in the performance
of each of the provisions of this Agreement, however, in the
event the provisions of this Agreement require any act to be done
or action to be taken hereunder on the date which is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday observed by Escrow Agent, such act or
action shall be deemed to have been validly done or taken if done
or taken on the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday observed by Escrow Agent.
11.13 In the event any provision or part of this
Agreement is deemed invalid, illegal or unenforceable, prior to
Closing, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability will not
affect the remaining provisions of this Agreement provided that
if the change materially affects the terms of this Agreement,
then either party may elect to terminate this Agreement, in which
event the Earnest Money and all interest earned thereon, will be
returned to Purchaser with all interest earned thereon and
thereupon this Agreement shall be null and void and of no further
force and effect.
11.14 All exhibits to this Agreement are fully
incorporated herein as though set forth at length.
11.15 In the event that eminent domain or
condemnation proceedings are commenced or notice is given of any
such proceedings or if any easements or dedications are sought on
or against any portion of the Real Property prior to Closing,
Purchaser shall have the right (a) to cancel this Agreement or
(b) to close the transaction contemplated hereunder, in which
event Purchaser shall be entitled to receive any and all
condemnation or eminent domain proceeds.
-18011\24443.3-A

11.16 Seller and TCF shall pay Wallace Associates
a commission which is equal to six percent (6%) of the purchase
price as computed in Paragraph 2. 1 above for services rendered on
behalf of Seller, TCF and Purchaser in this transaction. The
foregoing commissions shall be deemed to have been earned and is
due and payable only upon the Closing of this transaction and
recordation of the Special Warranty Deed. Except for the payment
of the foregoing commission, each party warrants to the other
that it has not entered into any agreement that would subject the
other to the payment of any real estate commissions or fees due
or allegedly due any broker by reason of such agreement. Wallace
Associates shall pay Kimball Investments fifty percent (50%) of
said commission through escrow.
11. 17
Nothing in this Agreement shall confer
upon any person, firm or corporation not party to this Agreement,
or the legal representatives of such person, firm or corporation,
any rights or remedies of any nature or kind whatsoever under or
by reason of this Agreement, except as expressly set forth
herein.
11. 18
The terms and provisions of this
Agreement represent the results of negotiations between Seller
and Purchaser, each of which has been represented by counsel of
its own choosing, and neither or which have acted under any
duress or compulsion, whether legal, economic or otherwise.
Consequently, the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be
interpreted and construed in accordance with their usual and
customary meanings, and Seller and Purchaser hereby waive the
application of any rule of law which would otherwise be
applicable in connection with the interpretation and construction
of this Agreement including (without limitation) any rule of law
to the effect that ambiguous or conflicting terms or provisions
contained in the executed draft of this Agreement shall be
interpreted or construed against the party whose attorney
prepared the executed draft or any earlier draft of this
;/%
Agreement.
/C<1.—
11. 19
TCF agrees to be responsible for the
proper and timely construction and installation of all required
improvements and equipment in connection with the new Judge Cafe
lease, and pay for all improvement and leasing costs,^in
»\ . ,
connection therewith. Purchaser shall have no responsibility or VV*-'-1*
f
liability in connection therewith.
2»r^
11. 20
It is a condition of purchase and
Purchaser' s obligations hereunder, that prior to the close of
escrow, there be executed a new parking agreement with the owner
-19011X24443.3
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of the Exchange Parking Terrace, utilizing proper and current
legal descriptions, that reaffirms the right of the Judge
Building and its tenants to certain minimum parking privileges in
the Exchange Parking Terrace, It is understood that Seller and
TCF make no warranty or representation to Purchaser in connection
with such parking privileges or rights, but shall assist
Purchaser in obtaining such rights.
11.21
In connection with the settlement of the
Action and the sale of the Property to Purchaser, TCF agrees to
preserve and assign to Purchaser the right to foreclose on the
leasehold interest of Martineau & Company.
DATED this 1**

day of May, 1993.

CONSENT AND JOINDER
TCF consents to and joins in the foregoing Agreement
and agrees to be bound by and perform those provisions pertaining
to TCF.
-20011X24443.3
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of the Exchange Parking Terrace, utilizing proper and current
legal descriptions, that reaffirms the right of the Judge
Building and its tenants to certain minimum parking privileges in
the Exchange Parking Terrace. It is understood that Seller and
TCF make no warranty or representation to Purchaser in connection
with such parking privileges or rights, but shall assist
Purchaser in obtaining such rights.
11.21
In connection with the settlement of the
Action and the sale of the Property to Purchaser, TCF agrees to
preserve and assign to Purchaser the right to foreclose on the
leasehold interest of Martineau & Company.
DATED this

day of May, 1993.
SELLER:
Judge Building Associates,
a Utah general partnership

By
Harold J. Hill, Partner

PURCHASER:

CONSENT AND JOINDER
TCF consents to and joins in the foregoing Agreement
and agrees to be bound by and perform those provisions pertaining
to TCF.
-20011X24443.3
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DATED this ^ ^ day of May, 1993
TCF
TCF Bank,
Republic

Its

\//cc -
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EXHIBIT "A1
The following tract of real property lying in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah:
PARCEL 1;
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence
East 148. 50 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West
148. 50 feet; thence North 100 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a non-exclusive right of
way over and across the following:
BEGINNING 138. 5 feet East of the
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and
running thence South 100. 0 feet; thence
South 7° 16' East 168.3 feet; thence East
10.0 feet; thence North 7° 16' West 168.3
feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence
West 10.0 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
PARCEL 2: (Foot-Walls)
A perpetual right to maintain and erect a Foot-Wall
upon a strip of land described as follows:
BEGINNING at the bottom of the building
at a point 100 feet South of the
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey,
at depth of not less than 14 feet
beneath the level of Main Street; and
running thence East 138 1/2 feet; thence
South 2 feet; thence West 138 1/2 feet;
thence North 2 feet to the place of
BEGINNING.
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EXHIBIT "B"
List of tenant leases to be provided at Closing.
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EXHIBIT "C"
pPSCIAL WARRANTY DEED
WHEN RECORDED. MAIL TO:
Daniel A- Miller
David M. Kimball
c/o Kimball Investment Company
999 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, Utah general partnership,
Grantor, of 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, hereby
CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against those claiming by, through, or under
said Grantor, but not otherwise, to DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M.
KIMBALL, as tenants in commons, c/o Kimball Investment Company,
999 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Grantee, for
the sum of Ten and No/100 Dollars ($10.00), and other good and
valuable consideration, the following described real property in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
The following tract of real property lying in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah:
PARCEL 1;
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence
East 148. 50 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West
148. 50 feet; thence North 100 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a non-exclusive right of
way over and across the following:
BEGINNING 138. 5 feet East of the
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat W A M , Salt Lake City Survey; and
running thence South 100.0 feet; thence
South 7° 16' East 168.3 feet; thence East
10.0 feet; thence North 7° 16' West 168.3
feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence
West 10. 0 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
-2401l\24443.3-A

PARCEL 2: (Foot-Walls)
A perpetual right to maintain and erect a Foot-Wall
upon a strip of land described as follows:
BEGINNING at the bottom of the building
at a point 100 feet South of the
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey,
at depth of not less than 14 feet
beneath the level of Main Street; and
running thence East 138 1/2 feet; thence
South 2 feet; thence West 138 1/2 feet;
thence North 2 feet to the place of
BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO:

WITNESS the hand of said Grantor as of the
, 1993.

day of

JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah general partner

By
Harold J. Hill
General Partner
STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me
this
day of
, 1993, by Harold J. Hill, the
General Partner of Judge Building Associates, a Utah general
partnership.
NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at:
My Commission E x p i r e s :
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EXHIBIT "D"
NON-FOREIGN AGREEMENT
Section 144 5 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
a transferee of a U.S. real property interest must withhold tax
if the transferor is a foreign person. To inform Daniel A.
Miller and David M. Kimball ("Transferee") that withholding of
tax is not required upon the disposition of a U. S. real property
interest by Judge Building Associates, a Utah general
partnership, ("Transferor"), Transferor hereby certifies as
follows:
1.
Transferor is not a foreign corporation, foreign
partnership, foreign trust, or foreign estate (as those terms are
defined in the Internal Revenue Code and Income Tax Regulations);
2.
Transferor' s U. S. employer identification number
and address are:
(a)

Judge Building Associates
c/o Harold J. Hill, General

Fed. ID Number

Transferor agrees to inform Transferee if it becomes a
foreign person at any time during the three year period
immediately following the date of this notice.
Transferor understands that this affidavit may be
disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service by Transferee and that
any false statement contained herein could be punished by fine,
imprisonment, or both.
Under penalties of perjury the undersigned declares
that he has examined this affidavit and to the best of his
knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete, and the
undersigned further declares that he has authority to sign this
affidavit on behalf of Transferor.
DATED as of the

day of June, 1993.
"TRANSFEROR"

By
Its
-260UX24443. 3-A

The undersigned hereby acknowledges and affirms to the
below named notary public that (1) [s]he appeared before such
notary public, holds the position or title set forth above, and,
on behalf of the above named corporation by proper authority,
either executed the foregoing document before such notary public
or acknowledged to such notary public that the undersigned
executed the foregoing document, and that (2) the foregoing
document was the act of such corporation for the purpose stated
in it.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

this
of

)
:
)

ss,

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me
day of
, 19
, by
, a
corporation.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
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EXHIBIT " E"

Assignments of warranties to be provided at Closing.
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EXHIBIT " F

BILL QT SALE
(Without Warranties)
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, Utah general partnership,
SELLER, of 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, for and
in consideration of the sum of Ten and no/100 hundred dollars
($10.00), and other good and value of consideration, hereby
sells, transfers and assigns, without warranty and "AS IS" all of
Seller' s right, title and interest in and to that certain
personable property located at 8 East Broadway/ Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 as more particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
The Seller makes no representation as to title to said
property, the right to sell same or whether said property is
subject to any liens or encumbrances, the same being sold to
Seller without warranty and "AS IS."
DATED this

day of June, 1993.
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah general partnership

By
Harold J. Hill
General Partner
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EXHIBIT
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Original tenant leases to be delivered at Closing.
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EXHIBIT "H"
Assignments of contracts to be delivered at Closing.
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 2

HLED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN23 1993
Robert D. Merrill, #2244
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

DepjWsteTiT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B.
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN
corporation,

PETITION FOR SETTLEMENT
OF FINAL ACCOUNT OF
RECEIVER; AND FOR DECREE
OF DISCHARGE OF RECEIVER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH H. GARDNER,
Deceased, MARTINgAU & COMPANY,
Certified Public Accounts,

Civil No. 920900094PR
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

David L. Jewkes, of Wallace Associates Management,
Inc.,

a Utah corporation (the "Receiver") states as follows:
1.

The Receiver is the duly appointed, qualified and

acting receiver of that certain real property located at and
commonly known as The Judge Building, 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111, which real property is more particularly

described at Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference
made a part hereof (the "Subject Premises").

2.

The Receiver was appointed by Order of this Court

entered on the 10th day of January, 1992, and the Receiver has
preserved the Subject Premises, has collected the rents arising
therefrom during the pendency of this action, has paid all
reasonable and proper costs and expenses and has taken all other
necessary and proper actions in connection with this
receivership.

At the present time the Subject Premises are

being transferred to purchasers pursuant to the terms of a
stipulation file concurrently with this petition (the
"Stipulation"), and there is no further need for the Receiver's
services.
3.

The Receiver is now preparing for filing with

this Court a Final Account showing all of the rents, issues and
profits which have been collected and received during the
accounting period and all disbursements which have been made by
Receiver.

The Receiver anticipates that there will be cash on

hand as of the date of the Final Account which should be paid
over to the Plaintiff and further accounted for as provided in
the Purchase Agreement, a copy of which is attached to the
Stipulation.

Said Final Account, together with prior quarterly

reports filed herein, shall constitute a true and correct
statement of all funds received and disbursed by Receiver with
regard to the Subject Premises.

011X34862.1

4.

The Receiver is entitled to reasonable

compensation for the services rendered by it in connection
therewith as set forth in the Quarterly Reports and the Final
Account.
5.

After payment of all costs of the receivership

and of all expenses of the administration thereof, the balance
of the sums collected by Receiver as rents, issues and profits
from the Subject Premises should be paid over to Plaintiff.
6.

Upon payment of all of the costs of the

receivership and the expenses of administration, the payment of
the remaining sums as hereinabove stated the Receiver will be
entitled to be released and discharged as Receiver.
WHEREFORE, the Receiver requests as follows:
1.

That the Receiver' s Final Account be approved and

allowed upon filing with the Court and approved by Plaintiff;
2.

That all acts of the Receiver in respect of the

receivership of the Subject Premises be approved and ratified;
3.

That the Receiver be discharged as Receiver of

the Subject Premises;
4.

That upon the discharge of Receiver, the Court

enter an Order releasing Receiver from any further duty or
obligation herein; and
5.

That such further orders be entered herein as may

be necessary.
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DATED this _^5fday of June, 1993.

DavicT L. Jewkes, of and for
Wallace Associates Management, Inc.
APPROVED:
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

<

Y^A>-0

Robert D. M e r r i l l
A t t o r n e y s f o r Republic C a p i t a l Bank, F. S. B.

A yAJ<?

William C. ' Halls
Attorney for J. Michael Martin

/

^

William R. R u s s e l l
A t t o r n e y f o r Judge B u i l d i n g A s s o c i a t e s
Harold J. H i l l
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EXHIBIT "A1
The following tract of real property lying in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah:
PARCEL 1:
BEGINNING at the Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence
East 148.50 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West
148. 50 feet; thence North 100 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a non-exclusive right of
way over and across the following:
BEGINNING 138. 5 feet East of the
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and
running thence South 100.0 feet; thence
South 7° 16' East 168.3 feet; thence
• East 10.0 feet; thence North 7° 16' West
168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet;
thence West 10. 0 feet to the point of
BEGINNING.
PARCEL 2: (Foot-Walls)
A perpetual right to maintain and erect a Foot-Wall
upon a strip of land described as follows:
BEGINNING at the bottom of the building
at a point 100 feet South of the
Northwest corner of Lot 5, Block 52,
Plat, Plat "A"., Salt Lake City Survey,
at depth of not less than 14 feet
beneath the level of Main Street; and
running thence East 138 1/2 feet;
thence South 2 feet; thence West 138
1/2 feet; thence North 2 feet to the
place of BEGINNING.
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 3

FILEO DISTRICT CSUaT
Third Judicial District

JUN 2 2 1993
SALT LAKE COUNT

V

VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Robert D. Merrill, #2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

O^uty Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B.
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN
corporation)
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY,
Certified Public Accountants,

ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION
AND MOTION RE PARTIAL
SETTLEMENT, ASSIGNMENT OF
CAUSE OF ACTION,
SUBSTITUTION OF PLAINTIFF
AND DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN
DEFENDANTS
Civil No. 920900094PR
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

The Stipulation and Motion re Partial Settlement,
[Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff and
Dismissal of Certain Defendants dated June J<j , 1993 having been
considered by the Court and good cause appearing
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

011\26932.2

The Stipulation is approved.

2.

Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are

substituted as parties plaintiff in the place of Republic
Capital Bank, F.S.B., (formerly known as Republic Savings & Loan
Association of Wisconsin, a Wisconsin corporation).

All

pleadings filed hereafter shall reflect this substitution.
3.

Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball are

substituted as parties plaintiff for the sole purpose of
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau & Company,
Certified Public Accountants, may have in the property which is
the subject matter of the Complaint and on the condition that no
deficiency judgment will be sought or granted against Judge
Building Associates, a Utah limited partnership, Harold J. Hill
or J. Michael Martin.
4.

Harold J. Hill and J. Michael Martin are hereby

dismissed as parties defendant.
5.

The third party Complaint and counterclaim as

between J. Michael Martin and Sam Sampinos are dismissed without
prejudice.
6.

The parties to the Stipulation are direct to take

such other and further steps as may be necessary or appropriate
to implement the terms and provisions thereof.
DATED t h i s ^ y d a y of June, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

FranJiCG. No£3r
jf
D i s t r i c t Court Judge; J
011X26932.2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing ORDER by mailing copies thereof,
postage prepaid to the following this ^ 3 * d a y of June, 1993:
Robert D. Merrill
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
William C. Halls, Esq.
9 Exchange, Place, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
William R. Russell, Esq.
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Daniel A. M i l l e r
DM Properties, Inc.
13601 Ventura Blvd., Suite 93
Sherman Oaks, California 91423
David M. Kimball
Kimball Investment Co.
999 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 4

DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037)
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M.
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN,
a Wisconsin Corporation),
Plaintiffs,

)
])
]
]

EX PARTE MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE

]

vs.

]

JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY,
Certified Public Accountants,

]I

Civil No. 920900094PR

)i
]
}
]
]
]

Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

]
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Plaintiffs Daniel A, Miller and David M. Kimball, through their attorneys David R.
Olsen and Claudia F. Berry of Suitter Axland & Hanson, make this ex parte motion for entry
of a Decree of Foreclosure.
STATEMENT OF ttKTFVANT FACTS
1.

On the 21st day of June, 1993, plaintiffs' predecessor, Republic Capital Bank,

F.S.B., and the defendants Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, J. Michael Martin, and
Sam Sampinos entered into a written Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment
of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants. A copy of
this Stipulation is appended as Exhibit A.
2.

In accordance with the Stipulation, on June 22, 1993, the court entered an Order

Approving the Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action,
Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants. A copy of the Order is appended
as Exhibit B.
3.

Pursuant to the Stipulation and Order, defendants Harold J. Hill and J. Michael

Martin were dismissed as parties defendant.

Defendant Wilma W. Gardner, as personal

representative of the Estate of Kenneth N. Gardner, has executed a release and reconveyance
of her encumbrance against the property. See Recital D of the Stipulation.
4.

Default judgment has been entered against defendant Martineau & Company. A

copy of the Default Judgment is appended as Exhibit C.
5.

Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation, Judge Building Associates stipulated

that the plaintiffs "may move Ex Parte and without notice to Judge Building Associates for the
entry of a decree of foreclosure consistent with the terms of this Stipulation. . . ." Paragraph

2
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3 further states that the plaintiffs "may proceed with the above-entitled foreclosure action . . .
provided Hill and Martin are dismissed as party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought
against Judge Building Associates. Hill, or Martin after any sheriffs or trustee's sale of the
property and that Purchaser indemnify and hold Bank harmless of or from any claims which may
hereafter be asserted against Bank by reason of further actions taken in this matter."
Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, and in accordance with the default judgment
entered against Martineau & Company, plaintiffs are entitled to a Decree of Foreclosure against
Judge Building Associates and Martineau & Company, the remaining defendants in this case.
As required by the Stipulation and Order, no deficiency judgment may be sought or granted
against Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, or J. Michael Martin. Further, inasmuch as
Martineau & Company was not a party to the contract with Republic Capital Bank, no deficiency
judgment may be granted against it, and it has no right of redemption.
DATED this ^

day of September, 1993.
SUTTTER AXLAND & HANSON

David R. Olsen, Esq.
Claudia F. Berry, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
hmd34.22
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Robert D. Merrill, #2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
I N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B.
( F o r m e r l y known a s REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN
corporation)

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
||De ceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY,
jjCertified Public Accountants,

STIPULATION AND MOTION RE
PARTIAL SETTLEMENT,
ASSIGNMENT OF CAUSE OF
ACTION, SUBSTITUTION OF
PLAINTIFF AND DISMISSAL OF
CERTAIN DEFENDANTS
Civil No. 920900094PR
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

This Stipulation is entered into as of the ZUf"day of
June, 1993 by, between and among Republic Capital Bank, F. S. B. ,
(now known as TCF Bank Wisconsin, fsb, a federal savings bank
(the "Bank"), Judge Building Associates, a Utah limited
partnership ("Judge Building Associates"), Harold J. Hill
("Hill"), J. Michael Martin ("Martin") and Sam Sampinos
("Sampinos") as follows:

'v V O 0 1

RECITALS
A.

On January 8, 1992 Bank filed a Verified

Foreclosure Complaint (the "Complaint") against Judge Building
Associates, Hill and Martin.

The Complaint was amended on

February 2, 1992 in order to join Wilma W. Gardner as a personal
representative of the estate of Kenneth N. Gardner, deceased
("Gardner") and Martineau & Company, certified public accounts
("Martineau").
B.

The Complaint was filed to foreclose a trust deed

(the "Trust Deed11) in favor of Bank covering real property and
improvements located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 known as the Judge Building and more particularly
described in the Complaint (the "Property").
C.

Judge Building Associates, Hill, Martin, Gardner

and Martineau were all duly served.

Judge Building Associates,

Hill and Martin have filed answers and Martin has filed a third
party complaint against Sampinos.

Sampinos has filed a

counterclaim against Martin and Martin has filed a response
thereto.
D.

Bank, Judge Building Associates, Hill and Martin

have agreed with Gardner to pay Gardner the total sum of $15,000
in exchange for Gardner' s release and reconveyance of the
Gardner encumbrance against the Property.

011X25932.2
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E.

Martineau has not filed any responsive pleading

and on March 3, 1993, upon the Bank's Motion the Court entered
its default judgment against Martineau.
F.

Judge Building Associates, as "Seller", has

entered into a Real Estate Sale and Purchase Agreement and
lEscrow Instructions (the "Purchase Agreement") with Daniel A.
Miller and David M. Kimball, as "Purchaser" with respect to the
Property, a copy of which Purchase Agreement is attached hereto
marked Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part hereof.
G.

In order to implement the terms of the Purchase

Agreement, the parties hereto have agreed to the settlement of
certain claims as among them with respect to the matters covered
by the Complaint in accordance with the terms of this
Stipulation.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties stipulate as follows and
move the Court to enter an order approving this Stipulation.
1.

Escrow.

The Purchaser, Bank, Judge Building

Associates, Hill and Martin acknowledge that the documents and
funds called for in the letter of escrow instructions (the
"Escrow Instructions") addressed to Associated Title Company
(the "Escrow Agent") have been delivered or will be placed with
the escrow agent within two (2) days of Court approval of this
Stipulation.
2.

Substitution of Plaintiff: No Deficiency.

As of

the date hereof Bank has assigned to Purchaser the cause of
01i\26932.2
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action set forth in the Complaint and the underlying note and
Trust Deed and the Purchaser has agreed that Purchaser' s rights
thereunder is junior and subordinate to the Trust Deed and other
loan documents entered into by the Bank and Purchasers pursuant
to the Purchase Agreement.

Accordingly, the parties stipulate

I that Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball may be substituted in
the above entitled action as parties plaintiff in place of and
as successor to the Bank as plaintiff for the sole purpose of
completing the foreclosure of any interest Martineau may have in
the Property and on the condition that no deficiency judgment
will be sought against Judge Building Associates, Hill or
Martin.

This substitution is made pursuant to the provisions of

Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.
3.
Claims.

Completion of Foreclosure: Dismissal of Sanvpinos

The parties acknowledge that Miller and Kimball, or

their designated assignees, may proceed with the above entitled
foreclosure action or proceed with the non-judicial foreclosure
of the Trust deed, provided Hill and Martin are dismissed as
party defendants, no deficiency judgment is sought against Judge
Building Associates, Hill or Martin after any sheriff's or
trustee's sale of the Property and that Purchaser indemnify and
hold the Bank harmless of or from any claims which may hereafter
be asserted against Bank by reason of any further actions taken
in this matter.

Martin and Sampinos agree that the Court may

enter an order dismissing the third party complaint and
011X26932.2
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IIcounterclaim as between them without prejudice.

Judge Building

Associates stipulates that the Plaintiff may move Ex Parte and
without any notice to Judge Building Associates for the entry of
a decree of foreclosure consistent with the terms of this
Stipulation or dismiss the Complaint.
4.

Termination of Receivership,

The parties agree

| that there is no further need for a Receiver in this Action and
the receivership may be terminated and the Receiver released
upon the filing of a final report and accounting with the Court.
5.

Settlement of Disputed Claims.

The parties

acknowledge that this Stipulation is intended as a settlement of
disputed claims and that nothing contained herein constitutes an
admission of liability by any of the parties.
6.

Costs.

Each party shall bear his or its

attorneys' fees and costs of court incurred in connection with
this matter, the negoriation of this Stipulation and the
performance of this Stipulation.

Any party wh$ sues

successfully to enforce the terms of this Stipulation may
recover his, its or their costs of court and reasonable
attorneys fees incurred in the prosecution of that suit.
7.

Successors and Assigns.

All covenants and

agreements contained in this Stipulation shall bind and inure to
the benefit of the respective successors or assigns of the
parties hereto.

011N26932.2
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8.

Entire Agreement.

This Stipulation contains the

entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements and
understandings oral or written pertaining to the same.

This

Stipulation may be amended or modified only by an agreement in
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement of any
waiver, amendment, extension or discharge is sought or the
assignee of such party.

No waiver of any provision of this

Stipulation and no consent to any departure by any party
therefrom shall in any event be effective unless the same shall
be in writing and signed by the other parties and then such
waiver or consent shall be effective only in the specific
instance or the specific purpose for which given.

This

Stipulation may be executed in counterparts each of which shall
be deemed an original but all of which taken together shall
constitute one and the same instrument.

011X26932.2
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DATED this 2^

day of June, 1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

yu^^
Robert D. Merrill
Attorneys for TCF Bank
Wisconsin, fsb

William C. Halls
Attorney for J. Michael Martin

William Russell
Attorney for Judge Building Associates,
Harold J. Hill and Sam Sampinos

APPROVED:
PURCHASER"

Daniel A. Miller

David M. Kimball

011X26932.2
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SENT BY:

DAtlD t h i t

Ju.n 1 4 , 9 3 1
) No 3 0 1 P ri7
YANCOTT.BAOLEYW . M , & ; * A . ? - ° 7

day of Juna, 1993.
VAN COTT, &AGL«Y, CORNWALL * McCAWHY

ROb#rt D. I t e r r i l i
Attorney! for tcF Bank
Wisconsin, fsb

WilliWB C. H*ll8

Attorney '£oz J. Michael Martin

Kill!am Rutaall
Attorney for Judge Building Aftsooiatas,
Harold J, K i l l and San Sampinoa

APPROVED:

David M. Kl
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FILES DISTRICT CdCST
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Third Judicial District

JUN 2 2 1993
i SALT LAKE COUNT
/ /

VAN COTT, BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Robert D. Merrill, #2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

Deputy Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B.
( F o r m e r l y known a s REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN
corporation)
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
jpersonal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY,
Certified Public Accountants,

ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION
AND MOTION RE PARTIAL
SETTLEMENT, ASSIGNMENT OF
CAUSE OF ACTION,
SUBSTITUTION OF PLAINTIFF
AND DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN
DEFENDANTS
Civil No. 920900094PR
Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

The Stipulation and Motion re Partial Settlement,
[Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff and
Dismissal of Certain Defendants dated June JZJ , 1993 having been
considered by the Court and good cause appearing
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

The Stipulation is approved.

011X26932.2
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2.

D a n i e l A. M i l l e r and David M. Kimball a r e

s u b s t i t u t e d as p a r t i e s p l a i n t i f f
C a p i t a l Bank,

F. S. B. ,

( f o r m e r l y known as R e p u b l i c S a v i n g s & Loan

A s s o c i a t i o n of Wisconsin,
pleadings

i n t h e p l a c e of R e p u b l i c

a Wisconsin corporation).

f i l e d hereafter shall r e f l e c t this
3.

All

substitution.

D a n i e l A. M i l l e r and David M. Kimball a r e

s u b s t i t u t e d as p a r t i e s p l a i n t i f f

f o r t h e s o l e purpose o f

c o m p l e t i n g t h e f o r e c l o s u r e of any i n t e r e s t Martineau & Company,
C e r t i f i e d Public Accountants,

may have i n t h e p r o p e r t y which i s

t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of t h e Complaint and on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t no
d e f i c i e n c y judgment w i l l be sought o r g r a n t e d a g a i n s t Judge
Building Associates,
o r J.

a Utah l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p ,

Harold J.

Hill

Michael Martin.
4.

Harold J.

d i s m i s s e d as p a r t i e s
5.
b e t w e e n J.

H i l l and J.

Michael Martin a r e hereby

defendant.

The t h i r d p a r t y Complaint and c o u n t e r c l a i m as

Michael Martin and Sam Sampinos a r e d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t

prejudice.
6.

The p a r t i e s t o t h e S t i p u l a t i o n are d i r e c t t o t a k e

s u c h o t h e r and f u r t h e r s t e p s as may be n e c e s s a r y or a p p r o p r i a t e
t o implement t h e terms and p r o v i s i o n s
DATED t M s ^ f f i d a y

of June,

thereof.
1993.

BY 51^E COURT:
tfO&3rJ!
FraxiRQS. No
D i s t r i c t Court Judge^ J
01t\26932.2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing ORDER by mailing copies thereof,
postage prepaid to the following this

~23day

of June, 1993:

Robert D. Merrill
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
William C. Halls, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
William R. Russell, Esq.
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Daniel A. Miller
DM Properties, Inc.
13601 Ventura Blvd., Suite 93
Sherman Oaks, California 91423
David M. Kimball
Kimball Investment Co.
999 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

,i(j^2^w
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Robert D. Merrill, #2244
Attorneys for Republic Capital Bank
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
REPUBLIC CAPITAL BANK, F. S. B.
(Formerly known as REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
OF WISCONSIN, a WISCONSIN
corporation)
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS MARTINEAU &
COMPANY, CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
Deceased;

Civil No. 920900094PR
Honorable Frank G. Noel

MARTINEAU & COMPANY,

Certified Public Accountants,
Defendants.

Upon motion of plaintiff and the affidavit of Robert
D. Merrill, and the Court having previously duly entered the
default certificate of defendant Martineau & Company, Certified
Public Accountants, upon the Amended Complaint of the plaintiff
on file herein,
-1-
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1-

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant

Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants, in accordance
with its Amended Complaint to the effect that the lien or
interest, if any, of the defendant Martineau & Company,
Certified Public Accountants is inferior, junior and subordinate
to the lien of plaintiff upon the real property at issue herein,
which property is located at #8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly described as
follows

(the "Property").
PARCEL A:
Beginning 13 8. 50 feet East of the Northwest
corner of Lot 5, Block 52 Plat "A", Salt
Lake City Survey; and running thence South
100.0 feet; thence South 7 degrees 16
minutes East 168.3 feet; thence East 10.0
feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes West
168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence
West 10. 0 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL B:
Beginning at a point 55. 0 feet East and
160.0 feet South of the Northwest corner of
Lot 6, Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City
Survey; and running thence East 12. 0 feet;
thence South 127.0 feet; thence West 72.4
feet; thence North 20. 0 feet; thence East
60. 4 feet; thence North 87. 0 feet; thence
North 45 degrees West 14. 10 feet; thence
West 40.40 feet; thence South 45 degrees
West 15.50 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16
minutes West 47. 70 feet; thence South 30
degrees 00 minutes East 30.40. feet; thence
East 52. 0 feet to the point of beginning.
-2
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The use of Parcel B is limited to providing
turnaround space for vehicles using the
right of way described as Parcel A above.
ALSO: Together with any rights enjoyed in
and to a foot-wall upon a strip of land
described as follows: Commencing at the
bottom of the building at a point 100 feet
South of the Northwest corner of Lot 5,
Block 52, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey,
at depth of not less than 14 feet beneath
the level of Main Street; and running thence
East 138-1/2 feet; thence South 2 feet;
thence West 138-1/2 feet; thence North 2
feet to the place of beginning, as set forth
in Agreement dated March 11, 1907, recorded
March 13, 1907, as Entry No. 219820, in Book
2-K of Liens and Leases, at Pages 325 - 327.
The above described property also known by
the street address of #8 East Broadway, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111.
2.

The defendant Martineau & Company is not a

judgment debtor in the above-entitled action, is not a creditor
having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the Property and is not
a successor in interest to any such person or entity, and is not
entitled to redeem the Property or any part thereof from any
sale of the Property pursuant to Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

Upon any execution sale of the Property pursuant

to order of this Court in the above entitled action any interest
or lien claimed by the defendant Martineau & Company shall be
forthwith extinguished and terminated.

-3011\26932.1
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DATED this ^

day of F*ferory, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

te
Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this

^

day of Fy binary, 1993 to the

following:
William R. Russell, Esq.
Attorney for Harold Hill and Judge Building Associates
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
William C. Halls, Esq.
Attorney for J. Michael Martin
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Martineau & Company
8 East Broadway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

9^^^v^^
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DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037)
SUTTTER AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M.
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN,
a Wisconsin Corporation),

DECREE OF FORECLOSURE

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 920900094PR

JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY,
Certified Public Accountants,

Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

Having reviewed: Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Decree of Foreclosure; the
Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of
1

Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants; and the Order Approving Stipulation and Motion
Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal
of Certain Defendants; and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that the property described below be sold at public auction by the
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales, and
that the Sheriff, when the subject property is sold by him, shall retain first his costs,
disbursements, and commissions from the proceeds of such sale, and then pay the remainder of
the proceeds to plaintiffs to be applied to the amount owing by defendant Judge Building
Associates, together with interest, costs, attorney's fees, and expenses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no deficiency judgment may be sought or granted
against the defendants.
The court finds that the interest of Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, J. Michael
Martin, Wilma W. Gardner, and Martineau & Company are subordinate to the interest of
plaintiffs, and these defendants are foreclosed of all right, title, and interest in the subject
property. As stated in the Default Judgment against Martineau & Company, Martineau &
Company does not have any rights of redemption.
The real property is described as:
PARCEL A:
Beginning 138.50 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 5,
Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence
South 100.0 feet; thence South 7 degrees 16 minutes East 168.3
feet; thence East 10.0 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes
West 168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence West 10.0 feet
to the point of beginning.

2

PARCEL B:
Beginning at a point 55.0 feet East and 160.0 feet South of the
Northwest comer of Lot 6, Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City
Survey; and running thence East 12.0 feet; thence South 127.0
feet; thence West 72.4 feet; thence North 20.0 feet; thence East
60.4 feet; thence North 87.0 feet; thence North 45 degrees West
14.10 feet; thence West 40.40 feet; thence South 45 degrees West
15.50 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes West 47.70 feet;
thence South 30 degrees 00 minutes East 30.40. feet; thence East
52.0 feet to the point of beginning.

DATED:

az%t w

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
)
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037)
SUTTTER AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M.
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN,
a Wisconsin Corporation),
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)

ORDER OF SALE

;
;
]
]
]

JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
;)
Utah Limited Partnership;
]
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
;i
MARTIN; WTLMA W. GARDNER, as ]
personal representative of the
]
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER, ]
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY, ]
Certified Public Accountants,
}
Defendants.

Civil No. 920900094PR
Honorable Frank G. Noel

]

TO THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, GREETING:
WHEREAS on the 16th day of September, 1993, issued a Decree of Foreclosure against
defendants Judge Building Associates and Martineau & Company, Certified Public Accountants,

1
l)

'J *•> v• 0U '*•'
i \J>'•

which Decree of Foreclosure was entered by the Clerk of Salt Lake County, and a certified copy
of the Decree of Foreclosure is attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof;
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the real property described in the
Decree of Foreclosure be sold at public auction.
NOW, THEREFORE, you, the said Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah, are hereby
commanded and required to proceed to notice for sale, and to sell the property described in the
Decree of Foreclosure and apply the proceeds of said sale as directed in the Decree of
Foreclosure and you shall make and file your report of such sale with the Clerk of this Court
within sixty (60) days from date of your receipt thereof, and you shall do all things according
to the terms and requirements of said Decree of Foreclosure, and the applicable provisions and
requirements of law.
EXECUTED this

day of

, 1993.

DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

, Clerk

By:

.Deputy Clerk

hmd3424
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 5
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DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458)
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, ESQ. (5037)
SUHTER AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7300

^nvtvcien,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M.
KIMBALL (substituted as parties plaintiff
in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as
REPUBLIC SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN,
a Wisconsin Corporation),

^-o->^

DECREE OF FORECLOSURE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 920900094PR

JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
MARTIN; WJJLMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF KENNETH N. GARDNER,
Deceased; MARTINEAU & COMPANY,
Certified Public Accountants,

Honorable Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

Having reviewed: Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Decree of Foreclosure; the
Stipulation and Motion Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of

1

Plaintiff, and Dismissal of Certain Defendants; and the Order Approving Stipulation and Motion
Re Partial Settlement, Assignment of Cause of Action, Substitution of Plaintiff, and Dismissal
of Certain Defendants; and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that the property described below be sold at public auction by the
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales, and
that the Sheriff, when the subject property is sold by him, shall retain first his costs,
disbursements, and commissions from the proceeds of such sale, and then pay the remainder of
the proceeds to plaintiffs to be applied to the amount owing by defendant Judge Building
Associates, together with interest, costs, attorney's fees, and expenses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no deficiency judgment may be sought or granted
against the defendants.
The court finds that the interest of Judge Building Associates, Harold J. Hill, J. Michael
Martin, Wilma W. Gardner, and Martineau & Company are subordinate to the interest of
plaintiffs, and these defendants are foreclosed of all right, title, and interest in the subject
property. As stated in the Default Judgment against Martineau & Company, Martineau &
Company does not have any rights of redemption.
The real property is described as:
PARCEL A:
Beginning 138.50 feet East of the Northwest corner of Lot 5,
Block 52 Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey; and running thence
South 100.0 feet; thence South 7 degrees 16 minutes East 168.3
feet; thence East 10.0 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes
West 168.3 feet; thence North 100.0 feet; thence West 10.0 feet
to the point of beginning.

2

PARCEL B:
Beginning at a point 55.0 feet East and 160.0 feet South of the
Northwest corner of Lot 6, Block 52 Plat "AH, Salt Lake City
Survey; and running thence East 12.0 feet; thence South 127.0
feet; thence West 72.4 feet; thence North 20.0 feet; thence East
60.4 feet; thence North 87.0 feet; thence North 45 degrees West
14.10 feet; thence West 40.40 feet; thence South 45 degrees West
15.50 feet; thence North 7 degrees 16 minutes West 47.70 feet;
thence South 30 degrees 00 minutes East 30.40. feet; thence East
52.0 feet to the point of beginning.

DATCD: iLLM}
'

hmd34.23
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HONORABLE F^RANK^G. NOEL ^
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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November 30, 1993

VIA FAX:

(801) 532-7355

Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
Suitter Axland & Hanson
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
S a l t LaJce C i t y , Utah 84101
Re:

Judge Building Matter

Dear Bruce:
I forward herewith a proposed draft of a Temporary
Restraining Order pursuant to the Court7s ruling this morning.
Please let me know whether you need to request any changes.
It is my understanding that you have cancelled the
pending sale (I just received your faxed letter to the Deputy
Sheriff) and that it is not necessary to have the actual Temporary
Restraining Order signed by the court prior to noon today. Please
let me know if I am incorrect in that understanding.
After we have agreed to the form of the Temporary
Restraining Order, I confirm that we need to make a joint telephone
conference to Judge Noel's clerk to schedule a hearing on the
injunction.
Your clients have indicated to Mr. Martineau that a
proposal for a new lease would be forthcoming. To date we have
seen no proposal. I suggest in the best interest of both of our
clients, now is the time to consider a voluntary lease amendment
before the legal action goes much further- If your client wants to
discuss any proposal, I encourage a proposal to be made as soon as
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Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
November 30, 1993
Page 2
possible. While you may choose to forward the proposal through my
office, I have no problem if the clients vant to discuss the matter
directly themselves.
Sincerely,
ATtfrffi NELSON RASMUSSEN
yCHKISTENSEN

kruca J.

Nelson

BJN/slf
Enclosure
cc;

Leiand A. Martineau
( v i a fax) (801) 364-0961
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LAW OFFICES OF

ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN &

CHRISTENSEN

A PttOrcSStONAL CORPORATION

SUITE 9 0 0
215 SOUTH STATE STREET

FACSIMILE
(SOI) 3 6 3 - 3 6 M

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*111

BRUCE J. NELSON

TELEPHONE (SOI) 53l-6«400

January 5, 1994
VIA "HAND DELIVERY"
Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
Suitter Axland & Hanson
175 South West Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

JUDGE BUILDING MATTERS

Dear Bruce:
I enclose the original Temporary Restraining Order which I have held pending
the setting of a Court date. Please approve it as to form and return it to me for
presentation to Judge Noel. Once signed, I will deposit the $1,000 bond with the court
clerk.
As we also previously discussed, I briefly reviewed the documents in the
possession of Harold Hill. Frankly, he did not have a very good set of documents. I took
the liberty of copying anything that looked relevant. I had indicated to you that I would
provide a copy of any documents which I obtained through inspection of Mr. HilPs files.
As a result, I enclose herein miscellaneous documents which were copied from his files. I
also indicated to Mr. Hill that the subpoena was "open" and that you reserved the right to
review his files at a later date, if necessary.
Sincerely,
NELSON RASMUSSEN
RISTENSEN

J.
ruce J. Nelson
BJN:slf
Enclosures
cc:
Leland A. Martineau
ftft 1 *) 3=;

AFFELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 8

LAW orncES o r

ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
A l»«tOrtSSlONAU CORPORATION

SUITE 9 0 0
215 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 * I H
TELEPHONE (SOI) 5 3 I - 8 4 0 0

BRUCE J . NELSON

FACSIMILE
(SOI) 3 6 3 - 3 6 I 4

January 24, 1994

Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
Suitter Axland & Hanson
175 South West Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

MILLER & KIMBALL VS. MARTINEAU & COMPANY

Dear Bruce:
The purpose of this letter is to summarize our various verbal agreements in
the above-referenced matter and to let you know my understanding of where this matter is
going.
As you know, on November 30, 1993, Judge Noel granted my motion for a
temporary restraining order, which order stopped a pending sheriffs sale relating to my
client's tenancy at the Judge Building. The Judge ordered that my client post a $1,000 bond
as a condition of the temporary restraining order. My client immediately gave me $1,000
which has been sitting in my trust account since such time.
It is my understanding that we have agreed to the verbiage of a temporary
restraining order but have waited to submit the order to the court until we agreed upon a
date for a one-day hearing on the preliminary injunction. We have delayed the date from
time to time pending settlement negotiations between our clients.
A few weeks ago, we obtained the date of February 1, 1994 for the one-day
hearing on the preliminary injunction. Last week, you requested that the hearing date be
continued to allow the parties more time to resolve the matter. I agreed to a continuance
on the condition that the status quo would be maintained and that the hearing date would
not be reset until after May 1, 1994. As you know, my client is an accountant and his
schedule between now and April 15, 1994 would not permit him to have a hearing prior to
the month of May, 1994.
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Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
January 24, 1994
Page 2
It is my understanding that you have cancelled the February 1, 1994 hearing
date with the court, and explained to the clerk that we would attempt to resolve the matter
through stipulation. If we are unable to achieve a stipulation for settlement, either party
could schedule a hearing anytime after May 1, 1994.
We agreed on the phone that no formal order was necessary for signature by
the court. It is my understanding that we have agreed that the temporary restraining order
remains in effect until either (1) the parties agree otherwise, or (2) subsequent order of the
court. I have also agreed to hold the $1,000 bond in my trust account inasmuch as the clerk
will not accept the funds without a formal court order.
I have not yet had an opportunity to speak with my client regarding this
matter. It may be that Mr. Martineau will want a formal stipulation and court order
submitted for the court files. If so, I will prepare such documentation along the lines set
forth herein for your review and consideration.
In the meantime, my client has recently stated his position to Mr. Miller and
to Mr. Kimball. If they care to respond, the ball is in their court.
Please let me know if I have incorrectly stated any of our agreements in this
matter.
Sincerely,
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN
(KCHRISTENSEN

\Bruce J. Nelson
BJN:slf
cc:

Lee Martineau
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F«ANo.M.SUITTC.

SUITTER

S T C W A W T M. H A N S O N , Jm.

Au T A M

AXLAND

& HANSON

^worcmsiONAi. LAW C O N D O N A T I O N

WILLIAM L. P*ATC»
DAVID R. OLSCN

175 S O U T H WEST T E M P L E

C A S L E ADDPESS: S A X L A W

S E V E N T H FLOOR

rACS,M,LE:<80.> 3 3 3 - 7 3 3 3

^ V a O ^ O Y D
FNANC.S J . CA«NCY
J . MlCMACL HANSCN
C A « L F. H u c r N c a
A N D H C W W . BurrMtMC
M l O * A * L W. HOMCK
DAN

S A L T

L A K E

C I T Y

TELEPHONE

U T A H

S4I0I-I480

(SOl)5 3 2 - 7 3 0 0

^ «,
LCHOY S. AlLANO
(ISAI-ISSO)

W. E G A N

MiCMACu L. AU.CN
CxANi.cs P. S A M P S O N
JCSSC C. TltCNTAOUC
P A U L M. S I M M O N S
C L A U D I A F. B C N N Y
G A N T R. H C N N I C

H. MtCMAtL DNAHC
M A N * R. G A T L O N O
L O N I N E. P A T T C N S O N
J I L L L. D U N V O N - H A N S E N

DAMNCLLCB.oorLt

J u l y

2 2 ,

1994

Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Miller & Kimball v. Judge Building Associates

Dear Bruce:
Judge Noel says that the first he can fit us in would be
September 29 at 10:00 a.m. I think we better grab this date
because Judge Noel has a very busy calendar. Please confirm your
availability.
Sincerely,
^SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON
/

Bruce T. Jones
BTJ/sr
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ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
A MVOTCSSlOMAi. CO»»OftATiON

SUITE ©OO
215 SOUTH STATE STREET
BRUCE J . NELSON

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 6 * N I
TELEPHONE (SOI) 5 3 1 - 6 * 0 0

FACSIMILE
(aOl) 3 6 3 - 3 6 1 4

September 23, 1994

HAND DELIVERED
Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Miller Kimball/Martineau Matter

Dear Bruce:
As a follow-up to our telephone conversation this morning, I wanted to confirm my
understanding of the following:
1.

I have asked to see your client's acquisition file of the Judge Building. You
have asked to see my client's lease file. We tentatively agreed to allow each
other to review such files prior to the hearing. As I indicated on the phone,
I will be unavailable most of the day on Monday, September 26, 1994. I
suggest we try to exchange files or documents on Tuesday or Wednesday.

2.

I expressed a desire to have David Kimball available at the hearing. Please
let me know if he is not planning on being there.

3.
You do not wish to stipulate that this hearing can be considered to be a final
hearing on the matter, reserving the right to undertake additional discovery in connection
with any final hearing you may request. Obviously, I reserve the same right if we cannot
stipulate that this will be a final hearing.
On the phone this morning, we discussed possible witnesses. In reviewing the
potential witnesses, I fear we might have trouble completing the hearing within the time
allowed by the Court. I wonder if it might not save time to stipulate to some of the
undisputed facts. To accomplish that result, I have prepared a proposed stipulation of those
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ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN

Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
September 23, 1994
Page 2
facts which I think we both have no dispute. I enclose a copy of the proposed stipulation
herein. If you want to stipulate to some or all of the facts, please advise.
Sincerely,
NELSON RASMUSSEN &
USTENSEN
/

\

,

BJNrple
Enclosure

bjn\maninca\judgc\0009
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BRUCE J. NELSON, ESQ. (#2380)
ROBERT L. PAYNE, ESQ. (#5129)
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Defendant Martineau & Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL A. MILLER and DAVID M.
KIMBALL (substituted as parties
plaintiff in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin Corporation),

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
vs.
)
)
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a Utah Limited )
Partnership; HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
)
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as personal
)
representative of the ESTATE OF KENNETH
)
N. GARDNER, Deceased; MARTINEAU &
)
COMPANY, Certified Public Accountants,
)

STIPULATION OF
AGREED FACTS

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 920900094
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

)

A hearing for Preliminary Injunction is currently scheduled before the above-entitled
court for Thursday, September 29, 1994. The current parties to the above-entitled action,
in an effort to shorten the required time for hearing, seek to stipulate to certain undisputed

001241

facts. As a result, the parties stipulate and agree to the accuracy of the following facts
without the necessity of introducing evidence regarding the same:
1. On March 6,1986, Judge Building Associates ("Associates") was the record owner
of real property ("Property") located at 8 East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah. Such
Property is commonly known as the Judge Building.
2. On March 6, 1986, Associates executed a Trust Deed and Assignment of Leases
(Trust Deed") on the Property in favor of Republic Savings and Loan Association
("Lender") to secure a $2,300,000 note.
3. On November 13, 1990, Associates entered into a lease agreement ("Lease") with
Manineau & Company, CPA's ("Manineau") with respect to certain space located on the
5th floor of the Property.
4. Manineau continues to occupy such 5th floor space.
5. On January 8, 1992, lender filed a Complaint with this Coun to initiate a judicial
foreclosure proceeding of the Trust Deed. The Complaint alleged an unpaid balance owing
to Lender of approximately $2,200,000.
6. Subsequently, on February 11, 1992, Lender amended its Complaint to join
Manineau as a Defendant in order to make the Lease subject to the pending foreclosure.
7. Manineau did not respond to the Amended Complaint, and a Default Judgment
was later entered against Manineau finding that the Lease was subordinate to the Trust
Deed.
2
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8. In cooperation with the Lender, on June 21, 1993, Associates sold the Property
to Daniel A. Miller and David M. Kimball. The purchase price was $750,000. Mr. Miller
and Mr. Kimball made a down payment of $200,000 and executed a new Trust Deed of
$550,000 in favor of Lender,
9. As part of the transaction, lender assigned to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball the
beneficial interest of the original Trust Deed and such new owners were substituted as
Plaintiffs in this action.
10. Also, as part of the transaction, Associates was released from any liability on the
$2,300,000 note to Lender. Associates and its principals was dismissed as a Defendant in
this litigation.
11. Martineau is the only remaining Defendant
12. Thereafter, the current Plaintiffs sought, and obtained, an Order of Sale against
the property and Martineau's interest arising out of the Lease.
13. A Sheriffs Sale was scheduled for November 30, 1993.
14. Prior to the Sale, Martineau sought and obtained a Restraining Order from this
Court which stopped the pending Sheriffs Sale. The Sale has been postponed awaiting the
outcome of the pending hearing for a Preliminary Injunction. The hearing had been
continued without date pursuant to agreement of the parties.

3

G01243

This Stipulation does not prohibit or prevent either party from introducing additional
evidence to clarify or explain any of the foregoing facts, but is intended to assist the Court
in its decision of this matter and to expedite the hearing.
DATED this ^ 3

day of September, 1994.
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN
& CHRISTBNSEN

Jl

By:

AASrv^

Eunice J. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant Martineau &
Company
r>ATED this

day of September, 1994.
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON
By:
Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
Attorneys for Miller and Kimball

bjn\maninea\judge\0008
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A L L E N N E L S O N R A S M U S S E N <& C H R I S T E N S E N
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

SUITE 9 0 0
215 SOUTH STATE STREET

FACSIMILE
(601) 3 6 3 - 3 6 M

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*111

BRUCE J. NELSON

TELEPHONE (SOI) 53l-8<400

September 30, 1994
HAND DELIVERED
Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
SUTITER AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Miller and Kimball v. Martineau

Dear Bruce:
The Court did not request a written order following our hearing yesterday. However,
because no previous Temporary Restraining Order was ever executed by the Court, I would
like some record in the file of what occurred in that regard.
I have drafted a proposed Order which would document the Court's Order made
yesterday at our hearing, as well as confirm what happened with respect to the Temporary
Restraining Order.
I enclose the original of my proposed order. If it is acceptable, please approve it as
form and return it to me for filing with the Court. If the proposed Order is not acceptable,
I would appreciate your calling so that we could discuss the matter.
Sincerely,
AJ^fcBN NELSON RASMUSSEN &
CHRISTENSEN

I
^ruce J. Nelson
BJN:ple
Enclosure
bjn\mamnca\judgc\0014
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BRUCE J. NELSON, ESQ. (#2380)
ROBERT L. PAYNE, ESQ. (#5129)
Allen Nelson Rasmussen & Christensen
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Defendant Martineau & Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL A MILLER and DAVID M.
KIMBALL (substituted as parties
plaintiff in the place of REPUBLIC CAPITAL
BANK, F.S.B., Formerly known as REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF
WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin Corporation),

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
vs.
)
)
JUDGE BUILDING ASSOCIATES, a Utah Limited )
Partnership; HAROLD J. HILL; J. MICHAEL
)
MARTIN; WILMA W. GARDNER, as personal
)
representative of the ESTATE OF KENNETH
)
N. GARDNER, Deceased; MARTINEAU &
)
COMPANY, Certified Public Accountants,
)

ORDER

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 920900094
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

)

Defendant Martineau & Company's Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on for
hearing before the above-entitled Court on Thursday, September 29, 1994 at the hour of
10:00 a.m. The current Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, Bruce T.

ftft1 2 4 6

Jones, Esq. Defendant Martineau & Company, by and through its agent Leland A.
Martineau, was present and represented by its counsel, Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
On November 30, 1993, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order. Such Order stayed a pending Sheriffs Sale affecting real property
commonly known as the Judge Building in Salt Lake City, Utah. During settlement
negotiation between the parties, counsel for the parties verbally continued without date the
hearing on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction which was to follow the issuance
of the Temporary Restraining Order. No formal written Temporary Restraining Order was
executed on November 30, 1993, or thereafter.

Nevertheless, the Sheriffs Sale was

postponed by counsel for the current Plaintiffs, and the sale has not been rescheduled
pending hearing on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
The issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order was conditioned upon the posting
of a bond by the Defendant in the amount of $1,000. Such amount was delivered by
Defendant Martineau & Company to its counsel, Bruce J. Nelson. Pursuant to stipulation
of the parties' counsel, such amount has been held in Mr. Nelson's trust account in lieu of
deposit with the Clerk of the Court.
At the hearing on September 29, 1994, the parties stipulated to a continuance of the
hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
Pursuant to the pleadings and documents on file herein, the various stipulations of
the parties, and for good cause shown;
2
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

The Court acknowledges its issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order on

November 30, 1993. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, such Order remains in effect
pending a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction Motion, or pending other subsequent Order
of this Court.
2.

Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, the $1,000 bond on the Temporary

Restraining Order will be held in the trust account of counsel for Defendant in lieu of
deposit with this Court.
3.

The hearing on Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is continued

until Wednesday, November 2, 1994 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. as a second place setting. In
the event the hearing cannot be held on such date, it will be held on Thursday, December
22, 1994 at the hour of 8:30 a.m.
4.

On or before Friday, October 7, 1994, Defendant may file a memorandum

outlining legal theories, authorities and facts supporting its request for preliminary
injunction. Thereafter, Plaintiff may have through Monday, October 17, 1994 to file any
responsive memorandum. Thereafter, Defendant may file a reply memorandum on or
before Friday, October 21, 1994.
5.

The Court, at the request of either counsel, may consider oral argument prior

to the scheduled evidentiary hearing in an attempt to resolve or narrow some or all of the
issues to be determined by the Court.
3

001248

DATED this

day of

, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

FRANK G. NOEL
Third District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

BRUCE T. JONES
Attorney for Plaintiffs

bjn\maninci\jodge\0013

4

001240

APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 12
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IN THE DISTRICT C
IN AN!

JTHE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

3SMBTCOUNTY
[D§!fctoAH—

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

DANIEL A. MILLER and
DAVID KIMBALL (substi-gy
tuted as parties
plaintiff in the place
Of REPUBLIC CAPITA1
BANK, FSB, formerly
known as REPUBLIC
SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF
WISCONSIN, a Wiscons in corporat ion.)

8
9

JUL 3*01996

U i-jjv'.T

•: {JiV.CA\.< \,,\{

C i v i l No.

920900094

D E F E N D A N
M O T I. O N

T'_S
FOR

E.E5.LI,MI_NARY
I N J U N C T I O N

Plaintiffs,
v.

:"'''

*

10
11
12
13
14
15

JUDGE BLDG ASSOCIATES,
a Utah limited partnership, HAROLD J. HILL;
J. MICHAEL MARTIN,
WILMA W. GARDNER, as
personal representative
of the ESTATE OF KENNETH
N. GARDNER, deceased;
MARTINEAU & CO. certified public accountants.

*

*
*

16

Defendants.

17
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on January 19, 1995, the above18
entitled cause of action came on regularly for hearing at the]
19
hour of 10:00 a.m. of said day before the

HONORABLE FRANK

20
G. NOEL, one of the Judges of the above-named Court.
21
22
23
24
25

A P P E A R A N C E S
For Plaintiffs:

MR. MARK R. GAYLORD &|
MR. DAVID R. OLSEN
Attornies At Law
SUITTER AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

For Defendants:

MR. JEFFREY M JONES &
MR. BRUCE J. NELSON
Attornies At Law
NELSON RASSMUSSEN AND
CHRISTENSEN
215 South State St. #900
Salt Lake City, Utah

*3 b
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1

THE COURT:

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen.

2

The matter before the Court this morning is Daniel Miller anc^

^

others versus Judge Building Associates and others. This

4

matter is on the calendar this morning on the Defendant Mart-I

5

ineau's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and I believe evi-j

6

dence will also be taken that may pertain to the Motion to

7

Set Aside the Default Judgment so that then the Court may

8

then rule on that as well.

9

I

MR. OLSEN:

Is that correct?

David Olsen for the TDuyer of the prope-|

10

rty# Your Honor•

11

this matter has been fully briefed and there has been previovj

12

discussions with the Court. Wondering if we might move dir-

13

ectly to the evidence and waive opening statements?

14

That is correct. And in fact. Your Honor,

MR. JONES:

I would like to make a couple of minute

15

opening statements to highlight a couple of points . we think

16

the Court should focus on as we proceed with our evidence.

17

THE COURT:

Please state your .names for the record?

18

MR. JONES:

Jeff Jones and Bruce Nelson on behalf

19

of the Defendant, Martineau and Company, Your Honor.

20

MR. OLSEN:

21
22

23

David Olsen for the Defendant Michael

Martin.
I

MR. GAYLORD:

Mark Gaylord for Plaintiffs Daniel

Miller and David Kimball.

24

THE COURT:

You may proceed.

25

MR. JONES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

If I may, I hav^

0 01C i O

2

1 l
2

prepared
ach the bench?

a set of exhibits for the Court;if I may apprcj
That's just a courtesy copy. We'll submit

° I exhibits.
4
5

Your Honor, as the Court is well aware, the purpose
J of this hearing today
1

is with respect to the defendant's

application for a preliminary injunction preventing the foreH
closure of a deed of trust, which is the subject of this act-j

8

ion, originally initiated by Republic and by the substituted

9

I plaintiffs;that is, Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball, who are here

10

in the courtroom today.

11

deed of trust was executed in 1986 at the time the Judge

12

Building was acquired by Judge Building Associates;thereafter)

13

in November of 1990, Mr. Martineau, on behalf of Martineau &

14

Company, entered into a lease for approximately forty-five

15

hundred square feet in the Judge Building.

I think the Court is aware that the

Subsequently ther|e

16 was a default by Judge Building Associates and a foreclosure
17 proceeding was initiated.

And initially, Mr. Martineau rec-

18 eived notice of that foreclosure proceeding from Mr. Hill,one
19

of the principals of Judge Building Associates, and subsequenj-

20 tly received notice from the lender's counsel, indicating that
21
22
23

no lease would be disturbed in the process of the foreclosure
That changed, however, when Mr. Martineau was named
as a defendant in the lawsuit and the allegations in the com-

24 plaint were amended to include allegations that Mr. Martineau
25 lease was junior in time and subordinate to the interest of

u u i -j t i

3

1

the lender by way of the deed of trust.

2

Mr. Martineau did not answer the complaint as the

3

facts were self-evident.

4

to the deed of trust.

5

ting that in fact that was the state of affairf and the .facts

The lease was executed subsequent

A default judgment was entered indica-l

6 with regard to the priority between the deed of trust and the]
7

lease.

8

At that point in time Mr. Martineau began to enter int<b

9

negotiations with the bank, whereby he met the purchasers. He]

10 talked to them on the one hand about the terms under which
11

they would finance it.

Ultimately he received a proposal where-

12 by they would sell 'em the building for $850,000.

Within a

13 very short number of days, after receiving that proposal, but
14 before responding;he received a telephone call from Mr. Hill,
15 who is present here in the courtroom today, and Mr. David Kim-f
16 Kimball, one of the plaintiffs;whereby they inquired of him
17 how he liked the building.

In fact the testimony will show

18 that Mr. Martineau immediately thought it was a great building.
19 He enjoyed being there.

He liked it so much that he was then

20 negotiating himself with the lender to buy it.
21

Mr. Kimball

stated to him, in fact there was negotiations with the lenderj

22 he wanted to buy the building.

They then discussed the matter

23 briefly, which at the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Marf
24 tineau said, if you buy the building what are you going to do
25 with me?

Mr. Kimball's response was, we aren't going to do
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1

anything with you. We're going to leave you where you

2

are;in the business of attracting and keeping tenants ar*d notj

3

foreclosing them out*

4

Several days later an offer for $850,000 under which

5

Mr. Martineau could have purchased the building, arrived from

6

their lender. Mr. Martineau determined act. to exercise his

7

right to purchase it;signed the offer. Accepted the offer

8

for $850,000

9

had told him that if he purchased the building and proceeded

10

down the road, he then would not interfere with or attempt tol

11

foreclose out his lease on the property;thereafter, the negon

12

tiations with Mr. Kimball and his partner, Mr. Miller contin-j

13

ued and they entered into an agreement which provided that

14

they would buy both the real property and a deed of trust

15

that was owed by the bank.

and purchased the building, because Mr. Kimballj

So in this event, Your Honor, we

16 have the first event which is the acquisition of the Judge
17

Building and the deed of trust in favor of Republic savers.

18 We have the second event which was the lease between Martin19

eau and the Judge Building.

And then finally, we have a thirja

20

event.

21

transactions(indicating) which happened simultaneously. Judge!

And that third event is evidenced by two separate

22 Building Associates by way of a special warranty deed, conveypd
23

it's interest in the property to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball.

24 At the same time, Republic conveyed it's interest in the trusi
25 deed to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball and assigned the fredlosure

6 § 1S7§

1
2

action to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball.
Now, in order to induce Republic to enter into this

3 transaction, Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball proposed to pay Repu4 blic $750,000.

$250,000 of that ammount was paid in cash and

5 the remainder,

a deed of trust for $550,000 was executed by

6 Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball in favor of Republic.

But, in add-f

7 ition to that, there was a subordination of the deed of this
8 transaction with Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball, who now owned th4
9 original deed of trust;agreed to subordinate the lien of that
10 deed of trust to the new lien, for $550,000. Thus added an
11 additional encumbrance of $350,000 to the property which by
12 the subordination, they made prior and superior to the lien
13 that was then in foreclosure. The two-million-three hundred14 thousand dollars lien.

So suddenly, by way of doing the tran^

15 action, they had increased the encumbrances upon the property
16 by $550,000, while buying the property for a gross ammount of
17 only $750,000.
18

At this point in time, this transaction was undisclo-f

19 sed, unknown to Mr. Martineau. No one gave him notice that
20 this would occur. No one gave him notice that they were goin^
21 to proceed in a fashion which would then make his lease junior
22 to not just a two-million-three-hundred-thousand dollars trust
23 deed, but an additional trust deed ot $550,000. This was don4
24 for one purpose only;and that was to give Mr. Miller and Mr.
25 Kimball leverage to negotiate a better price and terms for MrJ
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1

Martineau's lease. Mr. Martineau's lease is for a sig-

* I nificant
1
4

ammount of space in the Judge Building.

THE COURT:

You're saying that the obligation they

I entered into was for how much of his $550,000;that was done

5 {

for the sole purpose of getting them in a better position?

6

MR. JONES:

Appreciate you givng me an opportunity)

to clarify that. What I am saying is that the structure of
8

the transaction, Your Honor, whereby the rights*and the fee

9

J and the trust deed was acquired by Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball

10

and the new trust deed for $550,000 was subordinated by this)

11

transaction;was structured, was done for one purpose only.

12

And that is evidenced by a letter dated March 15th, 1994 be-|

13

fore the closing took place.

14

The closing took place on July 1, 1994. A letter fro|n

15

the lender's successor, the rEF Bank, the successor to Repub-

16

lic.

This letter to Mr. Miller, one of the plaintiffs. Thijs

17

] is not the entire letter, Your Honor. We have, in order thajl

18

I we can and I'll illustrate on this chart.

19

' ced the language of the parties' key language , TCP Bank of

Remember we redu-|

20

Wisconsin course of action was to refrain from the foreclo-

21

sure action in regard to Mr. Martineau's lease at the Judge

22

Building with the objective to try to negotiate a new lease

23

in order to maximize current and future cash-flow in the Jud^e

24

Building, given it's current occupancy.

25

agree our objective is we'll defer the foreclosure of this

In other words, we
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1

until such time as you can negotiate with 'em and see if

2

you can do tiaat to maximize the current cash-flow. Well,

3

that means only one thing. We'll give you an economic lever{•

4

a hammer, if you willf over Mr. Martineau's head;even though

5

in fact# we've assigned you all of our rights. You have

6

bought it from us and we have structured the transaction so

7

that you have both ownership of the property and of the deed

8

of trust. We have done that solely so you will have leverag^

9

over one tenant in the entire building.

The only remaining

10 I defendant in this lawsuit;indeed, the only tenant who was
ever named as a party defendant in the lawsuit.
12

|

13

I executed an assignment in favor of the lender.

They did this, Your Honor, at the same time that they
Signed the

14 I new $550,000 trust deed.
15

I

THE COURT:

I doA't mean to interrupt but I am

going to have to limit you to about two more minutes.
17

|

MR. JONES:

That will be fine. At the same time

18 I they signed the $550,000 trust deed to the lender, they also
19 I signed an assignment of leases, whereby they said we have
20

leases at the Judge Building and we'll sign them to yotf addi-l-

21

tional collateral.

22

Honor, assignor being Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball agree to ob|

23

serve and perform all the obligations imposed upon lessor.

24

They are the lessor under the leases and under paragraph D,

25

not to do any act which constitutes a breach under any of th^

That assignment provides as follows, Your

0013S2

8

leases or to do any other acts which would result in the
termination of any of the leases. So, they covenanted with
the lender that they will protect# enforce, observe and keep
the leases at the same time.
Now, Your Honor, all of that is in light of finally,
paragraph 33(b) of the lease. And this is a paragraph and I
apologize. We haven't indicated this paragraph as paragraph
33(b) of the lease. The leases that were assume3by Mr. Mill-)
er and Mr. Kimball. They acquired the property i.e. specifi
cally, Mr. Martineaus's lease. Again here, so long as leaser]
is not in default under the terms of this lease.
The evidence will show he has never been at default;
however, this lease shall remain in full force and effect for]
the full term;however, that's not been terminated as a result)
of any foreclosure or transfer in lieu thereof of such mortgage or other security interest to which the lessee has subordinated it's rights pursuant to this subparagraph.
THE COURT:
MR. JONES:

Now, this is which document?
In Mr. Martineau's lease. The lease

that they now own as the owner of the building.

At the same

time that they own a trust deed en the building that they are
attempting to foreclose and foreclose out Mr. Martineau's

in|

terest.
Your Honor, the action taken as a whole will infairly)
damage and prejudice Mr. Martineau

under circumstances where

mss*

9

1

he contracted and they knew so because they bought this

2

lease when they bought the building and that he would be pro-]

3

tected from foreclosure.

4
5

THE COURT:

Why wasn't this raised when the defaulft

judgment was entered?

6

MR. JONES:

Because at the time, Your Honor, they

7

were only seeking to establish this his lien was junior in

8

time;that's all that the default judgment sought was determinj-

9

ation that it was junior. This clearly says that his lease

10

is junior.

It is only now that they have subsequently said

11

not only are we going to proceed with the foreclosure, but

12

we're going to try to foreclose your lease out. The default

13

judgment complaint sought only and made only one allegation

14

with regard to Mr. Martineau;that his lease was junior in

15

time.

16

provision was the same then as it is now.

It is# it always has been and it always will be. This)

17

THE COURT:

But didn't they then ask for foreclosure?

18

MR. JONES:

Certainly, the lender did.

The lender

19

did.

20

er and they had this deal with that lender. And now we have

21

Miller and Kimball stepping in and taking the interest in the)

22

lease as the landlord and owner. And as the lender and attem

23

pting to do something different to foreclose them out at this)

24

point in time.

25

It asked for foreclosure# but that was a separate lend-j

THE COURT:

Let me ask one question, if I may, to

further clarify the issues for me. As I understand, the lea^e
I wa<? not rprordftd,
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MR. JONES:

That is correct.

THE COURT:

In your view, had it been recorded,

would that subsequently even lien the five-hundred and fifty
or whatever it was;would that have been then inferior to the
lease?
MR. JONES:

No it would not, Your Honor, because oif

the first sentence in paragraph 33(b).

Lessee hereby subord-[

inates it's rights in their lease to the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust security interest resulting from any
method of financing.
THE COURT:

Ok.

MR. JONES:

Mr. Martineau did

tinder his sanctions

as lender agree thfet it wouldn't be foreclosed out. What he
did when he signed this lease is subordinate to anything. If
he wants to put any financing he wants on there, but can't bej
foreclosed, especially under circumstances where he is on the
deed of trust, which is the case in this scenario.
THE COURT:

Ok.

MR. JONES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right. Now, you wish to make an ope

ning statement?
MR. OLSEN:

Briefly, Judge.

THE COURT:

I thought you might.

MR. OLSEN:

Judge, simply by way cf evidence to correct

perhaps a few inadvertant statements by counsel.

I have
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courtesy copies of the exhibits.

If you'll look

at

exhibit one, you'll see that Mr, Martineau was served with a
Complaint on February 14th, 1992;that Complaint provides for
a foreclosure.

The next document you'll see is number two

and is the default certificate.

Under the default certifica^

it shows that Martineau has not answered.
is the default judgment.

Attached to that

If you will look at paragraphs two

and three7paragraph two provides that Martineau has no rights)
whatsoever in the property.

No rights to bid, no rights to

redeem.
Paragraph three provides, that upon sale Mr. Martineaju's
lease is extinguished.

Doesn't provide an assumption.

The

default judgment provides that his lease is extinguished and
those records, if you could look at the next page signed by
Mr. Merrill;there is a certificate of mailing that went to
Mr. Martineau.

So, the evidence will show that Mr. Martineaij

knew the full effect of the default judgment;that his lease
was extinguished as of March first, or three days thereafter
for mailing.

In addition to that, Judge, there are argument^

that Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball assumed the leases pursuant
to their agreement with the landlord.
The evidence will show and the documents will show
quite the contrary.

If you look at exhibit nineteen in your

book at paragraph or page ten rather,there is a specific
agreement, paragraph 11.21 on page twenty.

This paragraph

0 £' 1 6 o o
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1

says, in connection with the settlement of the actioi^

2

and the sale of the property to purchaser;TCF agrees to pre-

3

serve and assign to purchaser the right to foreclose on the

4

leasehold interest of Martineau and Company.

5

agreement provides the foreclosure will take nlace.

6
7

THE COURT:

I guess what he is saying they didn't

have the right to assign that because they agreed not to.

8
9

So the purchas^

MR. OLSEN:
agreed not to is

No. The agreement they say they

assignment of rent for security purposes.

10

That's an assignment that was executed in conjunction with

11

this document.

12

leasehold interest that he nay have.

13

a lease with Mr. Martineau.

14

lease would be foreclosed.

15

ment, number two—exhibit number twenty-two in your book;the

16

bank specifically required and the parties agreed, that a

17

foreclosure would be completed with Mr. Martineau within nin^

18

months.

19

That's an assignment to the landlord of any
They didn't ever have

The parties considered this
In addition to that, this docu-

So, what Mr. Jones is trying to do is champion the

20

rights of the bank.

He's trying to say that the bank requir|

21

es that the Martineau lease stay in effect, and therefore

22

you can't foreclose it.

23

Martineau and in fact, the bank pursuant to the purchase

24

agreement pursuant to the letter agreement, which recites as

25

part of the purchase agreement, that Miller would have to

He ^ s championed every right by Mr
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1

foreclose.

In addition to that, and simultaneously with)

2

it, you have a Stipulation and Order of this Court of June

3

22nd, therein your Order approving the Stipulation which was

4

entered on the 22nd, provides (indicating) that Miller and Kimj-

5

ball were to foreclose on the property and this is your Order)

6

Daniel Miller and David Kimball are substituted as

7

party-plaintiffs for the sole purpose of completing the fore-j

8

closure of any interest Martineau and Company Certified Pub-

9

J lie Accountants may have in the property.

10

So this is all one)

document.

11

What they are arguing from is, they're taking an assij

12

gnment that doesn't pertain to Martineaus's lease.

13

ignoring the express provisions that require foreclosure and

14

then they're saying hey!

15

You agreed with the bank to keep them in possess ion; there fore)

18

you can't get us out;while they're not even privy to that

17

agreement, there is no agreement between Martineau—

18

THE COURT:

19

They are

The bank says you can't foreclose.

Well, but what about this paragraph

here that counsel referred to;this is the agreement contained

20

' in the agreement between Martineau and Company and Hill.

21

I

MR. OLSEN:

1990 unrecorded lease.

The bank isn't

22

a party to it.

23

aren't parties.

24

we understand that oftentimes in a building, you may need to

25

borrow money.

It didn't have the bank sign-off. My clients
What this paragraph says is, listen, Mr. Hil}

We agree to let you borrow money, provided

14

a o i s«s

1

that we're in a f i r s t position.

2

THE COURT:

Ok.

3

MR. OLSEN:

That's not what happened here. We are|

4

foreclosing on something four years before this.

5

gument was correct on this, I could enter into a lease with

6

anyone;that says my property is superior to anyone's interestJ

7

My interest is superior to anyone's interest and any-[

8

one who had recorded prior.

9

contract their rights away.

10
11

THE COURT:

If their ar-|

Their argument is that I could

Well, but the second lien talking

about $550,000 was after this.

12

MR. OLSEN:

That it did.

It did.

So if they

13

have an argument as to the five-fifty, it's another argument

14

for another day.

15

on the two-point three million dollar trust deed. And that is|

16

what is at issue, not the five-fifty that is at issue today.

17

But today we're foreclosing and proceeding

Certainly my client didn't sign it and didn't get the|

18

bank's consent to that.

19

submit there is just no basis, one, to set aside the default

20

or to enjoin the sale.

21

THE COURT:

But with that, Your Honor, we would

All right.

Now, you may call your

22

first witness, counsel.

23

through it pretty rapidly.

24

pute.

25

stipulations and then stick to the evidence that really is at

But I am going to insist we move
Most of the facts are not in dis-

Let's get the documents in and I think there can be

issue before the Court so we can conclude this sometime this
afternoon.
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MR. JONES:

We would do s o , Your Honor.

We would

c a l l Harold H i l l .
WHEREUPON THE WITNESS BEING DULY SWORN TO TELL THE
TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH
TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
DIRECT-EXAMINATION BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Mr. H i l l , would you s t a t e your f u l l name and

address for the record?
A.

Harold J . H i l l , 8 9 3 1 T r a c e y C i r c l e , Sandy,

Utah

84093.

THE COURT:

This thought just occurs to me and I

think that out of an abundance of caution, I'll raise this if|
I haven't already a ^ e ^ i n the past.

If I am not mistaken,

when I was practicing at Strong and Hanni, Harold Hill was a
landlord of ours1, is that correct?
MR. HILL:
THE COURT:

Yes. That's true.
Just occurs to me just this moment and!

I don't know whether or not I mentioned that before, but

Har+

old Hill had an interest in the Boston Building and Strong an<p
Hanni.
MR. JONES:

Would be no basis for us to object, Yoijir

Honor, to your hearing the evidence.,
MR. OLSEN:

Let's proceed, Judge.

THE COURT:

Ok.

I did not have any personal deal-

ings with Mr. Hill.
MR. HILL:

No. None.

16
• ^

4 9 ft, A

1

THE COURT:

Didn't negotiate any lease;don't think

2

I even formally met Mr* Hill.

3

on some documents.

4

MR. JONES:

I do remember the name being

That's all that I remember.
Thank you, Your Honor.

M. Hill, what

5

is your occupation?

6

A.

I am in the real estate business.

7

Q.

How long have you been in that business?

8

A.

About twenty years.

9

Q.

Are you a licensed real estate broker?

10

A-

Yes.

11

Q.

Have you ever owned commercial real estate?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And would t h a t include the Judge Building i n

Maybe a little longer.

14

S a l t Lake City, which i s l o c a t e d approximately on Main S t r e e t

15

and Third South?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

ok.

18

name or capacity?

19
20

And did you own that in your individual

A.

It was owned by the Judge Building Associates,

which was a limited partnership.

21

Q.

The partners;were those general partners?

22

A-

General partneis originally were Michael Martin

23

and myself.

24

Q.

ok.

25 J

A.

I am going to have to refer to your date 1986,

I guess.

And when did you acquire the Judge Building?

Is that right?
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1

2

Q.

And how did you acquire it?

Did you pay cash

or you have some financing to do?

3

A.

We originally purchased it from Granada Inc. on

4

a purchase contract and in approximately a year later, refin-

5

anced it through the bank.

6

THE COURT:

7

A.

8

MR. JONES:

9
10

Republic?

Yes.
Mr. Hill, let me show you what has

been marked for purposes of this hearing today as defendant's
exhibit number one.

Can you briefly identify that document?

11

A.

It's the agreement with Republic.

12

Q.

It's entitled Deed of Trust with assignment of

13

rents and leases;is that correct?

14

A-

Yes. It is.

15

Q.

And was this the Deed of Trust

that you and Mr|.

16

Martineau executed in order to give the lender,in this case

17

Republic Savings and Loan Association, a collateral security

18

interest in the property which is the Judge Building?

19

A.

It

is.

20

Q.

S u b s e q u e n t t o t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e Deed o f Ttus £,

21

d i d you perform t h e o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t you had t o t h e Judge

22

Building Associates.

23

the

Perform i t ' s o b l i g a t i o n s i n f a v o r o f

lender?

24

A.

Yes,

25

Q.

Ok.

A.

I am.

Now, are you familiar with Lee Martineau?

*%I392
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Q,

How did you become familiar with him?

A.

Lee actually has been a tenant in a building

that I been involved in for—I am not even sure of the ammcunt of time, but substantially twenty to twenty-five years
I would think.
Q.

Would that include for example, the Boston

Building?
A.

It would include the Boston Building.

Q.

At some point in time, did Mr. Martineau talk

to you concerning leasing space in the Judge Building?
A.

He did.

Q.

And can you tell me approximately when that was^

A.

1990.

Q.

Ok. And can you describe the circumstances und-j-

er which he approached you about leasing space there?
MR. OLSEN:

Objection.

Circumstances aren't rele-

THE COURT:

I'll sustain the objection.

MR. JONES:

Did you attempt to negotiate the terms

vant.

of the lease with Mr. Martineau for space in the Judge Build-)ing?
A-

I did.

Q.

And were you successful in concluding a lease

negotiation?
A.
I was.

eti>3 3
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1

Q.

Let me hand you what has been marked as defend-

2

an't exhibit number 2, and ask if you can identify that docu-

3

ment?

4
5

A.

This is the lease document that I signed with

Mr. Martineau.

6

Q.

The pages are not numbered;but below paragraph

7

thirty-eight, there is a signature for Judge Building Associa}-

8

tes.

Do you recognize that signature?

9

A.

This one(indicating)?

10

Q.

Yes.

11

A.

Which one, mine?

12

Q.

Yes.

13

Is that your signature for Judge Building

Associates?

14

A.

It is.

15

Q.

And you recognize the other signatures?

16

A.

That's Mr. Martineau's

17

Q.

Whose lease form is this?

18

A.

This was a lease form that actually originated-

19

MR #

20

A.

21

THE COURT:

Sustained.

22

MR. JONES:

Did you prepare this lease?

23

A.

24
25

OLSEN:

Objection as to relevence. Your Honor.

I am sorry.

I prepared the lease.

I did not originate the

the actual form.
MR. OLSEN:
is in effect.

Objection as to relevence.

The lease

Who originated it doesn't matter.

20
V U JL *J *} 4

THE COURT:

I think I'll sustain the objection.

Not sure this lease is in dispute anyway.
MR. JONES:

All right, Your Honor. Was the form

of the lease approved by the lender for your use?
A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

How did Mr. Martineau peform under the lease?

A*

Always performed on time.

Q.

At some point in time, did Judge Building Assod

iates default on the note which was the obligation secured by)
the Deed of Trust?
A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

Do you know about when tha t occurred?

A.

I think it was October of f91.

Q.

And in connection with that default, did you

negotiate a deal, if you will, with the bank whereby you
would bring potential buyers that may have had an interest
in buying the building?
A.

I did.

Q.

And would you describe what that agreement be-

tween you and the bank was?
A.

I was personally guaranteed on the mortgage to

the bank for the Judge Building;and it was my agreement with|
the bank that if I could procure a buyer that they actually
sold the property to;that I would be relieved of that obligation.

0 01 -3 3 5
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1

Q.

Ok*

So if you found someone to purchase the

2

property;that would be an event which would cause the bank

^

then to release you from your personal guarantee?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q-

And did that agreement also extend to your part}

6

ner, Mr* Martini?.*-

7

A.

8

ed by roe that way in the beginning, but it ended up that way.

9
10

It ended up being that way. It* was not negotiatf

Q.
buyers

At some point in time, did you attempt to find

for the building?

11

A.

Oh, yes.

Vigorous—vigorously.

12

Q.

Did you contact Mr. David Kimball, who is here

13

in the courtroom today about being a potential buyer of that

14

property?

15

A.

I did.

15

Q.

Ok.

Now, did you assist Mr. Kimball in formula}

17 ting an offer to purchase the ptoperty?
18

A.

Originally.

19

Q.

Ok.

20

In the course of assisting

him, did you

and he have a telephone conversation with Mr. Martineau?

21

A.

We did.

22

Q.

Do you recall approximately when that took plac^?

23

A.

Seems to me it was approximately a week or two

24

after I had introduced Mr. Kimball to the project.

25

ive, but somewhere in that neighborhood.

Not posit}
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1

Q,

Where were you when the conversation took placq?

2

A.

U h — I believe it was a conference call.

3

Q.

Where were you at the time?

4

A.

I was in my office.

5

Q.

And where was Mr. Kimball?

6

MR. OLSEN:

Yes.

Judge, by way of foundation, could we

7 get a little better clarification as to when Mr. Kimball was
8 introduced?
9

March or is it April?

THE COURT:

Yes.

That may be key.

If you can recall as to that

10 please, counsel?
11

THE WITNESS:

12

MR. JONES:

Oh, I am sorry.

I'm afraid I can't-j

I'll show you a copy of the offer thatf

13 was submitted and see if that refreshes you in terms of the
14 time period.

I am going to hand you what has been marked as

15 defendant's exhibit 13.

Can you identify that defendant's ex-f

16 hibit 13?
17

A.

This is an offer that I prepared 4r Republic

18 Savings on behalf of Kimball.
19

MR. OLSEN:

May I voir dire?

20

THE COURT:

Hasn't been offered yet.

Are you now

21 offering it?
22

MR. JONES

Not yet, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT

Ok.

24

MR. JONES

Although I will be shortly s o —

25

THE COURT

All right.
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MR. JONES:

May want to keep standing.

Do you knoy

about the date that this offer was submitted to Republic Savings and Loan?
A.

March 16th.

Q.

You recognize the signature under yours on the

bottom of page two?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And whose is that?

A.

David Kimball.

MR. JOKES:
sixteen, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.
Thirteen.

Offer defendant's exhibit
I apologize. Your Honor.

Mr. Olsen?

VOIR-DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Mr. Hill, was that offer ever accepted?

A.

This

Q,

Yes.

A.

I am not sure how to answer that (indicating).

Q.

You later, in fact, entered into a final pur-

particular offer?

chase agreement for the property, did you not?
A.

I did.

Q.

This was a preliminary offer during the scope

of the negotiations?
A.

This was the ori^nal offer presented.

Q,

The first offer?

A.

Yes.

0 01S 9 3
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1
2

Q.

But there was a final purchase agreement on the)

property?

3

A.

4

MR. OLSEN:

5

the parole evidence rule.

6

—al document.

7

There was.

MR. JONES:

Objection to this offer as violating
Preliminary injunction of the fin-j

Evidences three or four things.

The

8

fact Mr. Hill was acting with Mr. Kimball in this transactionl

9

Number two, it gives you a time frame in which these negotia|

10

tions were going on.

11

terms which are also incorporated in the final agreement.

12

Not attempting to contradict what the final agreement says.

13

Not offering it for purposes of saying the transaction is

14

something other than represented in the final agreement.

15

in this equity proceeding, we*re simply presenting the evidei}-

16

ce to show the course of negotiations,and the relationship o^

17

the parties,and what they were doing in that time period.

18

That's the purpose for which it is offered.

19

the parole evidence rule because we're not attempting to arg-j

20

ue that the final agreement means something different other

21

than what it says.

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

And number three, it sets forth the

But£

Doesn't violate

Well, I'll sustain the objection.

I

think he can testify when the negotiations were going on.
M R # JONES:
defendant's exhibit

Ok.
13.

Do you know when, having reviewed}
Do you know in what time period now)

you may have been having these discussions with Mr. Kimball
I and then the resulting conversation with Mr. Martineau that
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1,

you've spoken about.

2

after this letter?

3

A.

Would i t have occurred before op

There were two or three discussions;to be honest

4

with you,I am not positive whether or not the discussions with

5

Lee and Dave on the phone were prior to or after this.

6

not remember.

7

Q.

8

I canf

I am sorry.
ok. Would they have been in this time period?

The March-April time period?

9
10
11

A.

Oh, yes.

Q.

And would they have occurred before the final

agreement was entered into?

12

A.

Oh most certainly.

13

THE COURT:

14

A.

15

#R# JONES:

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Do you recall

We talking about 1993 or two?

1993.
Ninety-three?

who spoke and what was said in

13 that conversation?
19 I

A.

I remember the conversation that was a conferen

20

ce call between the three of us#

21

believe, if I reman ber correctly;I was talking with Dave Kim-

22

ball and he wanted to know some opinions on the building. And

23

if I remember correctly, I just conference-called into Lee's

24

office and Lee in particular I wanted to talk to.

25

already had some—they knew each other from playing tennis or

And the call was prompted I

He and Lee

something, if I am not mistaken.
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Q,

During the course of that conversation;was therje

any discussion whereby Mr* Kimball

whereby Mr. Martineau

described how he felt about the building?
A.

Oh yes.

Q.

And what did he say?

A.

He said he loved the building and that he most

certainly wanted to stay there;and he liked it and etc., etc.
Q-

Did he also indicate in the conversations that

he liked it so much that he was in the process of negotiating]
with the lender to buy the building?
Ayes.

I am recollecting that I heard Lee say that#

Not positive it was in that conversation.
MR# OLSEN:

Objection as to speculation.

THE COURT:

I'll sustain it.

is responsive.

I don't believe it

Talked about a specific time period?

MR. JONES:

Yes.

In the course of that conversat-

ion, you recall that Mr. Martineau indicated that he was trying to negotiate with the lender then to purchase the building?
A.

I believe he said that, yes.

Q.

Did Mr. Martineau at some point, also ask Mr.

Kimball what Mr. Kimball's posture would be if Mr. Kimball
bought the building?that is vis a vis", Mr. Martineau and his
lease?
A-

I remember that question coming up.

I cannot
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1

remember if it was in this conversation on the phone.

2

There was also a time when Mr. Kimball and I were in Mr. Mart

3

ineau's office.

4

but it did come up, yes.

And I am not sure which one of that came up,

5

Q.

In a conversation?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Between you, and Mr. Kimball and Mr. Martineau,

8

that question was asked?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q#

And what was Mr. Kimball's response?

11

MR. OLSEN:

Objection.

12

THE COURT:

I'll sustain the objection.

Foundation as to time.
If you

13

could set that out a little more clearly as to what time this

14

was?

15

MR. JONES:

You said it was either in a telephone

16

conversation which occurred in the March or April time period

17

but before the final offer was submitted?

18
19
20
21
22

A-

Or it may have been in other conversations that

occurred in Mr. Martineau's office.
Q.

Did that conversation also take place in the

same time period before the offer was submitted?
A-

Yes, it was a very short time frame.

I don't

23

know whether or not the conversations took place prior to thi£

24

offer(indicating)or in between.

25

remember that they did.

I can't remember.

I jis t
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28

1
2

Q.

Ok*

And so then what was Mr. Kimball's respons

to that question?

3

A.

That they were not in the habit of throwing out

4

tenants.

5

tainly wanted to retain Lee.

6

Something along that line, and that they most cer-

Q.

Ok.

At some point in time, did Republic comm-

7

ence this foreclosure proceeding and were you served as a

8

party-defendant?

9

A.

Yes, I was.

10

Q.

And were you also aware at some point in time,

11

that Martineau and Company was added as a party-defendant to|

12

the lawsuit?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Did anyone tell you why the plaintiff was doingj

16

A.

My understanding

17

MR* OLSEN:

15

18

that?

ponsive.

Objection, Your Honor.

That's non-resj-

It's a yes or no.

19

THE COURT:

Sustained.

20

MR. JONES:

Did you have d is cuss ioif where someone

21

told you why that was being done?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

With whom did you have those discussions?

24

A.

Ray Unrath.

25

Q.

Who is Ray Unrath.

A.

Ray Unrath was acting as the agent for the bankj.
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Q.

And when did this conversation take place, again)

relative to this offer?
A.

I had this conversation with Ray Unrath many,

many times;not only with this offer, but other offers that I
tendered to the bank.
Q.

Ok. And what did Mr. Unrath tell you as the

agent for the bank as to why Mr. Martineau had been added »s
a defendant?
A.

His lease

MR. OLSEN:

Object as to relevance.

THE COURT:

Overruled.

THE WITNESS:

That mean I can answer that?

The

length and ammount of Mr. Martineau's lease was a detriment
to the project and in selling it to a future buyer, which by
the way I didn't believe;that's why I remember so many converf
sations.
MRo JONES:

You say you. didn't believe that?

A.

Yes, I did.not believe that.

Q.

And did you voice that to the bank?

A.

Many times.

Q.

Did you a l s o v o i c e t l a - t t o Mr. Kimball?

A-

Yes.

Q.

Now, the transaction subsequently closed in

July—on July one of 1993?
A.

Yes.

9 014 6 4
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1

Q.

You, on behalf of Judge Building Associates,ex-

2 ecuted a special warranty deed, conveying your interest in th^
3 building to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball?is that correct?
4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Handing you what has been marked as defendant's

6 exhibit number four.

Can you identify that document, Mr. Hill?

7

MR0 OLSEN:

We'll stipulate that's the deed, JudgeJ

8

THE COURT:

That's exhibit what?

9

MR. JONES:

Exhibit number four, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

Exhibit four? Are you offering it?

11

MR. JONES:

We are.

12

MR. OLSEN:

No objections.

13

THE COURT:

Received.

14

MR. JONES:

Thank you. At the same time you execu-j-

15 ted the quit-claim deed;were you aware that the bank also ass+
16 igned it's interest in the Deed of Trust that was being foref
17 closed, to Mr. Kimball and Mr. Miller?
18
A.
Yes.
19
Q.
Were you also aware at that time, that M E Millet
20 and Mr. Kimball had paid the bank $200,000 in cash and executf
21
22
23
24
25

ed a new deed of trust for $550,000?
A.

I wasn't aware of the actual dollar figures, bu{:

I was aware that the transaction did happen, yes.
Q.

Were you also aware that they subordinated that

trust deed to an existing two-point million dollar trust deed
which was exhibit number one?
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1

A.

No, I wasn't privy to that.

2

Q.

No one advised that you were going to do that?

3

A.

No.

4 ;

Q.

And do you know who structured the transaction

5
6
7

in that fashion?
A.

The bank and the attorney, I am not sure of his;

name at this point.

8

Q.

You didn't have any role in doing that?

9

A.

I had no role.

10 '
11
12

MR. JONES:

No further questions for this witness,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Olaen?

13

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSEN:

14

Q.

15
16
17

Thank you, Judge. Mr. Hill, I take it that

the purchase of the Judge Building did not go well for you?
A.

It did for a time, but it did—yes,it went

sour very quickly.

18

Q.

You needed to unload the debt?

19

A.

Oh most certainly did.

20

Q.

The debt itself was a big concern, I take it?

21

A.

Very big.

22

Q.

You had to have the building on the market foxn

23

quite a time, didn't you?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

How long was it on the market?

A.

You mean after the foreclosure?
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1

Q.

No, before. When did you start listing?

When

2 did you start trying to sell this property?
3

A.

Uh-I had made some inquiries to sell it approxi-f

4 mately six months before or to take on a partner.
5

Q.

Didn't you start

6

A.

And it may have been longer, but time—

7

Q.

Back in 1990 you tried to get Mr. Martineau to

8 come in the building as an investor and partner, didn't you?
9

A.

I tried two or three times to get Mr. Martineau

10 to invest in the building, yes.
11

Q.

He didn't want to do that?

12

A.

At the time he did not, no.

13

Q.

He didn't ever come forward

with an offer to y<j>u

14 to invest in the building, did he?
15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Didn't ever come forward with an offer to buy

17 the building?
18

A.

He informed me on one occasion that and possible-

19 two, that he was working with some people to purchase the
20 building over a long period of time.
21

Q.

How long have you been in real estate, Sir?

22

A.

About twenty years.

23

Q.

Do you have a license to sell property?

24

A.

I do.

25

Q.

Do you hold a broker's license?

A.

I also do.

33
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Q.

And to hold a broker's license, there is a

training course you have to go through;isn't there?
A-

Uh-huh.

Q.

Also have to pass a test?

A.

Oh, most certainly

Q.

You also cover certain subjects in those class-]

es and testing, don't you, including the statute of frauds?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you understand that in an agreement in real]

estate that is not in writing, is not binding on anyone, is
that
MR. JONES:

Objection.

It's irrelevant and beyonc^

the scope of the direct examination.
THE COURT:

What is the relevance?

MR. OLSEN:

The relevence, Judge, is, they're talkf-

ing about Mr. Martineaus's interest;to take the testimony,
which is being put on of making an offer on the property. Anj
offer is not binding;an offer is not enforceable and an offer]
is speculative until it's reduced to writing.

For that pur-

pose I would like to state Mr. Hill's understanding.
THE COURT:

I know that. What is it's relevance?

MR. OLSEN:

It's also in addition, that goes to his)

second conversation;where they are talking about Mr. Kimball1
stating that it's not his business to put tenants out.
THE COURT:

I'll sustain the objection.
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1

THE WITNESS:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

4

MR. OLSEN:

5

What does that mean?

Mean I answer ijt?

Need not answer, Sir.
I am sorry.
You talked about Mr. Ray Unrath.

Mr.

Ray Unrath worked for whom?

6

A.

Wallace Associates.

'

Q.

He had what role with the lender to your under-

8

standing?

9

A.

10
11
12
13

That he was the leasing and selling agent for

the building.
Q.

I believe you testified that Mr. Unrath wanted

Mr. Martineau out of the building?
A.

I testified that Mr. Unrath had informed the

14

bank that Mr. Martineau*s lease was not a good lease to be

15

carrying the building forward to a potential buyer.

16

Q.

You told that to Mr. Martineau, did you not?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And t h i s i s before t h i s March and A p r i l

19

I did.

time

period that we're d e a l i n g w i t h , a r e n ' t we?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And you told Mr. Martineau there was a foreclos4

22

ure action; in fact, his interest could be foreclosed out, dicjl

23

you not?

24

A-

I did not tell him that his interest could be

25 I foreclosed.out.
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1

Q.

You had d i s c u s s i o n and talked w i t h him, d i d n ' t

3

A.

Yes, we d i d .

4

Q.

And didn't Mr. Martineau at that point, tell yo

2

you?

5 that he was looking for the other space?
6

A.

Mr. Martineau told me that he might be forced

7 into that because he understood his interest could be exting8 uished.
9

MR. JONES:

Objection, Your Honor.

Speculation.

10 He understood that Mr. Martineau believed his communication.
11

THE COURT:

To that extent I'll sustain the object

MR. OLSEN:

What did Mr. Martineau tell you he be-

12 ion.
13

14 lieved could happen to his interest;why was he looking for
15 space?
16

A.

Actually, two reasons: Number one, the fact tha

17 the foreclosure was in place and that there was a chance that
18 he could.

And the other side of that, if that did happen,he

19 wants to secure like space at a relatively good rate himself.
20

Q.

So what he told you was, that he understood that)

21 he could be foreclosed out, correct?
22

A.

He told me that it was served to him that way.

23 Not that he understood, but that's the way it come across to
24 him.
25

Q.

That he could be foreclosed out and his lease

could be extinguished?
A.

Yes.
36
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1

Q.

2

minute.

3

time?

4

Now, let's talk about the Kimball meeting for a

You said that was over a relatively short period of

A.

Short,when I am saying first off was March 15ih|,

5

closing July.

6

transaction this large.

7

Q.

That's a relatively short period of time for a

But in fact, these Kimball conversations;the on^P

8

you referenced occurred over less than that two weeks period,

9

did they not?

10

A.

They did.

11

Q.

So, within two weeks this conversation with Mar-f-

12

tineau was handled, and you testified as to the first conver-

13

sation,that Mr. Kimball said essentially, it's not our business

14

to kick tenants out, correct?

15

A.

I did.

16

Q.

Now at that point in time, had Mr. Kimball,to

17

your knowledge, seen Mr. Martineaus' lease?

18

A.

I don't believe he had.

19

Q.

You hand't given him a copy?

20

A-

I did not.

21

Q.

In that conversation, the terms of Mr. Martineaju's

22
23
24
25

lease were not discussed, were they?
A.

I had talked with Mr. Kimball about Mr. Martine^u'

lease and the fact that—do I say?
Q.

Go ahead.

Like to hear it.

ftft* i 1 1
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1

A.

And the fact that I felt that it was an asset

2

to the building.

3

action.

4

ing.

5

And that I felt that it should remain with the build

Q.

6

And that it had been put in a foreclosure

Did you tell him that you didn't give him the

rental rate on the lease?

7

A.

I did not.

8

Q.

Did you tell him that you thought it was such

9

a favorable lease that you had asked Mr. Martineau not to disj-

10

cuss it with the other tenants in the building?

11

A.

I do not remember saying that, no but

12

Q.

In fact, you did ask Mr. Martineau not to dis-l

13

cuss his lease with other tenants in the building, did you nop?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

You had a gentleman's agreement that you would]

16

not discuss it, correct?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Did you discuss with Mr. Kimball that the ini-j

19

tial term was three years?

20

A.

I am not sure I did that.

21

Q.

Did you discuss with Mr. Kimball that there

22

were 5 three year options in the lease?

23

A.

24

I discussed with him that the lease was, my

recollection is fifteen years.

25

Q.

Did you discuss with him that the rent could

only increase one percent a year?

I

L

T did.

.
38
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1

Q.

Did not?

2

A.

I did.

3

Q.

When did you discuss that?

4

A.

Conversation that we had—I mean over the lease|

5

and why the lease was trying to be foreclosed out.

6

Q.

7

Ok.

I am talking about this two week period of

time;you didn't discuss it during that two week period of timja?

8

A.

No, I don't think, so.

9

Q.

Now, after this conversation did you think that

10

there was a deal struck between Mr. Martineau and Mr. Kimball);

11

I that Mr. Martineau could rely on to stay in the building?

12

|

MR. JONES:

Objection as to that. Your Honor. Whatl

he thought about whether there was a deal is irrelevant. WhaS
14

I was communicated by Mr. Kimball to Mr. Martineau;that is relej-

1

5 vant.
16 j

THE COURT:

Ok.

17

MR. OLSEN:

They're asking for an agreement.

Response?
If

18 one of the parties didn't feel there was an agreement
MR. JONES:
Not a party to the agreement. The
19
20 Court makes that decision when it hears the effects of all
21 I of the reliance by Mr. Martineau..
22 |

THE COURT:

Sustained.

23

MR. OLSEN:

Let me make a proffer then.

If allow-|

24

ed to answer the question, Mr. Hill, that you did not think

25

that a deal was struck at that period of time;that it was too|
preliminary to reach a deal, especially in light of the fact
Mr. Kimball had not seen the lease;isn't that true?

0 01413
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1

MR. JONES:

Going to object to that# Your Honor.

2

Whether he intended to make a proffer or not;the Court has

3

already sustained the objection.

4

question.

5

MR. OLSEN:

He's asked the exact, same

That's how you protect the record.

6

ffer if it's not in evidence, Mr. Jones.

7

ward with the proffer?

8
9

THE COURT:

Pro)

Ask leave to go for]

Why don't you proffer to me what you

think you would have rather than have him say it?

10

MR. JONES:

I believe that's appropriate.

11

MR. OLSEN:

Mr. Hill will state at that time it was)

12

preliminary.

It was too preliminary to be a deal.

That Mr,

13

Kimball had not seen the lease, and that he did not think that!

14

it was

15

ineau and Mr. Kimball.

16

proceedings.

such an arrangement had been struck between Mr. MartjIt was a discussion very early in the)

17

THE COURT:

Ok.

So it's so noted.

18

MR. OLSEN:

Thank you.

You may proceed]

Now, shortly after that 2

19

week period, Mr. Kimball's attitude toward Mr. Martineau's

20

lease changed, didn't it?

21
22

A.

It was kind of taken out of the loop and it was

very early on in the stages after the first offer was made.

23

Q.

Well, let me ask the question a different way.

24

A.

So

25

Q.

The leases were subsequent.

Mr. Martineau's

lease was subsequently given to Mr. Kimball, was•it not?
A.

It was.

0 01414
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1

Q.

And it was given to Mr. Kimball and Mr. KimballI

2

informed you that it was not acceptable that Martineau remain|

3

in the building during that period a time?

4

A.

Don't recollect Mr. Kimball informing me of tha£,

5

Q.

Someone informed you of that# did they not?

6

A.

I was informed.

7
8
9

The bank informed me of that

and Ray Unrath informed me of that.
Q.

So, you knew shortly after that two week period

that it was unacceptable that Mr. Martineau stay in on his

10 present lease terms, correct?
11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And you told Mr. Martineau that, didn't you?

13

A.

I believe that I related to him that we were

14 going to try and make the foreclosure in his lease stick, yes,
15

Q.

So, you told them that shortly after this two

16 week period?
17

A.

18

THE COURT:

19

A.

20

MR. OLSEN:

21

Yeah.
Would

that have been in April or May?|

Close to, in that proximity, yes.

you had requested of

Now, at that point in time, at one timi
Mr. Kimball, Mr. Martineau be allowe^

22 to stay in the building,hadn't you?
23

A,

I had, yes.

24

Q.

But it became apparent Mr. Martineau could not

25 stay in the building under the same terms of his lease, correct?

$ 01415
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A.
was at*

I didn't totally understand where the whole

If you're saying was it apparent to roe;I felt at anyj

time the bank could waive the Martineau situation in favor of]
the buyer*
Q-

They could have waived it, but to your knowledgj*

they didn't waive it?
A.

They refused.

Q.

They refused to waive?

A,

Yes, they did.

Q.

And you knew that before it closed?

A.

I did.

Q.

Let me shew you what has been marked as plaintiffs

I did.

exhibit 19, page 20. The signature line.

Is that your signaf-

ture, Sir?
A.

My signature is not on page twenty.

Q.

I think you perhaps

A.

Sorry.

Q.

Dated 6/10/'93?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And on paragraph 11.21, would you simply read

You got two page twenties here. Sorry,

it is.

that for the Court?
A.

In connection with the settlement action to sell

the property to purchaser;TCF agrees to preserve and assign tcf
purchaser the right to foreclose on the leasehold interest of
Martineau and Company.

$01416

42

Q.

So at that point in time, you knew unequivocally

that the foreclosure against Mr* Martineau would proceed, did
you not?
A.

Yes .

Q.

And you were willing to sign the agreement with

that full understanding?
A.

I had.

I signed this agreement with the under-

standing that I was relieved from responsibility? I didn't eveiji
read it*
Q.

You understood, did you not, Sir, that that agr-j*

eement would be binding on the parties and that represented
the dealing between the parties?
A.

Yes .

Q.

And you understand 11.21 clearly says now and i^

did then that
THE COURT:

You don't need to go over that.

That14

repetitious.
MR. OLSEN:

Thank you.

I offer exhibit nineteen at[

this point in time, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Any objection, Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES:

Sorry, Your Honor?

THE OOURT:

He offered exhibit nineteen.

MR. JONES:

No. Absolutely none.

THE COURT:

Received.

MR. OLSEN:

Mr. Hill, I show you what has been mar-f

ked as plaintiff's exhibit number 22. Would you turn to the
second page of that exhibit?
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1

A..

Yes.

2

Q.

Would you look—does your signature appear on

3

this agreement?

4

A.

On page two?

5

Q.

Did you receive a copy of this agreement, June

twenty-first, 1993 instructions?

6

A.

My attorney may have.

9

Q.

Who was your attorney?

10

A.

Bill Russell.

11

Q.

Was he authorized to act on your behalf in this

7
8

I don't remember seeing

this.

12

proceeding?

13

A.

He was.

14 1

Q.

And if he entered into any stipulations or

15

orders with the Court, you authorized hira to act in your be-

16

half in that regard?

17

A-

Yes.

18

Q.

Are you aware of anything that he did that was

19

unauthorized by you?

20

A.

I am not.

21

Q.

I'll show you what has been marked as exhibit

22

three, which is a two-part document;a stipulation and a motion

23

regarding the partial settlement assignment to the cause of

24

action:

25

defendants. You'll notice that Mr. Russell's signature is on

Substitution of plaintiff for dismissal of certain

that;you authorized him to sign that document, did you not?
A.

I did.
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1

Q.

And that document authorizes Mr. Miller and Mr.

2

Kimball to proceed with the foreclosure in this action, does

3

it not?

4

A.

If that's what it says.

5

Q,

And that was all right with you?

6

A.

I have to say that I didn't have any choice.

7

Q.

You agreed to it?

8

A.

I agreed.

9

Q.

What is a non-disturbance certificate?

10

A.

Uh-usually in connection with a lease where the

11

landlord protects the tenant from any disturbance at all;eith

12

er on his premises or lease or anything like that.

13

Q.

So for example, a non-disturbance as in a situa

14

tion where a lender wants to make

15

piece of property?

16

A.

Could be.

17

Q.

Or a tenant wants a lease on a property?

18

A.

19

Q.

20
21

claim on a particular

* Yes.
And the tenant wants to make sure the landlord

won't forclose him out?
AI assume it could be, yes.
Q.

22

In a typical situation in commercial practice,

23

the tenant would obtain a non^disturbance certificate from

24

the lender?
A.

25

Uh-without seeing it, yes.

I would have to ex-j

plain.
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1

Q.

That's a practice you're familiar with?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

In fact, some of your tenants obtained that typ£

4

of certificate from lenders, have they not?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Did Mr. Martineau obtain one?

7

A.

I am not sure.

8

Q.

You're not aware of one?

9

A.

I am not sure if he did or not.

10

Q.

Mr. Jones asked the question about the earlier

11

Oh yes.

exhibit which was the form of the lease to Mr. Martineau.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

The bank did not approve of that executed lease

14 did they, Sir?
15
THE COURT:
You mean—excuse me—talking about
16 which, this Martineau lease?
17
MR. OLSEN:
Martineau lease
18

THE COURT:

The bank did not approve it?

19

MR. OLSEN:

Did not approve it.

20

THE COURT:

You understand the question?

21

THE WITNESS:

I do. Not sure how to answer it.

22 The bank was aware of the lease;we had to file all leases with
23 the bank.
24
MR. OLSEN:
The bank did not give you a non-dist25
urbance certificate?
A.

Did not.

They did not give me anything in

writing.

A ft 1 & *> 0
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1
2

Q,

To your knowledge, they did not agree at any

time to foreclose Mr, Martineau's interest, did they?

3

A.

The bank?

4

Q.

Yes.

5

A.

Yes, But they did approve the lease.

6

-ted the lease to them.

7
8

We submitf

Q.

But they didn't give up their priority at any

time to them?

9

MR. JONES:

Objection, Your Honor.

10

ask as to his knowledge as to the bank.

11

the bank did rather than what he knew.

12

that.

13

er for them.

If he wants to|

He is asking what
No foundation for

Mr. Hill is not a representative of the bank or speakj

14

THE COURT:

Sustained.

15

MR. OLSEN:

Now, in your trust deed.

And you gavel

16

the trust deed to the bank;the 1986 document, exhibit one toj

17

these proceedings?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Would you read the title to that document?

20

A.

Deed of trust with assignment of rents and leases,

21

Q.

And it's your understanding of that document,isj

22

it not, that if there is a default;that the bank has the

23

right to collect rent on your leases?

24

A.

It is.

25

Q.

They were i n f a c t doing that w h i l e you were in

default?
A.

Yes.
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M
2

Q.

In fact, a receiver was appointed to collect

rent, right?

3

A.

They were*

4

Q.

And if that deed of trust was assigned to some-)

5

one else, they too would have thr right to collect rent from

6

your tenants;isn•t that your understanding?

7

A.

8

MR. OLSEN:

9

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TONES:

10

11

Q.

It would be.
I have no further questions.

Let me have you refer briefly to plaintiff's exj-

hibit number 19.

P-nineteen.

Is it marked?

12

A.

Uh-huh.

13

Q.

And on page twenty—I believe it's the first

14

page twenty.

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

That Mr. 01sen pointed out to you.

17

He directed]

your attention to the 11.21 paragraph.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Is that correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Did you have any control over TCF, the lender

22

in this case, as to whether or not the lender would allow thej

23

purchaser to foreclose?

24

A.

I had no control.

25

Q.

Did anyone ever discuss this matter with you?

A.

I discussed it with my attorney.

48
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Q.

1
2

But did anyone on behalf of Mr, Kimball or Mr*

Miller ever discuss

it with you?

3

A.

I don't remember them—anyone doing that.

4

Q.

Now like wise, turn if you would to plaintiff's

5

exhibit P-3, which is; the Stipulation and the Motion.

I

6

THE COURT:

That has not been received, by the wayl

7

MR. OLSEN:

Excuse me. Ask the Court to take jud-

8

icial knowledge and offer exhibit three.

9

THE COURT:

Any objection?

10

MR. JONES:

None, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

Three is received.

12

MR. OLSEN:

Also offer Exhibit P-22.

13

THE COURT:

Any objection, Mr. Jones?

14

MR. JONES:

I think not, Your Honor.

15

or.

No, Your Honf

No objections.

16

THE COURT:

Received.

17

MR. JONES:

And while we're doing it, ve didn't

18

offer defendant's exhibits one and two, which are the Deed of

19

Trust and the Lease.
One was offered and received, I believe

20

THE COURT:

21

MRS. JONES:

22

THE COURT:

Any objection to one?

23

MR. OLSEN:

No objection.

24

THE COURT:

Any objection as to two?

25

MR. JONES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

No.

No objections to two.
Be received.

Directing your
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attention again to Exhibit P-3, and specifically
paragraph three, which is found on pages four and fiveJdid
anyone on behalf of the bank talk to you or solicit your app-f
roval or agreement that the Deed of Trust would continue to
be foreclosed after the transaction?
A.

No.

Q.

In fact, you had no control at. all over the

deal that was struck between Mr. Miller and Kimball on the
one hand and the bank on the other, concerning the fashion irj
which they would acquire the property?
A.

No.

Q.

These terms were dictated to you by the bank,

and Mr. Kimball and Mr. Miller, if you wanted to get your
release of liability, is that correct?
A-

They were dictated by the bank.

Q.

All right.

Now, let me direct your attention, iif

I may, to plaintiff's exhibit two, I believe, which is your
lease;which is Mr. Martineau's lease.

Mr. Olsen talked to

you about a non-disturbance agreement.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what was your understanding

THE COURT

P-2?

MR. JONES

D-2, Your Honor.

THE COURT

I am sorry.

MR. JONES

Thank you.

Sorry.

Mr. Olsen asked you about

0 014 2 4
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1

your understanding of a non-disturbance agreement and

2

the legal effect of that.

3

testimony;did you testify, that at some point you submitted

4

this lease—Mr* Martineau's lease to the bank for it's rev-

5

iew and approval?

6

I

A.

To make sure I understand your

This lease was sent to the bank on more than

one occasion.
8

Q.

And did the bank prior to adding Mr. Martineau

9 I as a defendant in the foreclosure proceeding,ever indicate
10

to you this lease was objectionable and that any of it's

11

terms would not be accepted by the bank?

12

|

A.

No.

13

I

Q.

Now, let me direct your attention to, if I may,

14

I paragraph 33(b).

The pages are not numbered, but it's a

15

little ways back in the document.

16

paragraph 33(b), if you would please?

Let me ask you to review
Okay?

17

|

A-

Yes.

18

j

Q.

Did anyone from the bank ever indicate to you

19

I that the bank objected to this particular paragraph in Mr.

20

I Martineau's lease?

21

A.

22

MR. OLSEN:

Object as to relevance

23

THE COURT:

Overruled.

24

THE WITNESS:

25

j

They did not.

MR. JONES:

Go ahead.

No, they didn't.
Ok.

Did anyone at the bank ever have

any discussions with you about the provisions of paragraph
33(b) in Mr. Martineau's lease?

G 0 1 4 25

1

A.

No.

2

Q.

And at any point in time after you submitted

3 the lease to the bankrdid the bank ever do anything to indic4 ate to you that any aspect of Mr. Martineaus's lease was ob5 |jectionable?
6

A.

7

MR. JONES:

8

THE CO URT:

9

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSEN:

10

Q.

No.
Ok. Nothing else. Your Honor.
Mr. Olsen?

Just a small clarification.

You misspoke, Mr.

11 Hill, and I think you did that unintentionally.

In your und-

12 derstanding, Mr. Unrath was a representative of the bank, was
13 he not?
14

A.

He's an agent representing the bank.

15

Q.

To use that terminology, he told you on repeats

16 ed occasions the Martineau lease was unacceptable, did he not?
17

A.

He did, in his opinion.

18

Q.

In his opinion?

19

A.

Yes.

20

MR. OLSEN:

Thank you.

21

MR. JONES:

Like to respond to that, if I may?

22 Prior to the time that you were in default and the bank filed
23 the foreclosure action.
24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Did anyone on behalf of the bank, including Mr J

UErath, ever indicate that the lease or any part of the Marti4
neau lease was unacceptable?

|
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A.

No.

MR. JONES:

No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Olsen?

MR. OLSEN:

When did you go in default?

A.

Well, actual notice of default was issued right

close to Christmas Day.

I think it was 1991 or'92—'90 or'91J

Q.

And you were in default before that, were you

A.

I quit paying the mortgage payment I believe

not?

in about October of that year* '91.
Q*

Didn't take the bank long to tell you that?

A.

Only down about two months before they got me.

MR. OISEN:

No further questions, Judge.

MR. JONES:

One last one. What were the ammounts

of your monthly payments to the bank?
A.

Hill.

Twenty-one-thousand dollars.

MR. JONES:

Ok. Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mere pittance.

You may step down, Mr

Thank you.
MR. JONES:

May be necessary to recall Mr. Hill,

but he's asked if he could be excused for the interim to conduct some business.
THE COURT:

I have no objections to that so long

as we know where to reach you?if you'll leave the number with
Mr. Jones, please?
THE WITNESS :

Ok.

00142?

1

MR. JONES:

2
3

WHEREUPON THE WITNESS BEING DULY SWORN TO TELL THE
TROTH, THE WHOI£ TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TROTH
TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

4

DIRECT-EXAMINATION BY MR. JONES:

5

Q.

6

C a l l now Mr. David K i m b a l l , Your Honor

Mr. Kimball, would you s t a t e your f u l l name and|

address for the record, please?

7

A.

David M. Kimball, 1891 Ridge H i l l D r i v e ,

9

Q«

And what is your occupation, Sir?

10

A.

Real estate development and hotel management.

11

Q.

How long have you been engaged in that business]

12

A.

Seventeen years.

13

Q.

Are you licensed by the State as a realtor or

8

14

BountifuJL,

Utah.

as a broker?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

When were you first licensed?

17

A.

1972 as a salesman and 1975 as a broker, I believe

18

Q.

And you continue to be licensed today?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q-

For the last seventeen years that you engaged

21

in the real estate business;can you. describe the nature of

22 your involvement in real estate?
23

A,

Primarily purchasing investment properties;foe-|

24 using a little bit more on office buildings and hotels.
25

Q.

You have bought a number of properties and owne<jI

and operated a number of properties in Utah;including properI ties along the Wasatch Front;is that correct?

90142-3
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Can you describe some of those properties by

3

name or location?

4

A.

Uh-Peery Hotel, Salt Lake City, the Holiday Inn|

5

Salt lake City, Judge Building, a dental office building in

6

Murray, some property called Benchmark Subdivision, Salt Lake)

7

A few.

8
9

Q.
ercial

You been involved in both residential and coram-|

real property?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

You been involved in real property relating to

12

lodging facilities?

13

A-

Yes.

14

Q.

The Peery Hotel that you've described?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Prior to this transaction and the closing of

17

the transaction;had you ever had previous experience in acquij

18

ring a deed of trust and also in the process of acquiring ti-|

19

tie to the property?

20
21

MR. OISEN:
seeing the witness.

Judge, wonder-I am having a hard time
Perhaps Mr. Jones could move the rostrunj

22

THE COURT:

Move that to your left, Sir?

23

MR. JCNES:

Happy to do so, Your Honor as long as

24
25

Mr. Martineau can see as well.
THE COURT:

Can you see, Mr. Martineau?

Oft 1 4 2 9

55

THE WITNESS:

Could you repeat the question?

MR. JONES:

Prior to this transaction, which you

and Mr, Miller acquired both the deed of trust and title to
the property concurrently;had you ever entered into a transaction like that previously, where you acquired both the deed
of trust and the real property at the same time?
MR. OISEN:

Objection as to relevance.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. JONES:

When did you first find out that the

Judge Building was for sale?
A-

Uh-I would say possibly in February.

Q.

That 1993?

A.

Sorry.

Q.

Now, how did that happen?

1993.
How did you find out

about it?
A.

Through Harold Hill.

Q.

Did he contact you or what happened?

A.

He did contact me and asked if I was interested

in purchasing the Judge Building, and I said I would be inter-}
ested in looking at it.
THE COURT:
A.
in February.

What was the date of that call again?

I am sorry.

I don't remember.

I think it was

Sometime in the month of February 1993.

MR. "JONES:

How did the transaction then proceed o^

your involvement with the Judge Building then proceed after
that phone call?
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1 !

A.

Dh-I believe he later contacted me and said,

2

would you like to go to look at it? And I said I would.

3

expressed that it was—could be bought at a very good price

4

And so we went up and looked at the building.

5

been the first of March

®I

He

That may have!

Q.

So you made a physical inspection of the build-]

A.

Yes, well, just looked in the lobby.

ing?
8 I
9

He took

me around through some of the suites or excuse me rooms and

10

I some of the offices

11

Q.

Was anyone else with you at the time?

12

j

A.

Mo. He had a key to the building there.

13

I

Q.

Did you see Mr. Martineau's space in the course]

14

I of that physical inspection?

15

A.

Yes, I did.

16

Q.

And did you talk to Mr. Martineau at the time

17
18

you first stopped by?
I

A.

Not sure if it was that particular time.

may have been.

It

It could have been that first time, but I am]

20

| not sure if it was or maybe the second time.

21

I

22

I shown you through it;did he give you any information in writ)

23

ing with regard to the terms, the leases, the condition of

Q«

After you had seen the property and Mr. Hill ha(3

24

I thh? building, the cash-flow, the obligations or anything

25

I that -nature?
A.

of]

He didn't give me anything then

57
ft {> 1 i 1 i

1

2

3

Q.

Did you subsequently receive information at tha]

A*

Uh-I received maybe something, what I think it

time?

4

could have come through Wallace Associates;maybe through Har-|

5

old Hill as far as the listing price and things like that.

6
7

Q.

Ok.

So you received something in writing,prov-|

iding information with regard to the terms of the

8

A.

That wasn't the first time.

9

Q.

Ok.

It was later in

1

At some point in time, did you have a dis-|

10

cussion with the lender about the lender's interest or how

11

the lender wanted to participate in the sale of the property?]

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Did you do that directly or through an agent?

14

A.

I did it through the agent first;through Wallacje

15
16
17

Associates.
Q-

Through them.
And did you do that with the assistance of Mr.

Miller or do that on your own?

18

A.

I did that on my own.

19

Q.

And did you also talk to Mr. Hill about how he

20

would participate in the sale?

21

A.

I did.

22

Q.

At some point in time# did you become aware

23

that there was a foreclosure action pending?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And approximately when was that?

A.

And you're talking about on the property?

Q.

Yes.

00H32
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1

A.

Yes.

It was probably right at the first of the)

2

conversation with Harold Hillrwhen we first looked at the

3

building.

4
5

Q.

Maybe the first part of March.
And you knew that Lee Martineau was a party-

defendant in that foreclosure action?

6

A.

Yeah.

I didn't really understand—didn't underj-

7

stand that at that time, until I talked to Ray Dhrath and,

8

well, excuse me.

9

was part of some type of foreclosure.

10

Then I talked to Ray.

And he told me as well.

11

12

Harold Hill did tell me that Lee Martineau

Q.

That would have come up in your first conversa-|

tion with Mr. Hill?

13

A.

Uh-huh.

14

Q.

Subsequently in c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Mr. Uhrath?

15

A.

Yes.

16

MR. OISEN:

Object to the question as being com-

17

pound.

18

the first.

19

question then came up in later conversations.

I think he answered the latter question instead of
The first question was did it come up in the firsj

20

THE COURT:

All right.

Let's clarify that.

21

MR. JONES:

I'll ask the question again.

In the

22

first conversation with Mr. Hill,he told you that the build-

23

ing was in foreclosure and that Mr. Martineau or Martineau

24

and Company were defendants in that action?

2

5

A.

He didn't really specify Lee Martineau at that

time was a part of the foreclosure.

I understood only that

the building was in foreclosure.

601433
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1

I

2

I a defendant in the foreclosure?

3

I

Q.

A.

Ok.

When did you learn that Mr. Martineau was

Later and I am going on this to my memory, so

I can't specifically tell you the time.

But I did talk to

5

I Ray Unrath on account 1 believe Harold Hill said that at a

6

later date than that, that Lee Martineau was trying to get

7

'em out of the building.

8

a little better.

9

And so I wanted to understand that

So I talked to Ray Unrath and he mentioned

I to me that there was a foreclosure against Lee Martineau.

10

Q.

And how shortly after your initial conversation)

11

with Mr. Hill would that conversation with Mr. Unrath have

12

taken place?

13

A.

Within two days maybe.

14

Q.

So probably in February?

15

A.

No, this was in March.

16

Short time.

This was probably.be th|e

first week in March.

17 I

Q.

First week in March or so?

18

A.

Uh-huh.

19

Q-

You had then gained knowledge that Mr. Martin-

20
21
22
23
24

eau was a party defendant in the action ?
A.

Uh-huh.

I didri^t understand it, but I under-

stood that there was a problem there.
M R # JONES:

Your Honor, this may be a good time

before I launch into other things to take a break, if that

25 J would be agreeable?
THE COURT:

This would be a good tine to do that,

so we'll be in recess until 1:30. /Noon recess taken at this
time.*
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JANUARY

19, 1995 - 1:30 P.M. - SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

P R O C E E D I N G S
(Continued)
THE COURT:

Resume the stand, please.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
(Continued)
BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Mr. Kimball, if you'll recall that you're

still under oath.
A.

Yes .

Q.

On or about March 16 of 1993, you made an

offer, with the assistance of Mr. Hill, to purchase
the Judge Building, didn't you?
A.

Yes .

Q.

And at the time you made that offer, you

offered to pay $850,000; is that correct?
MR. OLSEN:

Objection; relevance, Judge.

We haven't entered the document.
MR. JONES:

Objection; parol.

Your Honor, the relevance is

as follows: I would proffer that Mr. Kimball's
testimony will be that they offered $850,000 to
purchase the building.

They had a 30-day right to

review all of the documents regarding the building and
the condition, obtain the reports they wanted.

As a

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. A
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)531-0256
^

1

result of that, after the end of that review period,

2

they reduced their purchase price to $750,000.

3

was their offer, to 750, which was accepted by the

4

bank, and that's the final -- that is the final

5

agreement that was entered into, the purchase price of

6

750.

7

That

I would also proffer that Mr. Kimball's

8

testimony will be that in the course of that, they

9

reviewed in detail various leases, one of which was

10

Mr. Martineau's leases -- Mr. Martineau's lease.

11

as a result of the review, they determined to lower

12

the purchase price because they didn't think that the

13

leases were as advantageous as they thought they were

14

when they made the $850,000 offer.

15

THE COURT:

I'll allow you to go ahead,

MR. JONES:

Thank you.

16

counsel.

17
18
19
20

And

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Now, you offered to buy the building for

$850,000; is that correct?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And that offer would have included a down

23
24
25

payment of $170,000?
A.

If I remember right.

I can't -- seems

like that's what it was.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Q.

Or about 20 percent of the purchase price?

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q.

And the bank, then, would finance the

unpaid portion over a longer term; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, at the time you made that offer, you

were aware that the foreclosure proceeding was
commencing and that Mr. Martineau was a defendant?
A.

Well, no.

I didn't know about Mr.

Martineau then.
Q.

Well, I think you said that -- you said

before the break that during the first week of March
you learned that Mr. Martineau was a defendant in the
lawsuit, and you testified, or I asked you if you
didn't make an offer on or about March 16 of 1993, and
you said you did.

So that at the time you made the

offer, you knew then that Mr. Martineau was a
defendant in the lawsuit that had been brought by
Republic to foreclose the trust deed.
A.

Well, I didn't know if he was actually in

the foreclosure.

I knew that there was some problem

they had had with Lee Martineau, but I didn't know it
was a foreclosure from him.

I knew that the property

was in foreclosure.
Q.

So you don't recall your testimony prior

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)531-0256
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to the noon hour?
MR. OLSEN:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

Argumentative.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

When you made the offer on March 16th, you

expressly reserved the right to instruct the bank
which leases would or would not be foreclosed in the
foreclosure proceeding, didn't you?
MR. OLSEN:
objection?
this.

Judge, may I have a continuing

I suppose your ruling carries throughout

We're talking about preliminary offers.

We

have a final agreement in evidence.
THE COURT:

I understand.

MR. OLSEN:

Can I have a continuing

THE COURT:

You may.

objection?

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Let me direct your attention, if I may, to

Exhibit D-13.

Can you identify Exhibit D-13?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that your signature at the bottom of

the second page dated March 16, 1993?
A.

Yes, it is .

Q.

And is this the document you utilized

prepared by Mr. Hill in order to make your proposal to

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)531-0256

1

purchase the property at $850,000 to Republic

2

and Loan?

3
4
5

A.

Savings

Yes, with the intent to really continue

further negotiations with the bank.
Q.

Did you include in paragraph 8 a provision

6

that would allow you to specify which tenants were

7

included in the foreclosure proceedings?

8
9
10

A.

Well, I think the idea there, and this is

why -MR. JONES:

Well, your Honor, I'll move

11

again for the admission of Defendant's Exhibit 13 in

12

order that we can refer specifically to the language

13

and not have him speculate or discuss it without the

14

Court having the opportunity to review it.

15

THE COURT:

Mr. Olsen?

16

MR. OLSEN:

I object on the issue of

17

parol, your Honor, if there's an integrated

18

and on relevance.

19

THE COURT:

document,

He makes a good point.

I've

20

allowed you to go quite a ways, counsel, but

21

preliminary negotiations, we have an agreement that we

22

entered into on what can be relevant.

23

MR. OLSEN:

I understand, your Honor.

The

24

relevance relates to the estoppel argument that we've

25

already presented to the Court.

That is, at this

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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point in time he'd spoken to Mr. Martineau.

He'd

already told Mr. Martineau, according to Mr. Hill's
testimony, that he intended to foreclose him out, and
he included language in here that would prevent -that would give him that option, that would allow him
to control that as it went forward.

It is written

evidence signed by him confirming that he did not
intend, or at least he was retaining for himself the
right to determine who got foreclosed and who didn't.
So it's clearly relevant as to our estoppel argument.
I recognize, and again we're not saying
that this -- we're not arguing that this document
varies the final terms.

They are as they are with

regard to Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 19.

But this

sets forth, this verifies or ratifies the testimony
that Mr. Hill gave us with regard to Mr. Kimball's
statement that he didn't intend to foreclose out Mr.
Martineau.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

Go ahead.

MR. JONES:

Is this exhibit, then,

received, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. JONES:

Thank you.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Let me direct your attention specifically
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to paragraph 8 of Defendant's Exhibit D-13 and have
you read that.
A,

"No lease shall be foreclosed unless

otherwise specified by the buyer."
Q.

And you read that before you signed this

offer; did you not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Kimball, you were aware of that

provision?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you included that provision in this

offer to Republic specifically so you could

follow

through on your promise to Mr. Martineau that he would
not be foreclosed out if you acquired the property; is
that correct?
A.

No.
MR. OLSEN:

Objection; leading.

to the use of the word "promise."

Objection

Misstates the

testimony.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Overruled.
No, that's not correct.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

So you included that, then, so you would

have the option to foreclose him out and utilize that
to improve your position with regard to Mr.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Martineau's
A.
time.

lease?
Well, first I never saw this lease at the

I never saw Mr. Martineau's lease.

I never --

it was never my intention, as Mr. Hill and Mr.
Martineau put it, that they're trying to kick everyone
out of the building.

That wasn't our intention.

Our

intention was to lease out the building, to put money
in to improve the building.

My partner, Danny Miller,

was going to do the due diligence in reviewing the
leases.

My job was to do the due diligence on the

building, on the function of the building.

But this

is probably, this language right here, was really, or
this agreement right here was really in the form of a
negotiation for the bank with us to try to tie down
the building to see where we go from there.
Q.

Did you think this language had no effect,

didn't mean anything, Mr. Kimball?
A.

Didn't really mean anything to me.

Q.

I see.

So you didn't know what the

language -A.

It was subject to me approving the leases.

Q.

You didn't mean anything by this language

at all?
A.

Huh-uh (negative).

What should I mean by

it?
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1

Q.

It's in your document that you signed.

2

That's what I'd like to know.

3

it?

4

A.

What did you mean by

Well, Harold Hill wrote this up, and I

5

felt like this was an agreement that was as a form of

6

negotiation to start with for whomever had the

7

building, the lender or Harold Hill, to see where we

8

went from here.

9

Q.

When you read this language, and you

10

testified -- correct me if I'm wrong -- you did

11

testify that you read it before you signed it,

12

correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

You understood, then, when you read it

15

that you would have control, if the bank accepted your

16

offer, over which leases were foreclosed and which

17

leases weren't?

18

A.

I didn't know what I'd have control over.

19

Q.

You didn't understand that that language

20
21

gave you that authority or gave you that power?
A.

Well, I thought it was mainly between me

22

and Harold Hill, as far as what was specified.

23

didn't know who had control over the building at that

24

point.

25

Q.

I

Isn't your letter addressed to Mr. Dennis
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1

Bush at Republic Savings?

2

A.

Yes, it is.

3

Q.

And isn't this as set forth in paragraph

4

1, the purchase price of $850,000, offered to Republic

5

Savings?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And so you knew when you signed this

8

letter that you were dealing with Mr. Bush on behalf

9

of Republic Savings, correct?

10

A.

I knew I had to go through Mr. Bush, yes.

11

Q.

And it was your intent in submitting this

12

letter to him to make an offer to buy the building

13

from Republic Savings for $850,000, correct?

14

A.

I didn't know if it was going to be

15

actually bought from Republic or bought from Mr.

16

Harold Hill.

17

where it went.

I didn't understand the legality of

18

Q.

But your intent was to buy the building?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And your intent was to submit an offer for

21

$850,000?

22

A.

That's correct.

23

Q.

And your intent was also to control the

24

foreclosure process as it related to tenants in the

25

building?

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1

A.

Well, again, I didn't really -- I wasn't

2

really too concerned about it personally, because that

3

was going be part of the due diligence, and I wasn't

4

really privy, or not privy, but I wasn't too concerned

5

about getting involved in all of the leases.

6

going to be --

7
8

Q.

That was

I'm not asking you what your division of

labor was between and you Mr. Miller.

9

A.

Okay.

10

Q.

I'm asking you: When you signed this, and

11

by the language in paragraph 8, you intended to

12

control who would be included in the foreclosure

13

process as the potential buyer of the building; isn't

14

that correct, Mr. Kimball?

15

A.

You know, you asked the question that I

16

have control or my intent was to have control of all

17

the leases in this building.

18

and if, in fact, I saw the leases, I could have

19

control over that, yes.

20

Q.

I guess I could say yes,

You expected when you acquired the

21

building to acquire the leases, didn't you, Mr.

22

Kimball?

23

A.

Yes, I did.

24

Q.

So you expected, once you acquired them,

25

to exercise control over the leases?

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And so certainly when you were making the

3

offer, you didn't intend for the bank to foreclose

4

someone out that you wanted to keep in the building,

5

did you?

6

A.

No, I didn't.

7

Q.

So by this language, then, you intended to

8

have control over who would be included in the

9

foreclosure process among the tenants?

10

A.

Okay.

Yes.

11

Q.

And thus you have the ability, then, to

12

honor your promise to Mr. Martineau that his lease

13

would not be foreclosed out?

14

MR. OLSEN:

Objection on the question.

It

15

misstates the testimony, Judge.

16

promise of which there is none and there's no evidence

17

of a promise.

18
19
20

THE COURT:

It characterizes a

Sustained.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

You never requested that Republic add any

21

other tenant in the building as a defendant in the

22

foreclosure, did you?

23

A.

I never intended Republic to add?

24

Q.

You never requested Republic to add any of

25

the other tenants as defendants in the foreclosure
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action?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Prior to the time that you acquired the

rights in this action?
A.

No.

Q.

And since the time you acquired the rights

in this action, you've not seen to amend the complaint
to add any other tenants as party defendants, correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now, you said there was an inspection

period and you had some time to inspect the property;
is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

What was the purpose of that?

A.

To do the standard due diligence that the

property was, in fact, what they represented, and the
leases.
Q.

That's why you had an estoppel.
And you, then, or your partner received

that information and you reviewed it, correct?
A.

Yes, he reviewed the leases.

Q.

And as a result of that review, you went

back to Republic and you said we're going to reduce
our offer to $750,000?
A.

That's not correct.

Q.

Is that not correct?
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A.

That's not correct.

That wasn't based on

the leases.
Q.

What was it based on?

A.

Basically it was based on representations.

They came in, another bank acquired the Republic Bank,
which was TCF Bank.
money down.

They came in.

They wanted more

They wanted to sell the building as is,

whereas before they were representing that they would
do certain things with the building, the roof, bring
it up to the ADA, American Disabilities Act, fire and
safety.

We assumed that risk to take it as is so that

they didn't have any liability, and in effect that's
how we came to that price.
Q.

Where does it say in Exhibit 13 that they

would bring it up to ADA?

Where does it say that you

wouldn't take the building as is?
A.

I'm sorry?

Where?

Q.

Exhibit 13 is the offer that you've just

been looking at.
A.

Oh, this had nothing to do with it.

has nothing to do with the negotiations then.

This
This

was later.
Q.

Let me understand your testimony

correctly.

At the time you made this offer, it's your

testimony that you didn't have the leases?
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A.

Didn't have the leases.

Didn't know

anything about the building.
Q.

And you offered $850,000?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Not knowing anything about the building?

A.

That's correct.

Basically a quick

look-see to see that the value looked like it was
there.

And it was worth it to get into it, to draw up

an earnest money with a 30-day money back, basically.
It wasn't that -- it was a good faith on the buyer and
seller to see if the building would fit our needs and
if we fit their needs.
Q.

After you entered into negotiations, you

did get the leases and you did review the leases?
A.

That's correct.

Mr. Miller did.

I

didn't.
Q.

And after you'd reviewed the leases, you

signed an agreement with Judge Building Associates,
and TCF Bank of Wisconsin, which is Plaintiff's
Exhibit 19, on May 28, 1993, in which the purchase
price was going to be $750,000?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Let me ask you about the structure of the

transaction as it ultimately closed.

You and Mr.

Miller agreed to acquire a title to the property and
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agreed to acquire the note and the Deed of Trust in
consideration for payment of $750,000; is that
correct?
A.

Well, yes.

Q.

Did any portion of your purchase price go

to Judge Building Associates?
A.

None of mine.

They paid a commission.

Is

that what you're referring to?
Q.

No, I'm not referring to commissions.

Did

any portion of the purchase price go to Judge Building
Associates in consideration of receiving a deed?
MR. OLSEN:

I'm going to object.

calls for a legal conclusion.

That

Judge Building

Associates is getting out of its indebtedness, and to
ask him where it went, he had an agreement, he paid
$750,000.

The agreement speaks for itself.
MR. JONES:

Well, he may know whether they

received money or not.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

If he knows, he can answer.
Not to my knowledge.

I

don't know.
BY MR. JONES:
Q.

You also agreed that Hill and Martineau

would be released from liability under the Deed of
Trust and the note, correct?
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A.

That's correct.

That's why Harold called

Q.

And you agreed that they'd be dismissed as

them.

defendants in this action, correct?
A.

I assumed they would, yes.

Q.

You also agreed to sign a new Deed of

Trust in favor of the bank to finance the $550,000
portion of the purchase price, which was unpaid at
closing; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you also agreed to subordinate that

Deed of Trust -- excuse me -- subordinate the Deed
of Trust which is the subject of this action, to that
new $550,000 Deed of Trust; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And in order to do that, in order to do

those things, you executed various documents

in

favor

of the bank, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Let me have you first look at what has

been marked as Defendant's Exhibit Number 5.

Can you

identify that?
A.

It states it's a Deed of Trust Assignment

of Rents and Security Agreement.
Q.

Is it dated June 21, 1993?
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A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And is it executed on page 22 by you and

Mr. Miller?
A.

Yes.
MR. OLSEN:

Judge, we'll stipulate to the

admission of 5, 7 and 8.
THE COURT:

Very well.

Are you going to

offer them, counsel?
MR. JONES:

I am, your Honor.

THE COURT:

They will be received.

MR. JONES:

Exhibit Number 7, your Honor,

is an assignment dated June 18, 1993, and Exhibit
Number 8 is a subordinated agreement also dated June
18th.

Excuse me, I misspoke.

That's the 18th as

well.

Exhibit 8, D-8 is a subordination

agreement

dated June 18, 1993.
BY MR. JONES:
Q.

You executed each of those documents; is

that correct, Mr. Kimball?

Except I believe you did

not execute the assignment, which is 8; is that
correct?
A.

Not the assignment.
THE COURT:

Which is which?

MR. OLSEN:

7.

It's not 8,

is it?
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MR, JONES:

7, your Honor, is the

assignment from the bank of the Deed of Trust, which
is the subject of this foreclosure action.
THE COURT:

You said 8.

MR. JONES:

7, yes,

I think you meant

7.
I'm sorry.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Now, as additional collateral to the bank

in order to secure the $550,000 loan, you also
executed an assignment of all of your interest in the
tenant leases in the Judge Building, didn't you?
A.

Yes.

I can't remember, but yeah,

probably.
THE COURT:

This would be Exhibit

Number?

MR. JONES:

Exhibit Number 6, your Honor,

D-6, which is an assignment of leases.
THE COURT:

Any objection, Mr. Olsen?

MR. OLSEN:

No objection.

THE COURT:

It will be received.

MR. JONES:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

With regard to Exhibit D-6, let me ask you

one preliminary question.

In the course of doing

this, executing all of these documents whereby you
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would acquire the Deed of Trust, which is the subject
of this action, you would give the new trust deed and
you would subordinate it to the old trust deed, and
you would also assign the leases as collateral
security for the debt.

You attempted to preserve your

right to foreclose Mr. Martineau's lease, didn't you?
MR. OLSEN:

Objection.

The question is

compound and misstates the documents in evidence.
THE COURT:
misstates the documents.

I'm not sure how that
You intended to just refer

to these that are in evidence; did you not?
MR. JONES:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Restate the question, please.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

In connection with the closing where you

were giving the trust deeds, subordinating them to
older trust deeds, subordinating it to an older trust
deed and assigning your leases, during the course of
all that, you also intended to do what was necessary
to preserve your right to foreclose or protect Mr.
Martineau with regard to his lease, correct?
MR. OLSEN:
question.

Objection; it's a compound

The one question was foreclose, the other

is protect.
THE COURT:

Sustained.
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1
2

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

You executed documents preserving to you

3

the right to proceed with the foreclosure of Mr.

4

Martineau's lease; is that correct?

5

A.

Yes.

6

MR. JONES:

And I believe, your Honor,

7

that they have already been offered.

8

THE WITNESS:

9

MR. JONES:
Do you have 22 there?

12
13
14

from

the bank.

10
11

That was a requirement

Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 22.
P-22?

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Now, I'm going to direct your attention to

15

paragraph 2 in Exhibit P-22, found at the top of the

16

second page.

17

read it out loud, but just review that.

Would you read that?

You don't have to

18

A.

Number 2?

19

Q.

Yes.

20

A.

Okay.

21

Q.

You've read that?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Did you initial that paragraph?

24

A.

Yes, I did.

25

Q.

The changes that say -- the change from

Okay.
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1

six months to nine months?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And added the phrase, "use its best

4

efforts to"?

5

A-

Yes.

6

Q.

Now, you recorded or caused to be recorded

7

the assignment, the trust deed and the subordination

8

agreements, which are Defendant's Exhibits 5, 7 and 8;

9

is that correct?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Did you ever record this letter or cause

12

to be recorded this letter, which is Plaintiff's

13

Exhibit 22?

14

A.

I don't think -- I'm not sure if the

15

letter was recorded.

I think that language, I

16

remember, was in the purchase agreement.

17

Q.

This was never recorded, was it?

18

A.

I don't believe it was.

19

Q.

Now, the offer that was accepted by

I don't know.

20

Republic required Republic to produce tenant estoppel

21

certificates for your review, didn't it?

22

A.

I believe so.

23

Q.

And you received that, those certificates,

24
25

before closing, didn't you?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

And did you personally review those

tenants' estoppel certificates, Mr. Kimball?
A.

You know, I really didn't.

I didn't

personally review them.
Q.

Do you know if Mr. Miller reviewed them?

A.

I believe he did.

Q.

Now, as a result of the execution and

delivery of these documents, the trust deed, the
subordination agreement, the assignment of leases, and
your receipt of the assignment of this, of the Deed of
Trust, which is the foreclosure in this action, both
you and Mr. Miller owned both title to the property as
well as the trust deed, which is the subject of the
foreclosure, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And as a result, don't you and Mr. Miller

consider yourselves to be the landlords with regard to
tenants in the Judge Building?
MR. OLSEN:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Overruled.

Calls for a legal

conclusion.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Don't you and Mr. Miller consider

yourselves to be the landlords of the tenants in the
Judge Building?
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1

A.

Yes, we do.

2

Q.

And since June of '93, have you and Mr.

3

Miller assumed the responsibilities of the landlord to

4

the tenants in the Judge Building?

5

A.

We have.

6

Q.

Do you consider yourself bound by the

7

terms of the written leases which existed in June of

8

1993, at the time you acquired the building?

9
10
11
12

A.

I think we do, all except for the

Martineau lease.
Q.

You don't consider yourself bound by the

Martineau

lease?

13

A.

We don't.

I don't.

14

Q.

Have you refused to perform services as

15

requested by Mr. Martineau or anyone in his staff

16

since June of '93?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Have you refused to allow them access to

19

their space since June of '93?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

In fact, since June of '93, you've

22

performed all of the services that they have required

23

since they occupied that space?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And since June of '93, they've made all of
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the payments that were due and owing under the lease,
haven't they?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you've accepted all of those payments?

A,

Yes.

Q.

And you've never returned any of those

payments or refused to accept them, have you?
A.

No, although he didn't pay his increase.

So he is technically in default on that, I guess.

But

it's pretty minor, so we never . . .
Q.

Since June of '93 and with regard to the

Martineau lease, have you ever indicated to Mr.
Martineau or anyone that you didn't consider yourself
to be his landlord with regard to that lease?
A.

Well, I think he's very much aware that we

continually tried to continue some negotiations to
execute a new lease.

And we didn't want to be deemed

as a landlord, if you want to use that expression.
But during this negotiation we were continuing this
legal aspect as well.
Q.

The bank requested it.

But in these negotiations, you were

negotiating as landlord of the building, weren't you?
A.

I was.

Q.

And you were negotiating as owner of the

building, weren't you?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were negotiating with the person

who was a tenant who was occupying space?
A.

That's correct,

Q.

And who was paying you rent?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you provided all of the services under

the lease that his lease called for expressly?
A.

Yes.

Q,

And he was paying you?

A.

Well, I'm not sure what his lease really

called for expressly.
Q.

Have you never reviewed -MR. OLSEN:

asked and answered.

Objection.

This has been

We've been through it three

times.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Have you ever reviewed Mr. Martineau's

lease?
A.

Very briefly.

Q.

With regard to Mr. Martineau's lease, are

you familiar with the provisions of paragraph 33-B?
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A.

I'm not familiar with that.

Q.

So you've never reviewed that?

A.

I looked at the amount and the terms and

the length of the lease.
Q.

Since June of '93, if Mr. Martineau had

not paid his rent, was it your understanding that you
had the right to evict him from the premises and then
pursue him for whatever the unpaid rent was under the
lease?
MR. OLSEN:

Objection; relevance.

THE COURT:

Sustained

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Since June of '93, if you had refused to

provide services to Mr. Martineau, was it your
understanding that you would have been in default with
regard to your obligations?
MR. OLSEN:

Objection; relevance.

Objection; speculation.
MR. JONES:

Your Honor, it's clearly

relevant as to his understanding of what his
relationship is and how he's treated them.

We have,

again, our argument to the Court is it is unfair and
inequitable for them on the one hand to treat them as
tenants, to accept the rent, and in every fashion act
as if they are tenants in the building, and including
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providing all the tenants' services, and on the other
hand tell them that they are going to foreclose them
out and they're going to extinguish their rights
because they're junior and inferior.
THE COURT:

You can certainly argue that

on the basis of the record now.

You don't have to go

into what his understanding about the obligation under
the lease was.
MR. JONES:

I'll do so.

THE COURT:

I'll sustain the objection.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Since January of '93, well, let me

rephrase the question.

You've testified that you

signed at the time of the closing -- or excuse me -that you accepted -- I apologize.

At the time of

closing, you signed in favor of the bank an assignment
of leases, which is Defendant's Exhibit Number 6, D-6,
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

When you signed that Exhibit, D-6, did you

review it?
A.

Well, I looked at this as between us and

the bank and it didn't have anything to do with
Martineau.

So my partner, Danny Miller, went through

this quite extensively, so I wasn't really too
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concerned to review it.

So the answer is I really

didn't review it.
Q.

So you didn't read it?

A.

I didn't really read it.

Q.

You didn't read paragraph 2, found on the

very first page, specifically 2-A or 2-D found at the
top of page 2?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So you never read those provisions?

A.

I didn't, since it was between us

Q.

This was, however, a document that was

and

required by the bank in order that you could get the
financing from them, correct?
A.

Well, I assume it was, because everything,

every document we have in here was required by the
bank.
Q.

Now, inasmuch as you and Mr. Miller are in

a position of being both the landlord and trust deed
holder on the property, you find yourself in a
favorable position to allow Mr. Martineau to stay in
the building under the lease rates of the lease, under
the terms of the lease and at the rates that he's now
at, don't you?
A.

No.

I mean, I guess I'm thinking of two
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things here.

Can you restate that question again,

please?
Q.

Because you and Mr. Miller own both the

property, have title to the property, and because
you own the Deed of Trust, which is the subject of
this action, you and Mr. Miller are in a favorable
position -THE COURT:

Objection; relevance.

THE COURT:

Finish your question.

MR. JONES:

I had not.

Had you

finished?

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

-- you and Mr. Miller are in a favorable

position to determine that Mr. Martineau can stay in
the building and occupy his space under the existing
lease, aren't you?
A.

Well, we could.

position now.
Q.

Yeah, we're in the

However --

And you

—

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. JONES:

I'm sorry.

THE WITNESS:

Initially, and this is where

we're going back to this purchase agreement where it
states that -- where you pointed, and I can't

remember

what exhibit it is, but where we initialed six months
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and nine months, we wanted -- the bank requested the
six-month period to foreclose out Mr. Martineau.

We

wanted to extend it longer so we could try to
renegotiate something with Mr. Martineau and not take
such a drastic action.
BY MR. JONES:
Q.

So it is your testimony that you are

compelled to foreclose?
A.

We were, initially.

I believe that the

bank's position still is that we continue this.
Q.

And why?

Why is that?

A.

Because the lease is really detrimental to

the value of the security of the building.
Q.

And do you believe that?

A.

I do believe that.

Q.

I see.

You don't want Mr. Martineau as a

tenant in the building?
A.

No, I didn't say that.

I'd like to have

Mr. Martineau as a tenant.
Q.

But you want him as a tenant in the

building in order that you can get a higher lease rate
from him?
A.

Market value, yes.

Q.

And that's the only reason, isn't it?

A.

Pardon?
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1

Q.

That's the only reason that Mr.

2

Martineau's lease is expressly described in these

3

documents, and you have the right to proceed with this

4

foreclosure action, is so you can try to get a higher

5

lease rate out of Mr. Martineau?

6

MR. OLSEN:

I'm going to object; one, on

7

relevance; two, the question is vague; three, it calls

8

for speculation because there's a bank that's a party

9

to this.

The documents say what they say.

10

the reasons are, that was the reason.

11

object to all this on the basis of parol.

12

THE COURT:

13

getting at, counsel.

14

question.

15
16

I'm going to

I'm not sure what you're
I don't see the relevance is in

MR. JONES:
your Honor.

Whatever

I'll withdraw the question,

No further questions.

17

THE COURT:

Mr. Olsen?

18

MR. OLSEN:

I'll be brief, Judge.

19

to mark Exhibit P-26.

20
21
22

I need

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Mr. Kimball, I show you what has been

23

marked as Exhibit P-26.

Mr. Jones was asking you

24

questions about a document, this March 16th offer.

25

stopped with an offer.

He

Was that offer accepted?
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A.

No, it wasn't.

Q.

Would you turn to the back two pages of

Exhibit P-16.

Do you recollect P-16?

P-26, excuse

me •
A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that?

A.

Well, this is P-26.

I'm sorry, did you

say the back two pages?
Q.

What are the back two pages?

A.

It's the initial proposal that Harold Hill

gave to me to give to, I guess, Republic.
Q.

Whose handwriting is all over that

document?
A.

It's Ray Unrath from Wallace & Associates.

Q.

Was that document, was your offer ever

accepted?
A.

No, it wasn't.

Q.

And was this the reply that you got back,

A.

Yes.

Q.

And Ray Unrath was a representative of the

A.

That's correct.

P-26?
Yes, it was.

bank?

MR. OLSEN:

I'd move for the admission of

P-26 .
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MR. JONES:
of foundation.
Unrath.

I'll object, your Honor.

Lack

The document is not signed by Mr.

He's not here to testify that he even

prepared it.

It's not addressed to Mr. Kimball.

addressed to Mr. Hill.

It's

It's not been signed and it

doesn't bear Mr. Kimball's signature at any point.
And he's testified it's not his handwriting.

I don't

think there's foundation.
THE COURT:

Mr. Olsen?

MR. OLSEN:

It's the goose and gander

argument, Judge.

They introduced the offer, which was

parol, and what comes back to Mr. Kimball is what is
being introduced now, and it specifically treats
paragraph 8.

We have an unaccepted offer now in

evidence and he's objecting to the response that was
delivered back to Mr. Kimball.
THE COURT:

I guess it's an authentication

argument, counsel.
BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Do you recognize the handwriting on that

document?
A.

Yes.

Well, just that it was Ray Unrath

that made the notes on it.
Q.

Where?

The first two?

A.

Looks like he's wrote Ray Unrath where it
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says Harold Hill.
MR. JONES:

May I voir dire, your Honor?

THE COURT:

You may.

VOIR DIRE

EXAMINATION

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Are you familiar with Mr. Unrath's

handwriting?
A.

Yes, just not this.

Q.

Did you see him make any of these

notations on this page?
A.

No, I didn't.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Did you receive a copy of this directly

from Mr. Unrath?
A.

I don't remember receiving a copy of this

I received other notes from Ray Unrath, though.
Q.

Did he ever tell you that he made these

notations ?
A.

I don't remember.
MR. JONES:

I would continue to object,

your Honor, on the basis that he cannot authenticate
this document.

He's neither sufficiently

familiar

with his handwriting -- Mr. Unrath never told him
that this was his handwriting -- nor was he present
when this was made.
THE COURT:

I'll sustain the objection.
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MR. OLSEN:
can call Mr. Hill.

Judge, for time purposes, we

I'm wondering if Mr. Jones will

stipulate to the document.

If you look at the top,

you can see the fax is from Wallace & Associates.

If

you look at the cover page, you can see that it is
Wallace & Associates letterhead, and you can see
that's it's in my client's -- my client will testify
it's in their files in the normal course of business,
and this was sent back to them.
Now, we can recall Mr. Hill to testify as
to that or we can get Wallace & Associates in and put
their business

records

into evidence.

But if you look

at the cover, if you look at the fax, that's clearly
where it came from, and we'd ask for accommodation in
order to move it along.
MR. JONES:

I don't want to make it

difficult, your Honor, but I have never seen the
document before, the second page with handwriting.
Mr. Hill isn't here to talk to.
to him at such time as we can.

I'd be happy to talk
But I, under these

circumstances, couldn't agree to that because I don't
have sufficient background knowledge or information
with regard to this document.

I've not seen this

handwriting before.
THE COURT:

I'll sustain the objection.
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MR. OLSEN:

Judge, considering that,

considering that we have an unsigned offer with the
plaintiff's exhibit on March 16th, I think this points
out the problem with putting an unsigned offer in. And
I'd move to, again, renew my objection to the
admission and ask the Court to reconsider that ruling
on the March 16th document.
THE COURT:

You may be heard, Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, we have Mr.

Kimball here.

He's told us he signed it.

testified as to it.

He's

There's no reason, given the

purpose for which we have offered it, that it should
be withdrawn.
THE COURT:
authentication problem.

This is strictly an
I believe I'll sustain the

objection.
MR. JONES:

I understand, judge.

BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Mr. Kimball, was your March 16th offer

ever accepted?
A.

No, it wasn't.

Q.

Have you ever signed a lease with Mr.

Martineau?
A.

No, I have not.

Q.

Do you have any signed agreement with Mr.
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Martineau whatsoever?
A.

No.

Q.

Is there any signed agreement with Mr.

Hill whereby the Martineau lease has been delivered to
you or specifically assigned to you?
A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever signed an agreement in

writing assuming the obligations under the Martineau
lease?
A.

No.

Q.

You were also assigned the 1986 trust f

deed; were you not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that has a provision which allows for

the collection of rents if there's a default on the
trust deed obligation; does it not?
A.

Yes, I guess.

Q.

Now, they talked about the fact that

you've been accepting rent from Mr. Martineau.

How

long have you been trying to get Mr. Martineau out of
that building?
A.

Since before we closed, I guess, really.

Q.

And, in fact, a sale was scheduled in

November of 1983; was it not?
A.

'93.
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1

Q.

1993.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

So the reason that you've been accepting

4

rent is because there's an order pending this hearing

5

which precludes you from proceeding with the

6

foreclosure; is that correct?

7

A.

That's correct.

8

MR. JONES:

Objection; leading, your

10

THE COURT:

Sustained as to leading.

11

MR. OLSEN:

I don't have any further

9

Honor.

12

questions.

13

BY MR. OLSEN:

14

Q.

Oh, one more question, Mr. Kimball.

Earlier Mr. Jones had asked you about a

15

conversation with Mr. Martineau where you had

16

indicated that you did not want him out of the

17

building.

18

the building, did Mr. Martineau tell you that he was

19

interested in purchasing the building?

20
21

A.

At any time prior to the time you purchased

No, he didn't.

He did mention or did say

that at one time he wanted to buy the building.

22

Q.

When did he tell you that?

23

A.

He told that to -- I don't know exactly

24

when he said it to me, but it was in one of the first

25

meetings I had with him.

Maybe Mr. Miller was there,
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1

I can't remember.

2
3

MR. OLSEN:

I don't have any further

questions, Judge.

4

THE COURT:

Mr. Jones?

5

MR. JONES:

May I have just one moment,

6

your Honor?

7

I have no further questions.

8

THE COURT:

9

Mr. Kimball.

All right.

Thank you.

10

Call your next witness.

11

MR. JONES:

12

You may step down,

Mr. Miller, please, your

Honor.

13

(The witness was sworn.)

14

DIRECT EXAMINATION

15
16
17

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Mr. Miller, would you state your name and

address for the record, please.

18

A.

Daniel A. Miller.

19

Q.

Yes.

20

A.

3604 Glen Ridge Drive, Sherman Oaks,

21

California.

22

Q.

What is your occupation, Mr. Miller?

23

A.

I'm in real estate management, leasing and

24
25

My residence address?

ownership.
Q.

Tell me first what your education is.
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you have a college degree?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And from what university?

4

A.

UCLA,

5

Q.

And in what year did you obtain that

6

degree?

7

A.

I graduated in 1965.

8

Q.

And in what area did you receive your

9

degree?

10

A.

Business

11

Q.

And you have a postgraduate degree?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

A law degree?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

When did you obtain that?

16

A.

1968 .

17

Q.

From what

18

A.

UCLA.

19

Q.

Subsequent to obtaining your law degree,

20

administration.

Law degree.

institution?

did you have occasion to practice as a lawyer?

21

A.

I practiced for approximately ten years.

22

Q.

And in your practice as a lawyer, did you

23

have a particular area of emphasis or specialty?

24

A.

I would say more business and real estate.

25

Q.

Since approximately 1978; is that
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1

correct?

When you ceased that practice?

2

A.

I did continue to practice in 1980.

3

Q.

Since 1980, then, you've been involved in

4

the real estate business; is that correct?

5

A.

Yes, I have.

6

Q.

And would you describe generally since

7

1980 the nature of the real estate business that

8

you've engaged in.

9

of involvement?

10

A.

What kind of property or what kind

In the early '80s there were a couple of

11

retail projects, but since the early '80s through the

12

present, it's been exclusively office buildings in

13

Utah.

14
15

Q.

Are most of the properties you own or

manage located in Utah?

16

A.

They all are.

17

Q.

Do you own other properties with Mr.

18

Kimball?

19

A.

One other.

20

Q.

And what property is that?

21

A.

It's a professional office building in

22

Murray.

23

Q.

24
25

How did you become familiar with the

opportunity to acquire the Judge Building?
A.

Mr. Kimball brought it to my attention.
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Q.

And approximately when did that occur?

A.

This would have been approximately

sometime, I would say, mid-March of 1993.
Q.

And once the building had come to your

attention, did you and Mr. Kimball strike some sort of
agreement to proceed jointly to attempt to acquire the
building?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And in that regard, did you assume some

responsibilities as part of the due diligence process?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you describe to us what your

responsibilities were?
A.

I primarily reviewed the operational

records of the property and the leases of the
property, as opposed to building conditions and
inspections.
Q.

That was more Mr. Kimball's

function.

In that respect, then, did you have

occasion to review the lease between Judge Building
Associates and Martineau & Company?

A copy of which

has been marked as Defendant's Exhibit D-2, I
believe.
A*

Excuse me.

glasses on the bench.

I just realized I left my
If I may have those brought to

me I would appreciate it.
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(Mr. Miller's glasses were retrieved and given to
him. )
Thank you.
Q.

Certainly.

A.

The question was whether I had the

opportunity to review that lease?
Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you know when you reviewed the

lease?
A.

I know approximately when.

It would have

been in April of 1963.
Q.

'93?

A.

Excuse me, 1993.

It would have been after

April 7.
Q.

And how do you identify the date as April

A.

After we opened escrow, we had the right

7?

to inspect documents, and I submitted a document
request list for detailed documents on the Judge
Building.

That was dated April 7.

Q.

Okay.

A.

And sometime thereafter, I would say

within approximately ten days, the documents were
delivered to me to look at.
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And after you received them, how quickly

did you proceed to review them?
A.
day.

I would say within that day or the next

There were time constraints on this purchase.

We had a limited time in which to evaluate documents.
It was a large purchase, so I gave it my attention.
Q.

And do you recall specifically reviewing

the Martineau's lease at that time?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Did you review the provisions relating to

the term of the lease, how long it went?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what the renewal options would be?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what the rate per square foot was?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you also review the body of the lease;

that is the specific provision relating to some of the
other tenants' rights and obligations?
A.

Less so.

In other words, when I found out

that the lease went for 18 years at substantially
below-market rent, did not pass on operating expenses
as other leases had, my immediate response was that
this lease was not a good lease for the building.
I communicated

And

that to the parties we were dealing
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with.
Q.

Who was that?

A.

That would have been Ray Unrath and Bob

Merrill, the attorney for the lender.
Q,

Did you have occasion to review paragraph

25 of the lease?
A.

25?

Sale by lessor?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Did you have occasion to review paragraph

33, including specifically subparagraph B of paragraph
33?
A.

I believe I did review that, yes.

Q.

And you reviewed it before you signed the

real estate purchase agreement, a copy of which is
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-19?

By the time you signed

Plaintiff's Exhibit P-19 in May of 1993, you had
clearly reviewed by then the Martineau lease and
provision 33-B of the lease, correct?
A.

That's correct, because the Martineau

lease became a significant portion or part of the
negotiations and the transaction, and I had
substantial dealings with the attorneys for the bank
as to how we were going to deal with the Martineau
lease and the foreclosure of that lease.
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Q.

And your interest in dealing with the

foreclosure was so that you and Mr. Kimball would be
in a position to negotiate a higher or better lease
rate with Mr. Martineau and not accept the lease as it
was then written; correct, Mr. Miller?
A.

Not totally correct.

Not the way you've

expressed it.
Q.

How isn't it correct?

A.

Our position was that this lease, because

it went 18 years, at the rate that went it was almost
half the going rate, market rate at that time.
you carried it out with the 1 percent annual

And if

increases

for 18 years, you'll have a situation that the rental
rate on that lease after 18 years is not even the same
as what the market rate is today.

So it was the

longevity of the lease that was of major concern to
me.

The rental rate we felt we could in effect live

with for a shorter period of time.

And that's why as

the negotiations ensued, I felt we were very
reasonable in what we proposed to Mr. Martineau.
Q.

My question, Mr. Miller, was: You were

concerned about an opportunity to be in a position to
continue the foreclosure in order that you would have
the ability to get higher or better lease terms that
were more favorable to you out of Mr. Martineau, or to
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1

foreclose him out of the property; is that correct?

2

A.

That's correct.

3

Q.

And that's fairer by the way you have

4

viewed that, correct?

5

lease?

We wanted a fairer lease.

Something you view as a fairer

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

You don't have any reason to believe that

8

Mr. Martineau didn't believe this was a fair lease, do

9

you?

10

A.

I have no -- I'm sure he probably thought

11

it was a fair lease.

12

continue, I'm looking at it as a purchaser of a

13

property in which the rates are probably half of the

14

market rates and the lease is going to go out another

15

15 years.

16

Q.

I don't know.

If I may

I've handed you what has been marked as

17

Defendant's Exhibit 10.

18

document, please?

Can you identify that

19

A.

I'm sorry?

Which?

20

Q.

Defendant's Exhibit 10.

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Can you identify that document?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

What is it?

25

A*

When we purchased the property --
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Q.

If you'll just identify it.

A.

It's a letter from Mr. Richard Thurman of

TCF Bank.
Q.

And it's dated March 15, 1994; is that

correct?

me —

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Does that bear your signature -- excuse

at the bottom?
A.

That is my signature.

Q.

Daniel A. Miller?

A.

Yes.
MR. JONES:

We'd move for the admission of

Defendant's Exhibit 10, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Any objection?

MR. OLSEN:

Objection; relevance.

Objection; parol.
MR. JONES:

Your Honor, it's relevant as

to what their intent was in terms of excluding Mr.
Martineau's lease, isolating Mr. Martineau's lease and
proceeding with the foreclosure.
THE COURT:

I'll receive it.

MR. JONES:

Thank you.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Now, as part of the purchase of this

property, it was one of your requirements that the
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lender deliver estoppel certificates to you; isn't
that correct?
A.

On leases of a certain minimum size, we

wanted estoppel statements to confirm the terms of the
leases, that is correct.
Q.

in fact the agreement you signed said you

would get estoppel certificates from all of the
tenants?
A.

I don't believe so.

I don't know.

I

think you had to be a certain square footage and size,
and I think I then narrowed this to certain of what I
would consider the major tenants of the building.

You

have to realize that almost every tenant was on a
month-to-month tenancy, or their lease was due to
expire within maybe a year or two or three, other than
Mr. Martineau.
Q.

And were those estoppel certificates

delivered to you at some time for your review?
A.

Yes, they were.

Q.

And you got them before the closing on

this property in or about June or July, 1993, right?
A.

I received them before the closing, that

is correct.
Q.

What was the purpose of the estoppel

certificates ?
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A.

The purpose of the estoppel certificate is

to basically confirm, at least to us, the rent
payments that were being made by the tenants.

And

that if any of the tenants had any objections, such as
the owner of the building wasn't meeting his
obligations, the then-owners, we would know what we
would be stepping into, so it would give us a better
situation or understanding of the tenancy of the
property,
Q.

And you received an estoppel certificate

from Mr. Martineau, didn't you?
A.

Yes, we did.
MR. JONES:

I did.
Your Honor, we'd move for the

admission of Defendant's Exhibit Number 11, which is
the estoppel certificate.
MR. OLSEN:

No objection.

THE COURT:

It will be received.

MR. JONES:

Thank you.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Do you recognize that document, Mr.

Miller?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You wanted to know by way of that estoppel

certificate that Mr. Martineau was paying his rent?
A.

No, that's not correct.

I mean, that
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would be one thing, but I was much more concerned with
the handwritten notes on this document that said that
he had an option on adjoining suites.
concern me.

That would

And then when I saw that document, it

concerned me more.
Q.

You certainly wanted to know that he was

paying rent as provided in the estoppel certificate,
correct?
A.
was.

Yeah.

I would want to know what his rent

It confirms the terms of the lease.
Q.

That, too.

And you also wanted to know if he thought

there were any defaults by Judge Building Associates,
wouldn't you?
A.

Yes, I would want to know that.

Q.

And your estoppel certificate addresses

that, doesn't it?
A.

I'm not sure it does.

This was not our

form of estoppel, so I can't really address that.
Q.

Well, specifically paragraph 9 addresses

the fact that the lessee will pay its obligations to
the new landlord under the lease?
A.

Maybe I could stop you for a moment.

rejected this estoppel.

We

This estoppel certificate was

not satisfactory to us.
Q.

Did you receive a new estoppel
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certificate?
A.

No.

No, we did not.

Q.

Did you give anyone notice that you

rejected it?
A.

Yes, the bank and Ray Unrath.

First of

all, it purported to give Mr. Martineau an option on
adjoining space at the same low rate that he was
already having, so we objected to that for that
purpose.

We objected to it on the purpose that there

was a foreclosure already going on, and it was fully
our intention to preserve those foreclosure rights, to
either have the lender foreclose or give us an
opportunity to foreclose.

So in that sense, this

estoppel was something that raised questions that we
needed to deal with, and which we subsequently did
deal with with the lender.
Q.

So your testimony is you didn't like some

of the things that Mr. Martineau wrote in here; is
that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And you didn't have any objection, though,

to his signing without any modification to paragraph
number 9, though, did you?
A.

May I read it?

Paragraph number 9 in a

way was insignificant because of what was going on
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with the foreclosure of Martineau.
this is signed by Martineau.
Q.

In other words,

It's not signed by me.

So you didn't care about the promise that

Mr. Martineau made in paragraph 9?
A.

Which promise is that?

Q.

The promise that he would pay all of his

lease obligations?
A.

That was fine.

I would assume that he

would pay his rent as other tenants were paying their
rent.
Q.

Because you considered him to be a tenant

in the building at that time?
A.

At that time, until there was a

foreclosure, his lease was in effect.
Q.

Did you ever tell Mr. Martineau that you

rejected this estoppel certificate?
A,

I don't think I ever discussed the

estoppel certificate with Mr. Martineau.
MR. JONES:

No further questions, your

THE COURT:

Mr. Olsen?

Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Mr. Miller, did you ever have discussions

with Mr. Martineau on whether his lease was acceptable
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to you?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

When did those occur?

A.

Those would have occurred in April of

Q.

Where did they occur?

A.

In his office.

Q.

Who was present?

A.

He and I.

Q.

What did you tell him?

A.

I told him that I considered his lease to

1993.

be unacceptable in the present form.
Q.

Let me get right the issue.

lawyer, you did the documents.

You're a

Did you intend that

the trust deed be merged into the conveyance of title
to you?
MR. JONES:

Objection, your Honor, the

documents speak for themselves.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Overruled.
There was no intention -- in

fact, the intention was just the opposite.

Everything

was structured to specifically preserve the rights to
foreclose on that lease.

That was our intention, and

I believe, at least I hope, that is what has actually
happened.

That was our intention.

The parties to the
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1

transaction all signed those documents, including us,

2

including the bank.

3

BY MR. OLSEN:

4
5

Q.

And since you acquired title to the

property, have you made efforts to foreclose?

6

A.

Yes, we did.

7

Q.

And you had discussions with the bank

8
9

about that
A.

foreclosure?
Yes, we have, because under our agreement

10

with the bank, there was a nine-month period in which

11

to proceed -- excuse me -- to use our best efforts

12

to foreclose that lease.

13
14

Q.

And have they consented to the foreclosure

and proceeded?

15
16

19
20
21

Objection, your Honor;

THE COURT:

Sustained.

hearsay.

17
18

MR. JONES:

BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Have you ever been informed by them that

you should not proceed with the foreclose?
A.

No.

In fact, just the opposite.

This

22

exhibit that was shown to me, from the bank to me, was

23

giving us an extension of time.

24

was this June 21st letter that was part of the loan

25

documents.

In other words, there

It was that letter that informed us of the
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obligation of nine months to either foreclose or enter
into a satisfactory lease.
The nine months had expired, so we felt we
wanted the approval of the bank to continue, and we
requested it, and this was the response back from the
bank saying that okay, you know, go ahead and still
try to make a deal.
Q.

Have you ever signed an agreement with Mr.

Martineau whereby you would honor the lease that he
has on the property?
A.

No.

Q.

Has it always been your intention to

foreclose?
A.

Yes.
MR. OLSEN:

I have no further questions.

THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

You may step down, Mr. Miller,

thank you.
Let's take a short recess at this time.
Mr. Jones, time-wise, how are we doing?

You have one

more witness?
MR. JONES:

Mr. Martineau, and then we'll

THE COURT:

We'll take a ten-minute

be done.
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recess .
(Recess)
THE COURT:

Call your next witness.

MR. JONES:

We call Mr. Lee Martineau,

THE COURT:

Mr. Martineau?

your Honor

(The witness was sworn.)
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JONES:
Q.

Mr. Martineau, would you state your name

and address for the record, please.
A.

Yes.

Leland, L-e-1-a-n-d, Arah, A-r-a-h,

Martineau, M-a-r-t-i-n-e-a-u.
Q.

And your residence address?

A.

3167 East Deer Creek Circle, Salt Lake

City, Utah.
Q.

What's your occupation, Mr. Martineau?

A.

Certified Public Accountant.

Q.

And how long have you been engaged in that

profession or practice?
A.

I've been engaged in that since 1965.

I've been certified since 1968.
Q.

You're familiar with the lease which is at

issue in this lawsuit?
A.

Yes .
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rage

1

Q.

o^

Have you made, to your knowledge, all of

2

the payments that have been due and owing under the

3

lease?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Now, prior to the time that the

6

foreclosure commenced, who did you make those payments

7

to?

8 1

A.

To Judge Building Associates.

9

Q.

Were you aware that at some time a

10

receiver was appointed?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And after the receiver was appointed, who

13
14

did you make the payments to?
A.

To Mr. David Jewkes.

I believe it was --

15

there was an account set up for Wallace & Associates

16

in favor of the bank.

17
18

Q.

And did you understand Mr. Jewkes to be

the receiver of the property?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Now, at some point in time were you aware

21

that the property was sold?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And after that sale, who did you make your

24

payments to?

25

A.

To D.M. Properties, I believe it's called,
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or Judge Building, to Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball.
Q.

Since that time, have Mr. Miller and Mr.

Kimball ever refused your payments?
A.

No.

Q.

Have they ever told you they should be

made in any other fashion other than to them directly?
A.

No.

Q.

And where did you deliver the payments to?

A.

To their offices.

Q.

Where are there offices located?

A.

They're now in the Judge Building.

Q.

Has there ever been a time when they

refused to provide you with services?
A.

No.

Q.

And, in fact, have they provided you all

of the services you have requested under the terms of
the lease?
A.

Yes .

Q.

Have they ever given you any notice

indicating that you did not have any rights under the
lease; that you didn't have rights under the lease?
A.

No.

Q.

And have they ever given you any notice

that you should not ask them to perform services as
the landlord under the lease?
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A.

No.

Quite the contrary.

v/ -x

They've sent us

correspondence indicating we should request

anything

we needed from them.
Q.

And that correspondence was on their

letterhead with regard to this building?
A.

Yes.

Q.

When did you learn that there was a

default by Judge Building Associates to Republic
Savings and Loan?
A.

In December of 1991/ Mr. Hill advised me

that he was behind on the lease payments -- or excuse
me —

mortgage payments to the bank and having

trouble making those payments.
Q.

And at some point in time did you learn

that there had been a foreclosure proceeding
commenced?
A.

Yes

Q.

How did you learn of that?

A.

We received notice through the mail.

I'm going to hand you what has been marked
Q.
as Defendant's Exhibit Number D-14. Can you identify
that document?
A.

Yes, I can.

Q.

What is it?

A.

This is a letter dated January 9th, 1992
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addressed to the Judge Building tenants signed by Mr.
Robert E. Merrill from Van Cott-Bagley, who
represented Republic Capital Bank.
MR. JONES:

We move for the admission of

Exhibit D-14, your Honor.
MR. OLSEN:

No objection.

THE COURT:

It is received.

MR. JONES:

Thank you.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

As a result of receiving this letter, did

you have any concern that your lease on the building
was in jeopardy?
A.

No.

Q.

And why is that?

A.

Because Mr. Merrill also sent a letter out

to all the tenants that said none of the leases would
be affected.
Q.

And is that, in fact, found in this letter

about five lines down, or six lines down?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And is that the sentence that reads: "It

is not intended to disrupt your occupancy of space in
the Judge Building"?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Subsequent to the receipt of this --
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excuse me -- subsequent to the receipt of this
letter, did you develop an interest in buying the
Judge Building?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when did that occur?

A,

Shortly after we learned of the

foreclosure, Mr. Hill came to us and indicated that he
was looking for potential buyers, and asked if we were
interested.
Q.

Did you obtain information with regard to

the building?
A.

Yes .

Q.

And what kind of information was that?

A.

I received information that Mr. Hill had

put together in regard to the actual leases, the rent
rolls, if you will, provisions contained in the leases
and a brief package in regard to what the operating
cash flows would and should be in the future.
Q.

And at some point in time did you yourself

commence discussions with Republic Savings Bank about
buying the building?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Approximately when did those discussions

begin?
A.

The beginning of 1993, specifically in
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1

February or March.

2

Q.

And who were you dealing with expressly?

3

A.

I was not dealing expressly with one

4

person.

5

sort of kept inserting himself between me and Mr.

6

Dennis Bush, who was the bank officer in charge of

7

this particular sale and this building.

8

directly with Mr. Bush, Dennis Bush, and also Mr.

9

Unrath.

10

Q.

11

I was dealing with Ray Unrath only because he

I was dealing

Do you recall receiving a telephone call

from Mr. Miller and Mr. Hill in this time period?

12

A.

Not from Mr. Miller.

13

Q.

Excuse me, Mr. Kimball and Mr. Hill.

14

sorry, I misspoke.

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And do you recall about when that took

17

I'm

place?

18

A.

Approximately the first week of March, if

19

my recollection is to coincide with what David Kimball

20

said.

21

Q.

And can you tell us where you were?

22

A.

In my office.

23

Q.

And were they there with you, or was it a

24
25

telephone call?
A.

No, it was a telephone call.

I understood
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it to be a conference call.

Mr. Hill indicated that

he had David Kimball on the phone with us.
Q.

And can you tell me who spoke and what was

A.

Yes.

said?
I've known David Kimball for a long

time, and we had a personal relationship,
from before.

friendship

I don't recall that we had any

substantial business dealings, but we may have done a
little bit of work for Mr. Kimball.

But we talked a

little bit about tenants and then specifically I was
asked of my impressions regarding the Judge Building.
Mr. Hill and Mr. Kimball indicated that Mr. Kimball
was interested in buying it, and he wanted to know
what my impressions were of it, both as a tenant and
otherwise.
Q.

What did you say?

A.

I told him I loved the building.

the space, I was very happy there.

I loved

I liked it so much

that I was even trying to buy it.
Q.

Was there anything else said in the

telephone
A.

conversations?
Yes.

I indicated to Mr. Kimball that I

was certainly happy to indicate to him my feelings
about the building, but if he was going to become the
buyer, was he going to foreclose my lease.
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Q.

And did he respond to that?

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

What did he say?

A.

He said, "No, I'm not in the habit of

kicking tenants out.

I'm in the habit of bringing

tenants in."
Q.

Did Republic subsequently offer to sell

the building to you for $850,000?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when did Republic make that offer?

A.

Approximately two or three days after my

phone call with Mr. Kimball.
Q.

I'm going to hand you now what's been

marked as Defendant's Exhibit 12, D-12.

Can you

identify that document?
A.

Yes, I can.

Q.

What is it?

A.

There is a fax copy of a letter of intent

that was drafted by Mr. Unrath and faxed to Mr. Dennis
Bush of Republic Capital Bank at my request for him to
evidence in writing his offer to sell me the building
for $850,000.
MR. JONES:

We move for the admission of

Defendant's Exhibit 12, your Honor.
MR. OLSEN:

May I voir dire, your Honor?
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THE COURT:

You may.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. OLSEN:
Q,

There's some handwriting, Mr. Martineau,

just above Republic Capital Bank.

It says: "This

agreement is not binding."
A.

Yes.

Q.

Whose writing is that?

A.

I assumed it to be Mr. Bush's.

Q.

Was it in this form that it came to you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever sign this agreement?

A.

No.

It was not

mine.

MR. OLSEN:

I'll object on the basis of

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, the relevance is

MR. OLSEN:

Do you want an argument, your

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. JONES:

The relevance, we believe, is

relevance.

very clear.

Honor?

very clear.

Mr. Martineau is negotiating to purchase.

He has the conversation with Mr. Kimball.

Within

several days thereafter, he receives a proposal from
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the bank agreeing to sell or offering to sell the
building to him for $850,000.

He doesn't sign this or

accept it because of the conversation with Mr.
Kimball.

This is evidence of how he changed his

position in reliance upon Mr. Kimball's statement, so
it's clearly relevant.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

BY MR. JONES:
Q.

How did this come to your attention?

A.

This was delivered to me by Mr. Ray

Unrath.
Q.

And did you read the document when it

A•

Yes.

Q.

Did it set forth a price and terms that

came?

you had been negotiating to achieve with Republic?
A.

It was approximately $100,000 less in

total purchase price.

We had been talking in the

realm of $950,000 prior to that.

And as I was

discussing certain aspects of the building and the
status of the building with Mr. Bush, he indicated,
look, I'm going to give you a great deal.

It's

$100,000 cheaper than anybody else is going to get,
and I'll let you have it for 850, basically.
paraphrasing.

And I'm

It certainly was more of a conversation
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1

than that.

2

writing for me.

3
4

Q.

And I then asked him to put that in

And subsequent to that conversation, this

arrived?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Did you ever sign it?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Why didn't you sign it?

9

A.

Because I'm a CPA, and what I do, I do

10

very well, and I did not want to become a realtor or a

11

landlord.

12

staying just a tenant in this building.

13

Kimball was going to buy it, and he had assured me

14

that he would not be foreclosing my lease, I was very

15

happy with that.

16

Q.

And I was comfortable with becoming or
And if Mr.

And did you subsequently, after making the

17

decision not to accept this offer, did you

18

subsequently learn that Mr. Kimball had made an offer

19

that had been accepted by Republic?

20

A.

Yes.

And I was told by Mr. Hill that, in

21

fact, Mr. Kimball had reserved, in his understanding,

22

reserved the right to not foreclose me out as he had

23

promised.

24
25

Q.

I'm going to ask you if you recognize

Defendant's Exhibit D-ll.
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A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And what is that?

A.

It's an estoppel certificate that we

received in April of '93.
Q.

Does it bear your signature?

A.

It does.

Q.

And who asked you to sign this?

A.

It was delivered to us by Wallace &

Associates, I believe, the trustee, and his office,
acting for and in behalf of the lender.
Q.

The receiver, would that be Mr. Jewkes?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you signed it; is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you read it before you signed it?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And in reviewing specifically paragraph 9,

did you have an understanding that if you signed it
and the building was purchased by Mr. Kimball, that
you would then have an obligation to make your lease
payments to him?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did anyone, including Mr. Miller or Mr.

Kimball, ever get back to you and say that in any
fashion this estoppel certificate was unacceptable?
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A.

No.
MR. JONES:

No further questions, your

THE COURT:

Mr. Olsen?

Honor.
Mr. Olsen, if you

can move this so that counsel can see you.
MR. OLSEN:

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Mr. Martineau, when you were asked by

counsel, let me just get the time frames right and get
some dates right.

You said that you learned the

building was in default in December of 1991, correct?
A.

Yes, I believe that's correct.

Q.

And then you said that January of 1992 you

received a letter from Mr. Robert Merrill?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that letter was introduced into

evidence, and in that letter you pointed out to the
Court that Mr. Merrill had stated that the leases
would not be disturbed; is that fair?
A.

It says: "It is not intended to disrupt

your occupancy of space in the Judge Building."
That's what the letter says.
Q.

And is that what you believed this whole

time from the date of that letter through April of
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1994 -- 1993?
A.

No.

Q.

It changed, didn't it?

A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

In fact, later, in February of 1992, you

were joined as a defendant in the foreclosure action,
weren't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were served on February 14th,

1992, weren't you?
A.

I guess that's the date.

It was

approximately that same time, yes.
Q.

I show you what has been marked as Exhibit

1.
MR. OLSEN:

Your Honor, I'd ask the Court

to take judicial knowledge of the return of service,
certificate of service.
MR. JONES:

Your Honor, we'll certainly

stipulate to its admission.
THE COURT:

It will be received.

BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

So at that point in time, you realized

that the bank was trying to foreclose your interest,
didn't you?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

And did you have counsel available to you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you present this problem to them?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That you were being

A.

Yes, I did.

foreclosed?

I reviewed that with my

counsel.
Q.

Did anyone ever grant you an extension

within which to file an answer in this case?
A.

Not that I'm aware of.

Q.

Did anyone grant you an extension saying

you need not file a counterclaim in that case?
A.

No.

Q.

You didn't do anything?

A.

No, I did something.

I discussed it with

my attorney, who informed me that the purpose of this
foreclosure action was to determine if I was inferior
to the first trust deed, and he indicated we were.
MR. JONES:
interpose an objection.

Your Honor, I want to
He's now testifying with

regard to advice of counsel, and I don't think that's
appropriate in this proceeding.

It's attorney-client

privilege.
THE COURT:

Well, that's certainly true,

and I wouldn't want him to do that until he's had a
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1

chance to discuss that with counsel.

2

don't know if I can -- if that's an objection or just

3

a note of caution for your client.

4

MR. JONES:

5

Honor.

6

BY MR. OLSEN:

7

Q.

With that, I

It's probably both, your

Mr. Martineau, you had a very clear

8

understanding shortly after you were served in this

9

action that your lease was inferior to the Deed of

10

Trust; did you not?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And you were aware of the language in the

13

complaint that asked that your lease be extinguished,

14

correct?

15
16

A.

I don't recall the exact language in the

complaint.

17

Q.

But you read it?

18

A.

I did read it.

19

Q.

And you gave it to your attorney?

20

A.

Yeah, I did.

21

Q.

And after giving it to your attorney, you

22

made a conscious decision not to answer or respond in

23

this case, correct?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Now, your default in this action was taken
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March 5th, 1993?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You were aware that that default had been

entered; were you not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were aware that default

judgment

purported by its express terms to extinguish your
interest in the property, correct?
A,

No.

Q.

Did you read the default

A.

Yes.

Q.

You read all the words in the judgment?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What are the words: "On any execution,

judgment?

sale of the property pursuant to order of this Court
in the above-entitled action, any interest or lien
claimed by the defendant, Martineau & Company, shall
be forthwith extinguished and terminated."

What does

that mean to you?
A.

Is that from the document?

Q.

From the default judgment itself.

A.

It means what it says.

Q.

But you admit having received a copy of

that judgment?
A.

Yes, sir.
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Q.

And you admit having received it in the

first part of March?
A•

Yes, sir.

Q.

Of '93.

Now, after that time, you then

had your conversation with David Kimball that you
referred to, didn't you?
A.

Well, I'm not sure.

The date of this is

Q.

March 5th, 1993?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And after this default was entered, you

'93.

then had a conversation with Mr. Kimball?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And after that conversation with Mr.

Kimball, you had decided that you did not want to
purchase the property.

That's what you've testified

to, correct?
A.

That I preferred to remain a tenant, yes

Q.

Now, when you talked to Mr. Kimball you

didn't talk about the terms of your lease, did you?
A.

No.

Q.

You didn't talk about the length of the

A.

No

Q.

He didn't ask you not to try and buy the

term?
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1

property, did he?

2 1

A.

No.

3

Q.

In fact, you didn't even tell him in that

4

conversation you were attempting to buy the property,

5

did you?

6

A.

Yes, I did.

7

Q.

But he did not ask you not to proceed?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

And you didn't tell him that you would

10

dissuade from buying it if you could have a lease, did

11

you?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

It wasn't even discussed?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Now, there came a time -- at the time you

16

had the conversation with Mr. Kimball, you knew that

17

the bank wanted you out of the property, didn't you?

18
19

A.

I knew Ray Unrath wanted me out of the

property.

20

Q.

And he was a representative of the bank?

21

A.

He was a real estate agent.

I'm not sure

22

just how good of an agent he was for the bank, but he

23

did represent

24

Q.

25

them.

But he told you pretty clearly the bank

wanted you out?
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1

A.

2

not say that.

3

the lease.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Q.

Not that it wanted me out, sir.

He did

He said that he wanted to renegotiate

He said the lease in its present form was

unacceptable to the bank, correct?
A.

I guess.

I guess that's fairly

characteristic of what he said.
Q.

And you also discussed with him that your

lease was inferior to the security position of the
bank, correct?

11

A.

I didn't discuss that with Ray Unrath, no.

12

Q.

But you knew that?

13

A.

Yes, I did.

14

Q.

And understood it?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Now, within two weeks after your

17

conversation with Mr. Kimball, Mr. Hill testified that

18

you were told that your lease was unacceptable to Mr.

19

Kimball and Mr. Miller.

20
21

A.

You heard that testimony?

I heard that testimony.

The time frame

was incorrect.

22

Q.

How is it incorrect?

23

A.

Well, I did not hear that my lease was

24

unacceptable to Mr. Kimball until I was told that

25

either by Mr. Kimball or Mr. Miller when they came to
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my office.

But that was sometime in the mid or latter

part of April.
Q.

So now we're talking about four weeks?

A.

Or six.

Q.

Four to six weeks?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So at this point in time you have a

default judgment entered March 5th, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And within four to six weeks, by your

testimony, and two weeks by Mr. Hill's testimony, you
learned that your lease was unacceptable, correct?
A.

To Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball, yes.

Q.

And at that point in time you knew one of

two things, didn't you?

You knew that they would

either foreclose your interest or you'd have to enter
into a lease that was satisfactory, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Your lease as it was just wasn't going to

work with them?
A.

That's what they told me.

Q.

So we take that time period.

That now

takes us at the very latest through the middle of
April.
A.

Or the third week of April, yes.
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Q.

Third week of April.

At that point in

time you had had conversations with Mr. Kimball.

You

knew what he said about foreclosing, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Then you knew that they intended to

foreclose, right?
A.

Yes .

Q.

Now, why did you wait until October of

1994, which is 15 months, to move to set aside that
default
A.

Olsen.

judgment?
You'll have to ask my attorney that, sir.
MR. JONES:

Objection,

MR. OLSEN:

But you admit --

THE COURT:

There's been an objection, Mr.

your Honor.

State your objection.
MR. JONES:

Relevance, your Honor.

It has

nothing to do with -- when he moved to have the
default judgment set aside has nothing to do with our
motion for issuance of the preliminary
THE COURT:

injunction.

Overruled.

BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Mr. Martineau, isn't it true that you took

no efforts to set aside this default judgment until
October of 1994?
A.

I assume that's when the motion was made,
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yes .
Q.

Now, when the default judgment was entered

in this case, you realized that you had no right to a
possessory interest in the property, correct?
A.

I -- I
MR. JONES:

Objection, your Honor.

I

think that calls for a legal conclusion.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

BY MR. OLSEN:
Q.

Mr. Martineau, in any proceeding or any

paper that you were aware of prior to today's
testimony, are you aware of ever raising before this
Court that Mr. Kimball made a misrepresentation to you
and you relied on it?
A.

A misrepresentation?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I don't know.

Q.

At any time.

What I'm hearing today is

the first time we've heard it.

At any time in any

proceeding in this Court or elsewhere, are you aware
that you have raised the argument you're attempting to
make now?
A.
true.

I don't know when it was raised, but it's
That conversation did take place, and what I

have related to this Court today is the absolute
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truth.

That's what was said.
MR. OLSEN:

I don't have any further

questions, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES:

No further questions, your

THE COURT:

You may step down, Mr.

Honor.

Martineau.

Thank you.
MR. JONES:

prepared to rest.

Your Honor, I think we're

I just want to make sure quickly

that we have all of the exhibits received that I
believe have been offered.

And if I'm not mistaken, I

know Defendant's Exhibits 1 through 14 have all been
admitted or received.

And I believe those are the

only ones we have offered.
THE CLERK:

I don't have either of 3 or 9.

I don't have a ruling on 12.
MR. JONES:
I'm sorry, Pat.
offered.

Excuse me.

3 was not offered.

3 was not offered.
9 was not

I think those were the only two that I have

that were not offered because the plaintiff offered to
stipulate.
THE COURT:

So you're not going to offer

MR. JONES:

No.

19?
Those exhibits, your

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)531-0256

Honor, that we have marked are represented by
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.
THE COURT:

All right.

THE CLERK:

Was 12 received?

THE COURT:

What is the issue?

MR. OLSEN:

I don' think there's an issue.

He was just checking to see if they were received.
THE COURT:

Yes.

THE CLERK:

I don't have 12 received.

MR. JONES:

12 was.

THE COURT:

Did you have an objection to

MR. OLSEN:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

Received.

MR. OLSEN:

It was received over my

That's the letter of

intent.

12?

objection, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. OLSEN:

We would move for the

admission of P-2, which is the default

judgment.

THE COURT:

Any objection, Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES:

None, your Honor.

THE COURT:

It will be received.

Do you rest?
MR. JONES:

We do.
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1

MR. OLSEN:

Your Honor, at this point in

2

time we'd like to make a motion pursuant Rule 41-B to

3

dismiss the claims brought by the defendant,

4

Martineau.

5

judgment.

6

can be set aside, he's shown no meritorious defense.

7

He's shown no reason for the delay in bringing it, and

8

the rule provides that it must be brought within 90

9

days.

He's moved to set aside the default
At this point he's shown no basis that it

He testified that at the latest he clearly knew

10

all the facts by mid-April.

11

after that point.

12

It was brought 16 months

In addition, equitable grounds that are

13

raised are as insufficient as they are untimely.

14

those grounds themselves are not inequitable.

15

basis they are raising is that there was a

16

foreclosure.

17

That is what happens.

18

the Martineau lease was unrecorded; and the second

19

position is that they had no certificate of

20

non-disturbance from the landlord, which means that

21

there was a right to foreclose.

22

There was an attempted

And

The

foreclosure.

The evidence is very clear that

They raised the issue that rent was

23

accepted.

That was a right that was given under the

24

trust deed.

25

there was a default in the trust deed from December of

By their own evidence they established
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1991 through the present date.
that.

Mr. Hill testified to

So long as it is in default, the holder of that

trust deed is entitled to receive the rents.
rents were received.

Those

First they were paid to the

lender, and when the lender sold for consideration the
trust deed, they were paid to him.
So under those circumstances we submit
that there is no evidence of any kind authorizing the
setting aside of the default, and as such they lack
standing to challenge the sale.
as to merger.

There was testimony

The documents are very clear that on

the face there was no intent to merge.
testified to it.

Mr. Kimball

The purchase agreement provides it.

Exhibit 22 provides it.

The only document they

attempt to rebut it with is a document that is not
signed by Mr. Martineau, that was an assignment of
lease.

Those assignments of leases made assignments.
But as to Mr. Martineau's lease, there is

no document of any kind in evidence where Mr.
Martineau's lease was transferred to Mr. Kimball or to
Mr. Miller.
transferred.

In fact, they testified that it was not
As the Court's aware, the Statute of

Frauds requires that all agreements on real estate be
in writing, and there cannot be assumption of a debt
of another unless it's signed by the party to be
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bound.

And the estoppel certificate signed by Mr,

Martineau alone does not bind those who received it.
If they wanted to be bound, they needed an assumption
of lease signed by the parties to be bound.
The assignment that they introduced
does not assign the lease.

simply

It assigns leases in the

property, but those are leases that Miller and Kimball
will acquire.

The Martineau lease was specifically

treated -- the specific provisions in the lease
control over the general.

The parties treated it in

every single document through the decrees of the
Court, through the orders of the Court that have been
submitted, that the right to foreclose would be
preserved.

Merger is an issue of intent.

The intent

of the parties is to foreclose the issue, and that
intent is untraversed.
Mr. Martineau makes the argument that
there is an exception based upon innocent third
parties.

Well, there may be an exception, but the

case isn't treated as some third parties treat buyers
and sellers so that there's not a merger to defeat a
valid security interest.

You can never have an

innocent third party when you have a recorded lease
and they are in an inferior position.

That is what

the recording statutes are designed to protect.
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Once

1

you take something in a second position, that's the

2

position you have, and you cannot complain when the

3

first forecloses, because that is the contract.

4

What Mr. Martineau attempts to do in this

5

is to get a lease, which is a very good lease, and it

6

is subject to, despite what he says, that they had a

7

gentleman's agreement that it would be not be

8

discussed with anyone else.

9

and keep their lease ahead of the lender without the

They attempt to elevate

10

lender's consent, and there's no law to do that.

The

11

law permits everything to be done as it was done in

12

this case.

13

We submit we should be allowed to proceed.

14

THE COURT:

Thank you.

15

MR. JONES:

Thank you, your Honor.

16

Let me address the argument with regard to

Mr. Jones?

17

the setting aside of the default first, your Honor.

18

I'm not sure procedurally whether that's appropriate,

19

but in that it's been raised, the facts don't

20

that Mr. Martineau knew within 90 days after his

21

conversation with Mr. Miller -- excuse me -- after

22

his conversation with Mr. Kimball, that in fact Mr.

23

Kimball was not going to protect him and honor his

24

lease.

25

within that time period, but that isn't the event that

indicate

He may have come to some of that knowledge
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gives rise principally to the cause of action.
He didn't know at that point in time, Mr.
Martineau didn't know, that they were going to do the
macerations that they did to subordinated the lease to
the existing 2.3 million dollar trust deed to the new
$550,000 trust deed.

They could have changed their

mind, and he would have had a claim against them for
promissory estoppel.
But if they hadn't acquired title to the
trust deed and didn't have control over it, and the
lender had proceeded to foreclose, Mr. Martineau
wouldn't have an argument and he wouldn't be here
today.
None of those facts were known to Mr.
Martineau until well after June when they commenced
the foreclosure proceeding again, i.e., Mr. Kimball
and Mr. Miller did, having taken title to the Deed of
Trust, having then subordinated that Deed of Trust to
the new $550,000.

That was not known until well after

the closing, when these proceedings got started again
for purposes of foreclosure.

He had no reason to know

that he should have any concern with regard to this
lease until that happened.

He was in the same

position he was before, vis-a-vis the lender.
always in that position with the lender.

He was

And again,
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had there not been a conveyance to Mr. Kimball and to
Mr. Miller of the trust deed, he wouldn't have those
rights.
But because they acquired the trust deed
and subordinated it, that gives rights to his claim,
because they now control the ability to let him
proceed, if you will, under his lease or to attempt to
foreclose him out.
Now, all of that said, it's irrelevant
whether it was a year or three months or 18 months
afterward, because Rule 60b, subsection 6 and 7, are
not limited in scope as to when they can be brought.
Both of them indicate that if for reasons
post-judgment, 6 in particular, and I would read that
for the Court just quickly.
Subsection 6 provides: "Or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application."
the Court,

That's precisely what we've argued to

Their actions post-judgment make the

prospective application of that default

certificate

and judgement inequitable, unfair, and injurious.
all of those reasons, the default judgment

For

should

indeed be set aside.
Now, addressing the motion in particular.
We have made the showing we need to today, your Honor.
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And I'll go through I believe the six points very
quickly that established that.

Number one, the

purpose of the foreclosure is to collect a debt.

In

this case, they're attempting to foreclose a 2.3
million dollar trust deed under circumstances where
they own that and title to the property.
attempting to collect any debt.

They're not

The evidence is

unequivocal today that the whole purpose of the
foreclosure is to allow Mr. Miller and Mr. Kimball the
opportunity to improve their position vis-a-vis Mr.
Martineau's lease, get a better lease, or to collect
-- or to remove him from the property.

They do not

intend to collect one thing from that foreclosure.
They're not going to get one dollar.

They're not

going to get one right that they don't already have.
They have title to the property.
it.

They own

They've released or consented to the release of

the obligors.

No money is going to come as a result

of the foreclosure.

The only purpose of the

foreclosure it to foreclose out Mr. Martineau if they
can't get him to agree to pay to a higher and better
amount, an amount that is more attractive and
satisfactory to them.

You couple that with the fact

they have subordinated that Deed of Trust to the new
$550,000 loan, and what we have is a vigorous effort
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1

on their part to change the playing field, to make it

2

certain that they have as much leverage over Mr.

3

Martineau as possible.

4

sale and bid the amount of that trust deed, 2.3

5

million dollars.

6

THE COURT:

Now he can't go to a sheriff's

Let me ask you this question:

7

There's no evidence that's before me that they ever

8

intended to do that.

9

MR. JONES:

Well, your Honor, whether he

10

intended to or not I don't believe is the issue.

11

issue here is whether they've made it impossible for

12

him to bid, and the fact of the matter is --

13

THE COURT:

14

that at all, is there?

15

MR. JONES:

The

But there's no evidence on

Certainly, because the fact of

16

the matter is that the trust deed is for 2.3 million

17

dollars, the existing one that is the subject of this

18

action.

The new one is for 5.5 million -- I'm

19

sorry —

$555,000.

20

of leaving him in the position which he was in when

21

they started this action and took the default, where

22

if there was a sale he could walk to the courthouse

23

steps and he knew what the amount of the debt was, he

24

allowed the default to be taken under circumstances

25

where he knew there was 2.3 million dollars in debt.

And what they've done is instead
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1

Now, by subordinating that, he is subject to not 2.3,

2

but 2.3 plus $550,000.

3

THE COURT:

I guess what I'm saying is

4

it's all sort of academic, isn't it, unless there's

5

some evidence that he'd been harmed; that he would

6

have gone and made the bid and gotten the property?

7

MR. JONES:

I don't think so, your Honor.

8

The whole purpose of a sheriff's sale is to provide

9

number one, the ability to collect the debt.

And that

10

doesn't exist here.

And number two, what they have

11

done is to make it -- even if he intended to go and

12

stand there -- impossible for him to get what he

13

bargained for at the time the default judgment was

14

taken.

15

interposed an additional lien ahead of him for

16

$550,000.

17

with regard to --

He can't do that, then, because now they have

18

That's our argument on the trust deed.

THE COURT:

And

What you're telling me is

19

therefore I'm to conclude that he wouldn't have wanted

20

it with the $550,000 lien?

21

MR. JONES:

He may have wanted it with the

22

$550,000.

I don't know that, your Honor.

I mean, I

23

agree that that's speculative.

24

you is what they did was to act in a fashion which

25

improved their position to his detriment.

But what I'm saying to

They had
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added the $550,000, making it that much more difficult
for him to acquire the building, and they did it in
light of the fact that they don't have a debt to
collect out there.
no debt to collect.

That's our whole point.

There's

It's a foreclosure for one

purpose and one purpose only.

It's admitted; it's in

the documents; it's testified to by both Mr. Miller
and Mr. Kimball, and that is as stated by TCF Bank in
their letter: We'll let you foreclose this in order to
maximize current and future cash flow.
one thing only.

One thing and

We'll give you a hammer to beat him

over the head with to try to get more money out of
him.
THE COURT:

Let me ask you this: Is there

anything about the structure of this transaction
that's illegal?
MR. JONES:

Illegal?

I don't believe so.

I mean, your Honor our argument is an equitable
argument.
THE COURT:

Okay, they did what they were

entitled to do under the law.
MR. JONES:

Well, they violated his rights

by doing it, because they worsened his position.
Again, they did this all post-judgment, your Honor.
They took a judgment under circumstances where they
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1

said we're going to foreclose you behind this 2.3

2

million-dollar loan.

3
4

THE COURT:

I guess my question is: He

hasn't even recorded his lease?

5

MR. JONES:

That's correct.

6

THE COURT:

Does he have some vested right

7

to prevent them from going out and imposing new liens

8

on it, borrowing money?

9

MR. JONES:

They have -- well, your

10

Honor, they want their cake and they want to eat it,

11

too.

12

they do they want to ignore this provision in his

13

lease that says they won't foreclose him out.

14

want him to pay more money.

15

want their cake and to eat it, too, your Honor.

They either want to foreclose him out, and if

Or they

I mean, they really do

16

They're saying we'll make it so difficult

17

for you that you've got to negotiate with us or leave

18

the building. And all the while they're ignoring their

19

contractual obligation in the lease that says: "So

20

long as he isn't in default, the lease shall remain in

21

full force and effect for the full term hereof, and

22

shall not be terminated as a result of any

23

foreclosure."

24
25

Now, they own the Deed of Trust.

They

control entirely whether or not he is foreclosed,
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1

because this provision, number one, they control it,

2

number one.

3

obligation and says to them, I'm entitled to say in

4

under this provision of the lease.

5

no, no.

6

it.

But number two, he's performed his lease

We never signed that lease.

7

But they say, no,
We never signed

They say that in light of the fact that

8

they took a special warranty deed from the Judge

9

Building Associates and acquired title.

The law in

10

this state is real clear that when you acquire title

11

by a deed, you also acquire all of the incidents of

12

title of that property, including the leases.

13

acquired the leases and they so testified.

14

accepted the rents, they've accepted all the benefits

15

under the Martineau lease since the date they acquired

16

the property.

17

They

They have

Now, your Honor, I've switched horses.

18

I'm talking to you from a contractual perspective, and

19

by law they are the tenant -- excuse me —

20

landlord.

21

really not, we really tried to exclude Martineau, we

22

really didn't want to be bound by the lease, are

23

disingenuous in light of the fact that they knew when

24

they acquired the property and became the owner of the

25

property, that they would have a lease under which

the

And all of their attempts to say we're
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they accepted money and provided services, which gave
Martineau certain rights and required them to protect
Martineau; to keep Martineau in his position as long
as he was not in default under the lease.

And the

testimony is clear that he's not in default.
THE COURT:
here on me.

Well, okay.

You shifted gears

We were talking about events that

occurred after the default judgment was entered to
warrant this Court setting aside that default
judgment.

Now you're talking about a contractual

provision that presumably was known to your client at
the time the default judgment was entered.
MR. JONES:

Well, it existed at the time

the default judgment was entered, that's right.

But

remember, at the time the default judgment was
entered, Harold Hill, Judge Building Associates, they
didn't own the trust deed.

They didn't have any

rights under the trust deed.
THE COURT:

Why wasn't this raised?

MR. JONES:

For that very reason.

THE COURT:

But what I guess I'm saying is

he received a copy of the default

judgment.

MR. JONES:

He's testified that he has,

THE COURT:

So that extinguished his

correct.
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1

rights under the lease, didn't it?

2

MR. JONES:

Well, the default just says

3

that he's junior.

That's all it says, your Honor.

4

The default judgment doesn't say that his rights are

5

extinguished.

6

been a sale.

It says upon the sale, and there hasn't

7

THE COURT:

Well, okay.

8

MR. JONES:

And that's why we're here.

9

Again, what happened are all of their intervening

10

actions and the fashion in which they structured the

11

transaction places on them the contractual

12

to abide by the second sentence in paragraph 33-B.

13

THE COURT:

But the default

obligation

judgment,

14

counselor, I think you'll have to concede that's

15

fairly clear that he's not going to have an interest.

16

This Court has granted the plaintiffs a default

17

judgment in this foreclosure action to foreclose him

18

out.

19

pursuant to order of this Court in the above-entitled

20

action, any interest or lien claimed by the defendant

21

Martineau shall be forthwith extinguished and

22

terminated."

23

"Upon any execution of sale of the property

MR. JONES:

And again, your Honor, that's

24

why we're standing in front of the Court, because we

25

want to prevent that because of the subsequent events.
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1

All of these events --

2

THE COURT:

No, I'm talking about this

3

contract.

4

why if he, in the face of this, why he didn't raise

5

this issue sooner.

6

I guess I'm asking for an explanation of

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, I think the simple

7

explanation is that this imposes an obligation on the

8

lessee -- excuse me -- the lessor, to protect him,

9

all right?

The lessor is in default and the lessor is

10

being foreclosed out.

11

effort to go to the lessee -- I'm sorry, I keep

12

saying lessee -- obviously it would have been a

13

futile effort for the lessee, Mr. Martineau, to go to

14

the lessor, Mr. Hill, and say protect me, because he's

15

in default, and he obviously is being foreclosed out

16

by the lender at that point in time.

17

Obviously, it would be a futile

Now, that all changes when Mr. Miller and

18

Mr. Kimball buy both estates, when they buy both the

19

property and when they acquire title to the very trust

20

deed that they're trying to foreclose here.

21

control this foreclosure, and they have now the

22

obligation and can perform under that particular term

23

of the contract.

24

was not in a position to exercise any control or right

25

with Republic.

Mr. Hill had no leverage.

They

Mr. Hill

He was in default with them.

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)531-0256

00153 6

But the fact of the matter is by doing the
transaction in this fashion, and again this was not
unknown or undisclosed to Mr. Miller.

Mr. Miller

testified that he read this provision of the lease
before he bought it.

Presumably a man of his

experience and training, especially his legal
training, would know that if he becomes the landlord
of the property, then he's got these affirmative
obligations to protect the tenants.

And that's the

position he put himself in.
Now, whether it was intentional or
unintentional is really of no moment, because that's
where they now.

And despite the fact that they

continue to argue there is no merger, if the Court
buys that argument, accepts that argument -- excuse
me, I didn't mean that in a derogatory sense -- that
the Court accepts that argument, that there is no
merger, then clearly they have rights separate -- they
have rights in the Deed of Trust, and they control
that, and they can exercise that, and they have a duty
not to under any circumstances injure, harm or
diminish Mr. Martineau's rights in a foreclosure when
he is not in default under the terms of the lease,
which he is not.
THE COURT:

Now, well, let's get back to
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the argument*

Is there any evidence before me, and I

don't think there is, that Mr. Martineau did not move
to have this judgment set aside in reliance on the
fact that he had only the one lien ahead of him, and
that had he known there was going to be another lien,
that he would have moved to have the judgment set
aside?
MR. JONES:

That's precisely what he did.

When he found out that there was a lien ahead of him,
he did that.

I think that's the best evidence, that

he viewed the playing field as sufficiently

altered,

and that he was injured thereby.
THE COURT:

He still waited over a year,

MR. JONES:

After the closing, that's

didn't he?

correct.

But the fact, again, your Honor, under Rule

60-b, there's not a time period in 60-b(6).
limited in time to the three-month period.
doesn't have that three-month limitation.

We're not
60-b(6)
And the

fact of the matter is, he'd come to the Court well
before that, in November of '93, and filed a motion to
dismiss and said wait a minute.

You guys have changed

things, such that I think the remaining claims here
should be dismissed.

The motion to dismiss was filed

by Mr. Martineau on November 24, 1993.

That's five
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months after the closing, your Honor, but certainly
indicates that he was proceeding to do what he needed
to do to protect his position with regard to his
interest in this particular action, and his rights to
assert that he was being harmed thereby.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. JONES:

Now, while we're talking about

33-B, Mr. Olsen says gee, we're not subject to it.
never signed it.

We

If you're arguing it, the Statute of

Frauds prevents that.

Apparently Mr. Miller and Mr.

Kimball forget that the rule is when there is a part
performance, the Statute of Frauds won't defeat a
person's interest, and there is clearly part
performance, if not entire performance by Mr.
Martineau.

He's paid his rent checks every single

month to them.

They have provided services to him.

They've never denied him any services.

He's —

communicated

to him as the landlord, or he's

communicated

to them as the landlord.

respect there is part performance.

they

In every

The Statute of

Frauds would not in any way limit the application.
Your Honor, we've made arguments.

I also

want to talk for just a minute about the idea of a
non-disturbance clause.

Mr. Olsen raised that and

said gee, if he really wanted protection, he should

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)531-0256

have gone to the bank and got a non-disturbance
clause.

Well, that's exactly what that is once Mr.

Kimball and Mr. Miller acquired title to the Deed of
Trust.

That's a non-disturbance clause.

And when

they own the Deed of Trust, it's subject to this
agreement to protect them.
THE COURT:

Didn't you say the bank who

loaned this money was subject to that?
MR. JONES:

Well, I think the bank was.

They're not here to testify.

But the bank, it was Mr.

Hill's testimony, was not challenged that he submitted
the leases, Martineau's leases to the bank and the
bank never objected until he was in default.

I think

the fact he submitted them -THE COURT:

The loan was entered into

before the lease.
MR. JONES:

Oh, sure.

But he testified --

THE COURT:

How can you impose that on the

MR. JONES:

Because he submitted it to the

bank?

bank as he said he was required to do under his trust
deed, and the trust deed requires that he submit all
new leases to the bank for their review.
rejected it.

They never

They never said it was unacceptable

until after the foreclosure commenced.

Now, by then
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Clearly they went back to the bank and

2

said we don't think the cash flow is there out of

3

these leases.

4

only going to pay $750,000.

5

benefit of Mr. Martineau's low lease, if there is

6

such, if his rates are low, and at this point in time

7

there is no testimony other than from Mr. Kimball and

8

Mr. Miller that the rate is too low.

9

got the benefit of it in the reduced purchase price,

10

We find these objectionable.

We're

They've already got the

They've already

the different between the 850 and the 750.

11

Lastly, your Honor, again, I want to

12

reiterate that the cases are very clear that as to the

13

merger issue, that merger will exist or not exist;

14

that is depending upon the intent of the parties.

15

That's the modern rule.

16

merger, except when an innocent third party is

17

injured.

18

The parties' intent governs

I cite to the Court the case, the

•19

principal case that's argued by the plaintiffs, Paris

20

Bank of Texas versus Custer.

21

this language from page 76: "It was a well-established

22

inflexible rule under the common law that a merger

23

always took place when a greater and a lesser estate

24

coincided and met in the same person, one and the same

25

right, without any intermediate estate."

The plaintiffs quote

They argued,

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801)531-0256

001542

well, they're saying there is an intermediate estate.
That argument seems to fly in the face of
the lease not being recorded, but they say for
purposes of argument that there's the 1986 trust deed,
the Martineau lease, and then the later trust deed.
So there is an intermediate estate.
merger.

There can't be a

Well, what was not quoted is where the Court

goes on and says, let's see: "The interests of the
parties, when several estates where interests have
united and will prevent a merger, where the rights of
innocent third parties who are strangers to the
transaction" -- Mr. Martineau is clearly a stranger to
the transaction between the bank, Mr. Miller and Mr.
Kimball and Judge Building Associates -- "will be
prejudiced by merger."
And, in fact, in the case they cited the
Court found there was a merger.

Now there's abundant

cases, and I can cite them to the Court: Baxter versus
Revco, a 1977 case from Oklahoma; Walkup versus
Cushing, also an Oregon case from 1992, all of which
acknowledge that where there are rights of a third
party that are affected, then a party's intent as to
merger is not controlling.

And the Court should make

a decision, then, based upon how that third party will
be injured.
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1

Merger is a question of intent.

2

seller or the trust deed # owner of the trust deed and

3

purchaser of the trust deed, don't intend it to be

4

merged, it isn't.

5

If the buyer and the

The issue that Mr. Martineau is hurt, as I

6

think the Court has pointed out, that question is

7

disingenuous.

8

position.

9

before any of this happened, because the lease was

He is hurt because he is in the second

He was hurt when the default was entered

10

extinguished.

11

contracted with Mr. Hill that the bank would have the

12

right to foreclose.

13

the way it was set up.

14

Martineau.

15

He was hurt simply because the bank

That's the way it works.

That's

That is the only hurt to Mr.

He's not complaining because he's hurt,

16

he's complaining because he wants to be in a first

17

position with what he contracted for.

18

contracted for was he was in a second position that

19

could be foreclosed.

20

front of him and they gave him notice.

21

a junior inferior interest is the hurt that the law

22

has to handle or you can't get a clear title.

23

argue that there's no debt to be collected is totally

24

fallacious.

25

provided, into a non-recourse note.

What he

It was recorded, documented in
The hurt being

To

They turned the note, and as the document
That's how
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1

California and other states mandate that you do it in

2

residential property.

3

get to foreclose and clear title to the property.

4

That's how the lender gets its value.

5

It doesn't mean that you don't

Why is a lender interested in seeing that

6

this foreclosure goes through?

Because the value of

7

his property is tied to what's in there, and they

8

didn't want Mr. Martineau in there.

9

right, when they contracted with Mr. Hill.

That's their
And when

10

they contracted that contract prior to Mr. Martineau,

11

that's what they contracted for, clear title, free and

12

clear of encumbrances.

13

can sell it and deal with it, and that's what they

14

did.

15

If they have to get it, they

The O'Reilly case very clearly says intent

16

governs.

17

including the non-recourse in the leases.

18

every -- it's in the documents that you signed and in

19

the order that you signed, and it's in the foreclosure

20

documents.

21

The intent is in each and every document,
It is in

Mr. Martineau, there's no evidence that he

22

would have purchased that at a sale.

There's no

23

evidence that he would purchase it ever.

24

was that he didn't ever tell Mr. Kimball that he would

25

not buy because of this conversation.

The evidence

I mean, that
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1

wasn't a topic of discussion.

2

Martineau testify, I'm a good accountant, but I don't

3

want to be a landlord.

4

wants more, he has to improve.

5

And you heard Mr.

That's the evidence.

If he

The evidence of intent is everyone who is

6

involved in the transaction said the intent was not to

7

merge these documents.

8

agreed to it, but I agreed and I signed the document.

9

Mr. Miller says there was no intent.

Mr. Hill says I reluctantly

Mr. Kimball says

10

there was no intent.

The documents supported from the

11

bank that have been introduced into evidence show that

12

there was no intent, and they failed to call a bank's

13

witness to say there was an intent.

14

called a single witness that says there was an intent

15

to merge, and without that they're simply out of luck.

16

This contractual provision is a

They have not

17

contractual provision between Hill, and is a

18

contractual provision between Martineau, and it's

19

clearly inferior.

20

the default judgment did, is it extinguished

21
22

And that's what your order did and

THE COURT:

that.

Are you ready to assume that

obligation under this contract?

23

MR. OLSEN:

No, sir.

24

THE COURT:

Why not?

25

MR. OLSEN:

The agreement doesn't provide

0 0 i5 4
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It would require an express assumption.

It

would require an assignment and delivery of that lease
specifically.

And they didn't do it.

The assignment that they purport to rely
on is an assignment of any leases in the building to
the secured party.
have.

Well, those are leases that they

You can't assign what you don't have.

argue, well, you collected rents.
trust deed allows them to do.
you foreclose.

They

That's what the

You collect rents until

They argued that they collected rents

for a year-and-a-half, almost two years.

Well, yes,

they have, because they tried to foreclose and Mr.
Martineau came down and got a TRO that stopped it.
mean, that's where it is.

I

The reason they're

collecting rent is because they're entitled to under
the trust deed.
But upon sale, and that's what we're
asking you to do, this lease is gone, because it's
inferior.

Only if that lease were superior would any

of those provisions survive.

And then he's argued,

the other point they're making, if you look at the
signature lines on the assignment they're relying
upon, that's an agreement between the bank and my
clients.

I mean, he's -- Martineau's a stranger to

that agreement championing rights of the bank where
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1

the bank has clearly said foreclose.

2

With that, your Honor, part performance,

3

there's no part performance in this.

4

under the security agreement, they get the rents until

5

they foreclose.

6

lease.

It's not part performance of a

7

Thank you.

8

One final thought.

9

The performance

We'd submit it, Judge.

case would go to Mr. Martineau.

The windfall in this
He'd get something he

10

never contracted for, which is a lease in a second

11

position elevated to a first, and under his argument,

12

the type of argument he makes, no one could foreclose,

13

ever.

14

once you've taken assignment of rents for security,

15

there argument is that you have then accepted the

16

lease and it elevates above the trust deed.

17

happen.

Because once a lease is in the property, and

18

We'd submit it.

19

THE COURT:

All right.

It can't

Well, I think that

20

the crux of this matter before me seems to me to be

21

whether or not the Court is to set aside this default

22

judgment.

23

you have made that this default judgment should be set

24

aside, then we get further into other equitable

25

issues.

If the Court decides for the reasons that

If the Court rules that this default
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1

should not be set aside, then I think counsel is

2

correct that you at that point have no standing to

3

raise these issues if there's a default

4

that's already been entered which essentially allows

5

them to go ahead with the sale and to extinguish the

6

rights of Mr. Martineau.

7

judgment

So I think the decision this Court has to

8

make is whether or not to set aside the default

9

judgment.

And in allowing this matter to go forward

10

on an evidentiary hearing, I believe that I indicated

11

this morning I felt that I needed some evidence with

12

regard to that issue, whether or not to set aside the

13

default judgment, and that since we were hearing

14

evidence, I would hear evidence as well on the motion

15

for preliminary injunction.

16

I believe, have been before the Court this morning,

17

and the Court will rely on the evidence presented to

18

make its ruling on both issues.

19

So both of those issues,

The Court is not going to set aside the

20

default judgment.

The Court is of the opinion that

21

there was an unreasonable delay in bringing the motion

22

to set aside the default judgment.

23

have to have some finality, and under certain

24

circumstances they can be set aside, but there must be

25

a reasonable response to a motion for a default

These judgments
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1

judgment by a defendant to set aside that default

2

judgment, and the Court finds there was not in this

3

case; that there was an unreasonable delay.

4

Mr. Martineau knew in March of 1993 of

5

this default judgment, and the Court so finds.

And I

6

believe that I will have you, Mr. Olsen, have you

7

prepare some findings with respect to this ruling.

8

The Court finds that Mr. Martineau did have knowledge

9

of the default judgment; that the default judgment is

10

clear in its terms.

11

had some rights that arose out of this contractual

12

provision that you've shown me today that could be

13

relied upon to set aside the default judgment, then it

14

could have been done at that time.

15

contract; he knew of the contractual rights at the

16

very time that the default judgment was made known to

17

him, and still there was a delay of approximately 17

18

months.

19

Had this in some manner or had he

He knew of the

Now, you've relied quite heavily, Mr.

20

Jones, on this subsequent transaction that occurred in

21

June of 1993 to say that this default judgment

22

be set aside, and that that somehow violated Mr.

23

Martineau's rights.

24

not convinced and I haven't been shown that there's

25

any right of his that has been violated by that

And I disagree with you.
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subsequent

transaction.
I think you can see that the plaintiffs

had a legal right to do what they did.

They could

have gone out and borrowed money on the property.

I

believe they have acted legally in everything that
they've done and that they had a right to fashion this
transaction in the way that they did, and I don't know
of any vested right that the defendant would have in
his position to prevent them in any way from doing
that, or even to argue that they shouldn't. So I just
am not convinced.
And in addition that, there's been
absolutely no evidence, and as heavily as you have
relied on that subsequent transaction, there's been no
evidence as to the significance of that subsequent
transaction, actually, to your client, as to what his
intent was, what he relied upon, whether he intended
to bid on this property or whether in any way he
actually has been harmed.

I think that you've asked

me to rule on that academically, that there may be
some harm.

But there has been no evidence from your

client with regards to those subsequent transactions.
I think that you failed in your evidence
to show that there would be irreparable harm if the
sale had gone forward, but that may be a superfluous
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ruling inasmuch as the Court feels there has been an
unreasonable delay in moving to set aside the default
judgment.

Therefore, I will allow the default

judgment to stand.
MR. JONES:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Olsen, would you prepare

findings of fact?
MR. OLSEN:

I will, your Honor.

One brief

bit of testimony if the Court would like it now or if
you would like it later.
without —

The injunction is issued

he's pursued an issue without right.

Utah

case law provides the difference between fair rental
value and what's actually paid by Mr. Martineau as an
element of damages.

Otherwise, he could stay in the

property forever at the $5.90 rate, and the going rate
is roughly $11 a foot.

We are prepared to introduce

testimony from Mr. Miller and Mr. Greg Dunn, who is
the leasing agent, and that would probably only take
us five minutes, if we can introduce it now or set up
a subsequent time.
THE COURT:

Mr. Jones, are you prepared to

MR. JONES:

Certainly not, your Honor.

meet that?

It's an inappropriate time and place to raise that,
let alone that we have legal objections to it.
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They're not entitled to it under the case law, I don't
believe.

Number two, that's not the purpose of the

hearing today.

We're certainly going to be entitled

to have notice of what their claims are and what they
are going to assert the fair rental value was in order
to be prepared to respond.

It's not the subject of

the hearing today.
THE COURT:
time to respond to that.

All right.

I'll give you some

If you think it can be

decided on a legal basis, then submit a memorandum.
And I'd like to have that memorandum if you can do
that in 15 days.
MR. JONES:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

I think the way we'll proceed

is to have you, Mr. Olsen, prepare a memorandum
indicating why you feel you're entitled to that and
what you think you're entitled to and why there needs
to be an evidentiary hearing.

I'll give you 15 days

to do that.
Mr. Jones, I'll allow you 10 days to
respond to that with your argument as to why they're
not entitled to any damages.

And I'll allow you five

days to respond to that, Mr. Olsen, and then the Court
will rule.

And if I determine at that time that I

need evidence, that they are entitled to something
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and I think I need some evidence, then I'll tell you
and set up an evidentiary hearing.
MR. OLSEN:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, with regard to our

claim to set aside the default judgment and the
Court's ruling, I understand that the Court is basing
its ruling principally upon the fact that there was an
unreasonable delay after the time it was entered.
Does the Court feel it necessary to make a ruling with
regard to our evidence as to the equitable issues, the
estoppel issues as they relate to the default?
THE COURT:
to.

Well, I don't know that I need

I'll be prepared to do that, but I'm not certain.

As it relates to the default?
MR. JONES:

Yes, the setting aside of the

THE COURT:

Well, as it relates to the

default.

default, yes, I think that would have been something
for the finder of fact and the conclusions as it
relates to that.

And the Court's just of the opinion

that inasmuch as there was an unreasonable delay, that
the Court has to balance the harm in this case.

And

to come in just a few days before the sale, 17 months
after the default was entered, the Court feels is
unreasonable.
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MR. OLSEN:

We'll prepare those*

THE COURT:

Now, I'm not sure which

specific equitable issues you're referring to.

If you

want me to clarify that, I will.
MR. JONES:

Recognizing the Court has made

its ruling, I think it wasn't 17 months later, your
Honor, since this notice.

The sale was noticed, I

believe, in September and that's when Mr. Martineau
came in and obtained a TRO.

He responded within a

matter of two or three months after the —

actually a

matter of three months after the closing.
THE COURT:

I don't want to go back and

argue that, but the specific dates I may be in error
on.

The default judgment was entered in March of

1993, March 5th.
MR. NELSON:

The sale was scheduled —

if

I could just jump in because I was there for the date
-- the sale was scheduled for the end of November.
Just before the sale, a motion was filed to dismiss
all the causes of action.

You issued a TRO.

We went

through the next eight or nine months of arguments.
MR. JONES:
MR. NELSON:

That's right.
Counsel, at the last hearing

we were at scheduled in October, suggested we hadn't
filed a motion to set aside the default judgment.
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indicated I didn't think it was necessary because we
had already filed a motion to dismiss heretofore, but
based upon his statement we then filed the motion to
set aside the default

judgment.

THE COURT: And that was about 17 months
after the default was entered.

What specific

equitable issues are you referring to?
MR. JONES:

Well, the estoppel issue that

we've already mentioned, I think, goes well to the
basis for setting aside the default.
THE COURT: All right, then.

I think that

you're referring to the testimony of your client that
there was a promise made that he would not be
foreclosed on.
MR. JONES:

Both that and the payment of

THE COURT:

The Court finds with regard to

rent.

the estoppel argument that in light of what happened
after that promise, and the Court finds it does not
rise to the level of a promise.

But in any event, the

Court finds that there was an unreasonable reliance
upon that promise; that if there was reliance, it was
an unreasonable reliance in light of what occurred
shortly after that so-called promise was made, and
that Mr. Martineau would not have been entitled to
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1 I rely upon that promise that he would not be foreclosed
2

upon, in light of the default judgment and in light of

3

everything else that occurred after that period of

4

time.

5

MR. JONES:

Thank you, your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

Court will be in recess.

7

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 4:03

8 I p.m.)

9 I

***

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.
Salt Lake City, Utah (801)531-0256

0 01558

r QVJ o

x A -x

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

ss .

This is to certify that the
preceding motion hearing before Judge Frank G. Noel
was taken before me, Kathy H. Morgan, a Certified
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APPELLEES' ADDENDUM NO. 14

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from afinaljudgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2),
or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

Rule 65A- Injunctions.
(a) Preliminary injunctions.
(1) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party.
(2) Consolidation of hearing. Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an
application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits
to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when this
consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a preliminary
injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes part of the trial record
and need not be repeated at the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied
as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury.
(b) Temporary restraining orders.
(1) Notice. No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party
or that party's attorney unless (A) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or
by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to
the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and
(B) the applicant or the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing as to the efforts, if
any, that have been made to give notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should
not be required.
(2) Form of order. Every temporary restraining order shall be endorsed with the date and hour
of issuance and shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record. The order
shall define the injury and state why it is irreparable. The order shall expire by its terms within
such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed
the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against whom
the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the
extension shall be entered of record.
(3) Priority of hearing. If a temporary restraining order is granted, the motion for a
preliminary injunction shall be scheduled for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes
precedence over all other civil matters except older matters of the same character. When the
motion comes on for hearing, the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall have
the burden to show entitlement to a preliminary injunction; if the party does not do so, the court
shall dissolve the temporary restraining order.
(4) Dissolution or modification. On two days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary
restraining order without notice, or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may
prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification. In that event
the court shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice
require.

(c) Security.
(1) Requirement. The court shall condition issuance of the order or injunction on the giving
of security by the applicant, in such sum and form as the court deems proper, unless it appears
that none of the parties will incur or suffer costs, attorney fees or damage as the result of any
wrongful order or injunction, or unless there exists some other substantial reason for dispensing
with the requirement of security. No such security shall be required of the United States, the
State of Utah, or of an officer, agency, or subdivision of either; nor shall it be required when
it is prohibited by law.
(2) Amount not a limitation. The amount of security shall not establish or limit the amount of
costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the restraining order or
preliminary injunction, or damages that may be awarded to a party who is found to have been
wrongfully restrained or enjoined.
(3) Jurisdiction over surety. A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits to
the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as agent upon whom
any papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. The
surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent action.
The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk
of the court who shall forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses
are known.
(d) Form and scope.
Every restraining order and order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its
issuance. It shall be specific in terms and shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by
reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. It shall
be binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive
notice, in person or through counsel, or otherwise, of the order. If a restraining order is
granted without notice to the party restrained, it shall state the reasons justifying the court's
decision to proceed without notice.
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing
by the applicant that:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or
injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the
underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject
of further litigation.
(f) Domestic relations cases.
Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in domestic
relations cases.

